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"Let there be progress, therefore; a widespread and eager progress in every century and epoch, both of individuals and of the general body, of every Christian and of the whole Church; a progress in intelligence, knowledge and wisdom, but always within their natural limits and without sacrifice of the identity of Catholic teaching, feeling and opinion."—ST. VINCENT OF LERINS, *Commonit.*, c. 6.

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THE AVESTA AND THE BIBLE.

LITERATURE.*

1. SOURCES (translations).

A. *Avesta*.

JAMES DARMESTETER—The Zend-Avesta :

Part I. The Vendidad. Oxford, 1880.

Part II. The Sirozahs, Yashts, and Nyayish. Oxford, 1883.

LAWRENCE H. MILLS—The Zend-Avesta :

Part III. Yasna, Visparad, Afringans, Gahs, and Miscellaneous
Fragments. Oxford, 1887.

These three parts form volumes IV, XXIII, and XXXI of the Sacred
Books of the East, edited by Max Müller.

CHARLES DE HARLEZ—Avesta, livre sacré du Zoroastrisme, traduit du texte
Zend. Paris, 1881.

JAMES DARMESTETER—Le Zend-Avesta, traduction nouvelle, avec com-
mentaire historique et philologique :

Vol. I. La liturgie (Yasna et Vispéred). Paris, 1892.

Vol. II. La loi (Vendidad), l'épopée (Yashts). le livre de prière
(Khorda Avesta). Paris, 1892.

Vol. III. Origines de la littérature et de la religion Zoroastriennes.
Appendice à la traduction de l'Avesta (fragments des nasks perdus
et index). Paris, 1893.

L. H. MILLS—A Study of the Five Zarathushtrian Gathas with Texts and
Translations. Leipzig-Oxford, 1892-4.

B. *Pahlavi Literature*.

Pahlavi Texts, translated by E. W. West :

Part I. Bundahish, Bahman Yasht, and Shayast-la-Shayast. Ox-
ford, 1880.

*This list does not aim at being exhaustive.

Part II. *Dadistan-i Dink*, and the Epistles of Manushkhihar. Oxford, 1882.

Part III. *Dina-i Mainog-i Khirad*, Sikand-Gumanik Vigar, and Saddar. Oxford, 1885.

Part IV. Contents of the Nasks. Oxford, 1892.

These four parts form volumes V, XVIII, XXIV, and XXXVII of the Sacred Books of the East.

2. WORKS FOR GENERAL REFERENCE.

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MARTIN HAUG—*Essays on the Sacred Language, Writings, and Religion of the Parsees*. 2d Ed., London, 1878.

WILLIAM GEIGER—*The Civilization of the Eastern Iranians in Ancient Times* (Trans.), 2 vols. Oxford, 1885-'87.

W. D. WHITNEY—*Oriental and Linguistic Studies*, Series I. New York, 1873. Ch. VI.

GEORGE RAWLINSON—*The Five Great Monarchies*. London, 1878. (Media, ch. IV).

Z. A. RAGOZIN—*The Story of the Nations*. Media. New York, 1891.

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Les Origines du Zoroastrisme, 2 vols. Paris, 1879-80.

JAMES DARMESTETER—*Ormazd et Ahriman*. Paris, 1877.

Études Iraniques, 2 vols. Paris, 1883.

FRANÇOIS LENORMANT—*Histoire ancienne de l'Orient*. Paris, 1887. Vol. V, livre VII, ch. I.

FRIEDRICH SPIEGEL—*Eranische Alterthumskunde*, 3 vols. Leipzig, 1873.

C. DE LA SAUSSAYE—*Religionsgeschichte*, Freiburg, 1889. Vol. II.

C. P. TIELE—*Kompndium der Religionsgeschichte*. Prenzlau, 1887.

3. AUTHORS TREATING OF THE RELATIONS OF JUDAISM TO ZOROASTRIANISM :

MAX MÜLLER—*Chips from a German Workshop*. N. Y., 1887. Vol. I, ch. VII.

MAX MÜLLER—*Theosophy, or Psychological Religion* (Gifford Lectures for 1892). London and N. Y., 1893. Ch. II.

T. K. CHEYNE—*The Bampton Lectures for 1889*. London, 1891. Lect. VI and VIII.

T. K. CHEYNE—"On the Possible Zoroastrian Influences on the Religion of Israel." *Expository Times*, June-August, 1891.

H. EWALD—*The Old and New Testament* (Trans.). Edinburg, 1888. p. 72-8.

A. KUENEN—*The Religion of Israel* (Trans.). London, 1875. Vol. III, ch. IX.

A. KOHUT—"The Zend-Avesta and Genesis I-XI." *Jewish Quarterly Review*, April, 1890.

- C. DE HARLEZ—Avesta, p. ccv seq.
 C. DE HARLEZ—"La Bible et l'Avesta." *Revue Biblique*, April, 1896.
 J. VAN DEN GHEYN, S. J.—"L'Avestisme et le Judaïsme." *Revue des Religions*, 1889, p. 193 seq.
 J. DARMESTETER—*Zend-Avesta*. Vol. III, p. LVII seq.
 M. BRÉAL—*Mélanges de mythologie et de linguistique*. Paris, 1877, p. 123 seq.
 FR. SPIEGEL—Vol. I, p. 446 seq. of work cited above.
 A. KOHUT—*Über die jüdische Angelologie und Dämonologie in ihrer Abhängigkeit vom Parsismus*. Leipzig, 1866.

The translation of the Avesta which appeared in the years 1852-63 from the pen of the great Iranian scholar, Friedrich Spiegel, awakened on all sides a keen interest in the ancient religion of Zoroaster.¹ Scholars engaged in the comparative study of religions turned their eyes eagerly to this new field of investigation and sought out diligently the development of ancient myths and the parallel forms of religious belief and practice. From the very first they did not fail to remark the many striking points of resemblance between the religious system of the Avesta and that of the Bible. The doctrines touching belief in angels, demons, and the future life offered the closest analogy. And as these elements seemed to have the merit of priority in the Avesta, and only in the later parts of the Bible to receive explicit recognition, it was generally concluded by non-Catholic scholars that their presence in the Old Testament was due to the influence of Zoroastrianism.

One of the first to give expression to this conclusion was a scholar of Jewish descent, Alexander Kohut, who published at Leipsic, in 1866, a small pamphlet² in which he sought to trace the origin of the Jewish belief in angels and demons to the religion of Zoroaster. Similar views were expressed by Bréal³ and many others, and soon became part of the accepted opinions of less conservative scholars.

¹The more correct, but less popular, name is Zarathushtra.

²"Über die jüdische Angelologie und Dämonologie in ihrer Abhängigkeit vom Parsismus."

³"*Mélanges de mythologie et de linguistique*." Paris, 1877, pp. 123-126.

The notion that the Jewish religion (and consequently the Christian) is indebted to the religion of the Avesta for its doctrines on angels, demons, and the future life has held its own down to the present day. While some scholars like Ewald¹ and Cheyne² hold that the development, but not the origin of these doctrines, was dependent on Zoroastrian influences, a far greater number speak of their derivation from Zoroastrianism as of an established truth.³

The "New World" of March, 1895, contains two independent expressions of this latter view. In his article entitled "The Devil," Dr. Charles C. Everett says: "It is now generally admitted that the Jews received from the Parsees during the Captivity in Babylon the questionable gift of the devil."⁴ And a few pages further on, Dr. L. H. Mills, the eminent Iranian scholar, says: "The entire mass of hagiology, demonology and perhaps of minute ceremonial distinction between clean and unclean, came in upon the Jews from the Persian theology, and with them came a strong assertion of those doctrines of resurrection, immortality and Paradise on the one side, and of Satan, judgment and Hell on the other, which slowly drove the old Sadducean simplicity to its extinction."⁵

In a previous article, "Zoroaster and the Bible," published in the "Nineteenth Century" for January, 1894, he drew out a detailed comparison between the Avesta and the Bible, and concluded that while the Scriptures far surpass the Avesta in grandeur and religious fervor, still the "religion of the Mazda-worshippers was useful in giving point and body to many loose conceptions among the Jewish religious teachers, and in introducing many ideas which were entirely new, while as to the doctrines of immortality and resurrection, the most important of all, it positively determined belief."⁶

¹"Old and New Testament Theology," Edinburgh, 1888, pp. 72-78.

²Bampton Lectures, 1889, London, 1891, pp. 269-272 and 390-402. Cf. Kuenen, "Religion of Israel," London, 1875, II, 156.

³Compare the more guarded statement of de la Saussaye, *Religionsgeschichte* II, p. 2, with the words of Tiele, *Komp. der Religionsgeschichte*, pp. 100 and 197. Cf. also Bellangé, "Le judaïsme et l'histoire du peuple juif," pp. 281-282. The Jewish religion, he says, is "constamment imitatrice de la persane."

⁴p. 11.

⁵"The God of Zoroaster," *New World*, '95, p. 51. Cf. his *Introd. to the Gathas*, p. xlv, in S. B. E. XXXI.

⁶p. 57.

Those who accept conclusions like these and still cling to some form of Christianity, have been led to adopt a new view of the origin of the Jewish religion. They can no longer hold with consistency that the religion of Israel came wholly from the revelations of God to his chosen prophets. They are obliged to assume that in some respects the religion of Iran surpassed in clearness of vision that of Israel itself, and thus became in Divine Providence the medium whereby new fundamental truths of religion became known and embraced by God's chosen people. This is the stand that Dr. Mills has taken. In the article just referred to, he seeks to justify his position in the following words: "To state what is intended to be the keynote of the present communication, I would say that any, or all, of the historical, doctrinal, or hortative statements recorded in the Old or New Testament might, while fervently believed to be inspired by the Divine Power, be yet traced, if the facts would allow of it, to other religious systems for their mental initiative; that the historical origin of particular doctrines or ideas which are expressed in the Old or New Testament does not touch the question of their inspiration, plenary, or otherwise."¹

This language is startling to the Catholic ear. The question naturally presents itself, Do the ascertained facts of the early Jewish and Zoroastrian religions necessitate so radical a position? Can it be demonstrated with certainty that the religion of the Avesta has contributed any of its doctrines to the theology of the Bible? It is the attempt to solve this interesting and important problem that has given rise to the present essay.

In order to carry out this purpose systematically, we shall 1) take note of the translations that have been made of the various parts of the Avesta; 2) study the nature of their contents; and 3) examine at length whether the analogies existing in the Bible can be reasonably derived from the Avesta.

I.—THE TRANSLATIONS OF THE AVESTA.

It is from the Zoroastrians of India that the European world obtained its first knowledge of the sacred literature composing the Avesta. They were the chief surviving remnant of

¹p. 45.

the Persian people that remained true to the religion of their fathers. To escape the religious persecution of their Arab conquerors, they migrated into India in the tenth and following centuries, and formed settlements on the northwest coast, from the Gujerat peninsula to the neighborhood of Bombay. They were known as the Parsees, i. e., Persians, or Guebers, the name given to the conquered Persians by the Arabs. Here, under the sky of religious toleration, they soon developed into a prosperous people, and by the exclusiveness of their religious life kept intact their blood, social customs and religious practices. They have preserved their identity to the present, being now about ninety thousand in number.

The opening of India to European commerce brought the Parsees in contact with British merchants, one of whom secured a manuscript of their sacred books liturgically arranged¹ and sent it to England in 1723. It was chained to the wall of the Bodleian library and remained for years an object of idle curiosity.

The honor of making its precious contents known to European scholars belongs to the French savant, Anquetil Duperron. When a young student at the University of Paris, passionately devoted to Oriental studies, he was shown a short extract, copied from the Bodleian manuscript, which no one could yet decipher. His interest was aroused at the sight of a script so mysterious and at the same time so venerable from its association with the name of Zoroaster, and he made up his mind at any cost to bring to France the glory of producing the first translation of this precious relic of antiquity. The story of his romantic departure for India, of his six years of unremitting struggle against hardships and difficulties, crowned at last with the acquisition of the sacred traditions of the Parsees, is told in interesting and circumstantial style in the first volume of his translation. In 1762 he returned to Paris with one hundred and eighty precious manuscripts in his possession. After nine years more of close application to the study so courageously begun, he gave to the world the fruit of his long labors. The work, consisting of three quarto volumes, bore the title: "*Zend-Avesta, ouvrage de Zoroastre, contenant*

¹ Vendidad Sadah.

les idées théologiques, physiques, et morales de ce législateur, les cérémonies du culte religieux qu'il a établi et plusieurs traits importants relatifs à l'ancienne histoire des Perses.'"

At its first appearance it was bitterly attacked by Sir William Jones, then a young student at Oxford. He declared the Zend-Avesta a forgery and accused Anquetil of being either a fraud or a dupe. But sound criticism soon rallied to the defense of Anquetil's cause and secured it a complete triumph. His work became authoritative in matters pertaining to Zoroastrianism; for the authenticity of the Avesta having been made good, no one presumed to question the accuracy of his translation.

But it was just here that Anquetil's work was defective. The Parsee priests were almost entirely ignorant of the original language, commonly called the Zend, in which the Avesta was composed, and their knowledge of the Pahlavi tongue, the parent language of modern Persian, into which the Avesta had been translated and paraphrased in the period preceding the Arab conquest, was lamentably defective. Sanskrit was not yet known to European scholars, and thus Anquetil was committed to the faulty teachings of his masters without any means of verification.

The scholar who opened the way to the scientific knowledge of the language and contents of the Avesta was the great orientalist, Eugène Burnouf. With his remarkable genius for grammatical analysis, quickened by a profound knowledge of Sanskrit, he detected that Anquetil's interpretation of the Zend text was at best but a paraphrase marred by many inaccuracies. Luckily there existed among the manuscripts brought from India by Anquetil a Sanskrit version made by an Indian dastur¹ of the thirteenth or fourteenth century on the Pahlavi translation of the Yasna, the sacrificial book of the Avesta. It was thus only a version of a version, but it carried one back to the time when the knowledge of the Avesta was based on a fairly trustworthy interpretation, the ancient Pahlavi versions and commentaries. With the aid of this version Burnouf was able to penetrate into the grammatical construction of the Zend, analyze more than one thousand of its words

¹ Neryosangh. A dastur is a Parsee priest versed in Avestan studies.

and give an intelligent and truly scientific translation of the first nine chapters of the Yasna.¹

The work so magnificently begun by Burnouf was carried on by a worthy successor, Friedrich Spiegel,² who, after profound studies in Pahlavi, Zend and Sanskrit, brought out his German version of the Vendidad in 1852. Seven years later appeared the translation of the Visparad and the Yasna, followed in 1863 by that of the Khorda Avesta. Spiegel's translation was a vast improvement over that of Anquetil, and gave in the main a faithful interpretation of the Avesta. But owing to the rudimentary condition in which he found the science of Zend and Pahlavi, his work was to a large degree tentative and marred by vague and inaccurate expressions.

The method followed by Burnouf and Spiegel did not hold undisputed sway. It was sharply opposed by the so-called Vedic school, which numbered among its members brilliant scholars like Kuhn, Roth, and Haug. Following in the steps of the eminent linguist, Franz Bopp, they took the close resemblance of Zend to Sanskrit to be a mark of dependence, and looked upon the Avestan religion as a schism from the Vedic. They protested against the Parsee tradition as utterly untrustworthy, and insisted on the method of comparison and inference based on data supplied by the Vedas. The traditional school, however, did not reject the aid of Sanskrit philology and of Vedic mythology and ritual; but they rightly refused to commit themselves exclusively to a method so subjective, involving, as it did, the practical denial of an independent historical development in the Avestan language and religion.

The Vedic school did not produce a complete translation of the Avesta. The one who accomplished the most in this respect was Martin Haug, of the University of Munich. Haug brought out a translation of the Gathas, the most ancient portion of the Avesta, in the years 1858-1860.³ His preconceived notions as to the intimate dependence of the Avesta on the Vedas led him into many errors of judgment, so that his version

¹ Eugène Burnouf, "Commentaire sur le Yaçna." Paris, 1833.

² "Avesta aus dem Grundtexte übersetzt, mit steter Rücksicht auf die Tradition." 3 Bde. Leipzig, 1852-1863.

³ "Die fünf Gatha des Zarathustra." 2 Bde. Leipzig, 1858-1860.

is, in not a few instances, inaccurate and misleading. The voyage he made to Bombay, soon after the publication of this work, was the means of converting him to a more reasonable appreciation of Parsee tradition.

Until the year 1876, Spiegel's translation held its own as the only complete version of the Avesta worthy of consideration.¹ But in that year appeared the French translation of the Belgian priest and scholar, Mgr. Charles de Harlez. It was entitled "*Avesta, livre sacré du zoroastrisme, traduit du text zend.*" It was published in three successive detachments, and so great was the appreciation of its merit that the second volume was exhausted before the third appeared. This led to a second edition in 1881, carefully revised and amplified with notes, indexes, and a masterly introduction to the study of the books and of the religion of the Avesta. The learned author followed the method adopted by Spiegel, but by a skillful use of the advances made in Avestan studies, to which he contributed not a little himself, he produced a work that stands far above that of his illustrious predecessor.

While de Harlez was busy with his translation, two other scholars were at work on a rendering that would afford English readers a reliable means of access to the thought of the Avesta. Thus far the only available work in English was Bleek's translation of Spiegel, published in 1864. With the advance in Iranian scholarship, the need of a new and independent version was felt. The University of Oxford had already matured its plan of bringing out, under the judicious direction of Max Müller, uniform and trustworthy versions of the sacred books of the East. In 1877 the great Zend scholar, James Darmesteter, was commissioned to make the translation of the Avesta. Three years later appeared his translation of the Vendidad, with an excellent introduction,² followed in 1883 by that of the Sirozahs, Yashts and Nyayish.³ This part of the work was excellently done and met with general approbation. But when requested to finish the work by bringing out the Yasna and Visparad, he declined on the ground that he was not yet

¹In the years 1858-62 there appeared in Berlin a translation in Polish and French on a new plan of the Zend-Avesta, corrected into the name *Zenddaschta*. The author, M. Pietraszewski, failed to shed honor on his name.

²S. B. E. IV.

³S. B. E. XXIII.

sufficiently prepared. These two books, he maintained, being liturgical, could not be properly interpreted till one was thoroughly acquainted with the religious rites they presupposed. Again the Yasna presented unusual difficulties on account of the archaic and abstruse hymns it contained.

The task refused by Darmesteter was accepted by Dr. L. H. Mills, now of Oxford. His translation of the Yasna, Afringans, Gahs, and various Fragments¹ which appeared in 1887, was the fruit of ten years' diligent study of the Avesta in the Pahlavi and Sanskrit versions, no less than in the original. But his work, valuable as it is, cannot be pronounced a masterpiece. Not to speak of his tendency to read his own ideas of spirituality into the obscure Gathic text,² his style of translation is anything but happy, being heavy, unnatural, and saturated with antiquated words such as yea, aye, ye, verily, and the like. This, together with the excessive use of parentheses, tends to weary rather than interest the reader.

In declining the invitation to translate the Yasna, Darmesteter did not renounce the laudable ambition to give to the world a complete translation of the Avesta. After his fruitful studies in Bombay in the years 1886-'87, armed with the precious results of West's studies in the Pahlavi literature, he set himself to the task of translating the entire Avesta into French. In 1892 he brought out the first two volumes under the title, "*Le Zend Avesta, traduction nouvelle avec commentaire historique et philologique par James Darmesteter.*" These beautiful quarto volumes, forming the twenty-first and twenty-second volumes of the *Annales du Musée Guimet*, and containing the Liturgy (Yasna and Visparad)³ and the Law (Vendidad), the Epic hymns (Yashts), and the Book of Prayer (Khorda Avesta)⁴ were followed next year by the third volume,⁵ containing a learned discussion on the formation of the Avestan literature and religion, translated fragments of lost books of the Avesta, some prayers of the modern Parsees, and two comprehensive indexes.

This work is a masterpiece of scholarship and literary

¹S. B. E. XXXI.

²Cf. Y. 30; also introd. to Y. 28. S. B. E. XXXI.

³Vol. I.

⁴Vol. II.

⁵Vol. 24 of the *Annales du Musée Guimet*.

style. The smoothness and elegance of its diction, not absent even in the obscure Gathas, would never lead the casual reader to suspect the many difficulties that hampered the progress of translation. Iranian scholars have lavished praise on its accuracy and on the fullness of information scattered through the work in copious notes and special dissertations. It stands at the head of the translations of the Avesta, and though doubtless destined to many minor corrections with the advance of Iranian studies, will rank as a classic in the literature of oriental philology.

It is thus chiefly through the versions of Darmesteter, Mills and de Harlez, that scholars unacquainted with Zend have access to the ideas contained in the Avesta. In the main outlines they are at one, but they do not agree in many points of detail, some of which, if placed beyond doubt, would be of great importance for doctrinal study. This disagreement is most prominent in the Gathic hymns.

As an illustration of the uncertainty of meaning that prevails in this portion of the Avesta, it is worth while to compare the series of versions which Mills, de Harlez, and Darmesteter give of Yasna 30:4. In his article on "Zoroaster and the Bible" Mills bases his assertion that heaven and hell are, according to Gathas, little more than mental states on the following version: "The two spirits came together at the first, and determined how life at the last shall be ordered, for the wicked (Hell), the worst life; for the holy the best mind (Heaven)."¹

Compare this with de Harlez' version; "(Let me say) this, too, that these two spirits met at the first to create life and death and the final lot of the creature; (these two spirits who are) the bad spirit of the wicked, and the good spirit of the just."²

Darmesteter gives another variation: "And these two spirits met at the creation of the first individual, (bringing) life and death; and so will it be till the end of the world, the wicked belonging to the Bad Spirit, pious thought to the Good."³

¹ "Nineteenth Century," 1894, p. 54. Cf. S. B. E. XXXI p. 25. In his Hampton Lectures, p. 398, Professor Cheyne gives expression to this view of Mills as if it were an unquestioned feature of Zoroastrian theology.

² Trans. from Avesta, p. 321.

³ Trans. from Zend-Avesta, I, p. 221.

Divergencies like these are unfortunately but too common. Let the curious reader take any one of the Gathic hymns and compare the versions of Mills, de Harlez and Darmesteter, and he will be struck by the varieties of meaning that present themselves on every page. In other portions of the Avesta the uniformity is greater, but by no means perfect.

The conclusion that forces itself on every thoughtful mind is, that in the reconstruction of the early Avestan religion those renderings alone offer a trustworthy basis which are common to the three translators. A fair amount of probability may be assigned to meanings supported by two of them, especially if one of these two be Darmesteter. But it would be rash to attach to the text a reliable meaning where the three translators are at odds with one another.¹

II.—THE AVESTA AND ITS CONTENTS.

The Avesta of to-day, which is but a remnant of the twenty-one sacred nasks or books that existed during the Sassanian dynasty (226-652 A. D.), comprises the following parts:

1. The Yasna and Visparad, two books making practically one and constituting the liturgy of the public sacrifice.
2. The Vendidad, the book of the laws of purification and exorcism.
3. The Yashts, prayers of praise in honor of the supreme God Ormazd and his created deities.
4. Four small collections of prayers for minor devotions. They are the Gahs, prayers for different parts of the day and night; the Sirozahs, prayers for the days of the month; Afringans, prayers for certain festivals of the year; and the Nyayish, devotions to certain deities of nature. These four collections, together with the preserved fragments in Zend of the lost nasks, are often grouped together under the title Khorda Avesta, or Little Avesta. The exact application of this term is not fixed, for it sometimes excludes the Sirozahs, sometimes the Yashts, as well as a number of short prayers, which are nothing more than extracts from different parts of the Avesta.²

¹ For this reason Max Müller is at fault in concluding from his (and Haug's) doubtful version of Yasht 1: 8 (accepted neither by de Harlez, Darmesteter nor West), that Ex. III, 14, "I am that I am," is probably an interpolation of Avestan origin. Cf. Gifford Lectures, 1892, p. 55.
² Darm. "Zend-Avesta," III, p. xxxiii. and xxxiv.

THE YASNA.¹

The most important part of the modern Avesta is the Yasna, the Sacrifice. It is a book of liturgical prayers and invocations to accompany the supreme act of worship in honor of Ormazd and his creation. This ceremony is still performed by the Parsees. It is not a bloody sacrifice. The principal offering consists of the sacred drink Haoma, a slightly inebriating juice crushed out of the stems of the Haoma plant, and like its Vedic equivalent Soma, supposed to give both physical and spiritual strength to him who drinks of it. It is not consumed clear. In the mortar with the Haoma sprigs are also crushed some twigs of pomegranate, and to this mixture are added a few drops of milk and of water, both being duly blessed with sacred rites. This consecrated mixture, known as Parahaoma, is supposed to contain the concentrated virtue of the water, plant, and animal creation. It is consumed by the celebrating priest with great reverence.

This sacred liquid of the sacrifice offers a certain, though very distant analogy, with the consecrated wine in the sacrifice of the Mass. In like manner, reminding one of the consecrated bread of the Mass, are the so-called Draona, small round wafers of bread, which, with butter or fat, are solemnly offered to Ormazd and his Yazads,² and then consumed by the priest and faithful after the manner of a communion service. The butter or fat doubtless stands as the survival and substitute of the ancient annual victims.³

There are offerings, besides, of choice wood and incense for the sacred fire, whose flame, personified as Atar, the son of Ormazd, is symbolic of the Creator; and, lastly, there are libations of consecrated water mingled with a few drops of Parahaoma and poured in part on the so-called Baresma, the bundle of blessed twigs representing the vegetable creation, and in part into the well adjoining the place of sacrifice as an offering to the waters.

It is the prayers that accompany the preparation and con-

¹ The references to the texts are according to Darmesteter's French translation, which alone will be designated by the name *Zend-Avesta*.

² *i. e.*, inferior deities worthy of veneration.

³ *Zend-Avesta* I, pp. lxxv-lxxvi.

summation of these various offerings that make up the book Yasna.

Of the seventy-two chapters composing this book, a large number are lacking in originality. They consist to a great extent of monotonous litanies, in which the various elements of the sacrifice are announced, consecrated, and offered up to Ormazd and his many Yazads, and abound in quotations and imitations. By far the most interesting portion is the middle part, comprising chapters 11-58. The bulk of these chapters is written in an archaic form of Zend that is found nowhere else in the Avesta. These are the so-called Gathas, or songs, the most ancient portion of the Avesta.

The Gathas, in the strict sense of the term, consist of but seventeen hymns, arranged in five groups by reason of their different kinds of meter.

Besides these, which for convenience sake may be designated as the lyric Gathas, there are a number of prayers composed in the same archaic dialect and likewise known as Gathas¹ in the later parts of the Avesta. They are four short metrical formulas which play an important rôle in the Avestan rites, and a series of seven prayers in prose, called the Gatha of the Seven Chapters. This prose Gatha is of more recent origin than the lyric Gathas themselves.²

The fact that the lyric Gathas are the most ancient records of the Zoroastrian religion, gives them an importance that the other parts of the Avesta cannot claim. Let us then examine their contents first and see what they set forth.

The first thing that strikes us is the profoundly spiritual conception of the supreme deity. This deity, sometimes called Ahura,³ Lord, sometimes, Mazda,⁴ Knowing One, more commonly, Ahura Mazda,⁵ (Ormazd), Omniscient Lord, is the one supreme God,⁶ creator and lord of the world,⁷ having called it into being by his thought.⁸ As his name Mazda implies, he knows all things, he cannot be deceived; he sees the hidden thoughts of men, and takes account of all they do.⁹ He is the Spenta Mainyu, the bountiful spirit, who has provided pastures

¹Cf. Vend. 10:4, 10, 12.

²Cf. S. B. E. XXXI, 281.

³Y. 28: 6, 8.

⁴Y. 28: 1, 2.

⁵Y. 28: 3, 4.

⁶Y. 34: 7.

⁷Y. 31: 7, 8; 44: 7.

⁸Y. 31: 11.

⁹Y. 43: 6; 45: 4, 10; 31:13. Cf. 29: 4.

and cattle for the good of man.¹ He is the source of prosperity, happiness and immortality.² He is the friend of the good,³ the judge and rewarder of good and evil.⁴ He is holy in thought, word and action.⁵

Ormazd is not alone in his work of sustaining and directing the world. Associated with him, but depending upon him, are six spirits known in the prose Gatha⁶ and the later Avesta as the Amesha Spenta (Amshaspands), the Undying Beautiful Ones. These spirits, which seem at times to be mere abstractions, but which are also addressed as distinct personalities,⁷ are constantly invoked together with Ormazd, their lord and creator. They are: Vohu Mano, the Good Mind; Asha Vahista, Excellent Virtue; Khshathra Vairya, Desirable Sovereignty; Spenta Armaiti, Bountiful Piety; Haurvetat, Health, and Ameretat, Immortality. At times they seem to be poetic personifications of graces bestowed by Ormazd on the faithful, for they are given to men and dwell in their hearts.⁸ The Amshaspands are sometimes spoken of as if they were on a level with Ormazd himself, appearing more as emanations of his own spirit than as separate personalities.⁹ At other times they seem to fulfil the office of archangels, bringing the souls of the deceased faithful to heaven,¹⁰ rewarding their good actions,¹¹ overcoming the evil spirit,¹² watching over the herds,¹³ and giving increase to the earth.¹⁴

Quite like these Amshaspands, though by no means so frequently mentioned, is the personified abstraction, Sraosha, Obedience or Faith. In Y. 44:16 he is invoked, together with Vohu Mano. Like the Amshaspands, he watches over the faithful and provides for their spiritual and temporal welfare.¹⁵

Of a wholly different character is the mythical genius that is mentioned in the beginning of the twenty-eighth chapter and assumes a conspicuous rôle in chapter twenty-nine. This is Gaush Urvan, the divinized soul of the primitive ox. It was the first of the animals to be created, but having been slain by the evil spirit, its soul became the tutelary genius of cattle. In the twenty-ninth chapter it lifts its voice in complaint to

¹Y. 47: 3. ²Y. 34: 1. ³Y. 45: 11; 46: 2. ⁴Y. 43: 5. Cf. 30: 8, 10. ⁵Y. 45: 8.
⁶Y. 35: 1; 39: 3. ⁷Y. 28: 1, 3, 4; 47: 1-3. ⁸Y. 30: 7, 8; 31: 21; 32: 2; 34: 1. ⁹Y. 33: 11; 23: 5, 9;
 29: 10. ¹⁰Y. 32: 15. ¹¹Y. 28: 8; 46: 18. ¹²Y. 44: 14; 48: 1. ¹³Y. 28: 1; 48: 6. ¹⁴Y. 38: 11.
¹⁵Y. 23: 5; 43: 12.

Ormazd, in behalf of the herds maltreated by wicked plunderers, and hearing that Zoroaster has been appointed protector, laments that one so powerless should have been chosen.

The beneficent reign of Ormazd is not universal. It is prevented from exercising full sway by the powers of evil. Here we are brought face to face with, perhaps, the most striking and distinctive feature of the religion of the Avesta, its dualism. Whether this dualism was the result of Chaldean influence,¹ or was simply the development of a tendency discernible in the primitive Aryan religion,² one thing is certain, namely, that special stress was laid upon it in early Zoroastrianism. The opening stanzas of chapter thirty, which is devoted to the exposition of dualism, might well have been applied to the introduction of a new and important teaching.³

The doctrine of dualism in the Gathas is as follows. Equally eternal with the good spirit is the spirit of evil. From the beginning these two spirits have been absolutely opposed to each other in thought, word and deed.⁴ The one is the giver of life and immortality, the other is the author of death. The one is the promoter of peace and prosperity, the other of strife and rapine. The one brings truth and virtue to men, the other falsehood and wickedness.⁵ Hence the good spirit is said to have declared to the evil spirit, "Neither our thoughts nor our teachings, nor our minds, nor our desires, nor our words, nor our deeds, nor our consciences, nor our souls are at one."⁶ The very names of these two spirits designate their absolute opposition in character. The one is called the beneficent spirit, the good (principle); the other is called the bad (principle), in the later Avesta, *Angro Mainyu* (*Ahriman*), the destroying spirit.⁷

Just as Ormazd is assisted in his work of beneficence by the *Amshaspands* and *Sraosha*, so *Ahriman* has at his command evil spirits called *Daevas*.⁸ Of these three are mentioned by name in the Gathas. They are 1°) the *Druj*, Deceit, the demon especially opposed to *Asha*;⁹ 2°) *Akem Mano*,

¹ For dualism in Chaldea see Lenormant, *Histoire ancienne de l'Orient*, V, 194.

² Cf. Darmesteter *S. B. E.* IV., p. lvii. and lxxxi. Cf. Ormazd et Ahriman, p. 337.

³ The same remark applies to beginning of ch. 45, which treats also of dualism.

⁴ Y. 30:3. ⁵ Y. 30:4, 6, 11, cf. 45:1, 7, 8, 9. ⁶ Y. 45:2. ⁷ Y. 30:3; 32:5; 45:2.

⁸ Y. 30:6; 32:3. ⁹ Y. 30:9 44:14; 48:1.

Bad mind, the antithesis of Vohu Mano, Good Mind;¹ and 3°) Aeshma, Fury, whose personality, however, is not so strongly marked in the Gathas as in the later Avesta.² Such then are the spiritual forces ranged against each other, Sraosha and the Amshaspands under Ormazd on the one side in increasing conflict with Ahriman and his Daevas. This great struggle is particularly centered about man.

In the Gathas, man is not a creature of fate, led by force of events to be a follower of Ormazd or of Ahriman. There is no predestination to good or evil. The wicked spirits try to seduce every individual and make him an abettor of evil like themselves. But Ormazd counteracts their evil designs through his revealed law of truth and justice. This law is not meant exclusively for a specially favored nation. It is Ormazd's will to bring all men to the knowledge of his revealed truth.³ Even the Turanian, the deadly enemy of the followers of Zoroaster, is not absolutely excluded.⁴ In short, it rests with the free choice of every man to which side he shall belong.⁵ Those who choose the right path of holy thoughts, holy words, and holy actions are not left to themselves in the struggle with the powers of evil. Mazda sends them his Good Mind and Excellent Virtue, and Power and Wisdom,⁶ so that they may know what is right and have the strength to accomplish it.⁷ On the other hand, those who give way to wicked actions, to the delight of the Daevas, are cut off at once from the friendship of Ahura Mazda. "They become estranged from the Good Mind and fall away from the understanding of Ahura Mazda and of holiness."⁸

There is thus no middle way of compromise. Man cannot serve two masters so opposite in character and aims. He must belong wholly to Mazda or to Ahriman. "They who know, O Mazda, that Holy Wisdom is thy love, and for lack of possessing the Good Mind give themselves up to sin, are as far removed from Virtue (Asha) as are the wild beasts."⁹ Nor is it a question of external conduct alone. Just as Ormazd is opposed to Ahriman in thought as well as in word and deed, so the man who would claim Ormazd's friendship must be

¹Y. 32:3; 47:5.²Y. 30:6; 48:7; 49:4.³Y. 31:3.⁴Y. 46:12.⁵Y. 30:2.⁶The first four Amshaspands.⁷Y. 31:21; 32:2; 33:10; 34:1; 43:4, 10.⁸Y. 32:4.⁹Y. 31:9.

faithful to him in spirit no less than in action.¹ The importance of interior piety is implied in the name borne by one of the Amshaspands, Vohu Mano, Good Mind, in opposition to Akem Mano, Bad Mind. Evil thoughts are frequently mentioned in the Gathas as one of the elements of wickedness.²

One of the most striking features of the theology of the Gathas is its eschatology. Here the joyous, optimistic character of Zoroastrianism comes clearly into view. The ray of religious hope shines upon the sharp conflict with the powers of evil. Falsehood and oppression may win present success, but final victory is on the side of religious truth. Time will come when the Druj and the Daevas shall be brought to naught and justice shall reign over the renewed earth.³ Meanwhile virtue and vice will not go unrewarded. Even in this life piety is rewarded with happiness and prosperity.⁴ But it is especially after death that the full demands of justice will be satisfied. Then every soul will be requited according to its earthly deeds. Those who have lived in fidelity to Ormazd's holy law will pass in safety over the Kinvat bridge and enter into the house of Ormazd to receive the rewards in the gift of Vohu Mano and to enjoy a blessed immortality.⁵

Not so the wicked, the followers of the daevas. They shall be seized with terror as they behold the Kinvat bridge, over which no guilty soul can pass in safety.⁶ They shall go down instead, into the abode of the Druj, where darkness and wailing and noisome food shall be their portion.⁷

We have already alluded to the Gathic doctrine of the coming renovation of the world, when the powers of the evil will be destroyed and justice will reign supreme over the whole earth. This renovation of the world, the Frasho-kereti, includes in latter parts of the Avesta the idea of the resurrection.⁸ But whether this extension of meaning also attaches to the term as employed in the ancient Gathas⁹ is far from decided. Darmesteter, following the opinion of Haug,¹⁰ attributes to the word the meaning of the resurrection. In accordance, also, with the traditional interpretation of the Parsees,

¹Y. 31:21. ²Y. 49:11; 32:5; 45:2; 30:3. ³Y. 30:8-10; 31:4; 34:15; 48:1-2 (de Harlez and Darmesteter). ⁴Y. 43:2; 51:8. ⁵Y. 46:10; 30:10, 11. ⁶Y. 46:11. ⁷Y. 49:11; 31:20. ⁸Yasht 19:89-90; Vend. 18:51. ⁹Y. 30:9; 34:15. ¹⁰Haug, *Essays*, p. 312-13. *Zend-Avesta*, I, p. 255.

he sees allusions to the doctrine of the resurrection in the vague expressions, "the day of the grand affair,"¹ "the hour of the great trial."² But both de Harlez and Mills understand these latter texts as referring to the preaching of the law. Mills attributes to the expression *Frasho-kereti* the meaning "millennial perfection,"³ and de Harlez, while giving it a similar meaning, "renovation of the world," expresses his conviction that it is a mistake to conclude from these texts that the Gathas teach the resurrection.⁴

When we pass from the lyric Gathas to the prose Gatha, and to the rest of the Yasna, we find ourselves in a different atmosphere. The lyric Gathas, while partly didactic, are in great measure religious outpourings of the soul to Mazda and his Amshaspands, in acts of faith, of trust, of thanksgiving, of petition, of benediction for the faithful, and of imprecation on the wicked. There is no reference to liturgical rites, nothing to indicate that these prayers were originally meant to be the accompaniment of a sacrifice. In the rest of the Yasna the prayers, with a few exceptions, have a liturgical form, with direct reference to the sacrifice.

But even greater than the change of form is the difference in the subject-matter. The religious system of the lyric Gathas becomes greatly complicated by the intrusion of a host of divinized virtues, prayers, and elements of nature which claim a part, as Yazads of Ormazd, in the prayers and sacrifices of the faithful. Still this difference may be more apparent than real. It may be, indeed, that the religious system that gave birth to the Gathas was not so free from these inferior elements as would appear from the Gathas themselves. These prayers are too short and too few, too limited in their purpose and scope, to give a complete picture of the religion to which they belonged. Had they been less personal and more liturgical, they would doubtless have revealed some at least of the inferior elements that we find in the rest of Yasna. The religious conceptions of the Gathas undergo scarcely any change in the remaining parts of the Avesta.⁵ The dualism and the personality of the Amshaspands become more strongly emphasized, but that is all. Ormazd remains the supreme

¹Y. 30:2. ²Y. 36:2. Y. 33:5. ³S. B. E. xxxi, p. 90, note 6. ⁴Avesta, p. clxxxv.

⁵There are poetical exaggerations in Vend. 22:2 seq.; also Yasht 5:17; 15:2.

Lord and Creator in the midst of the multitude of Yazads that share in his worship. Then, again, it is to be noted that the lofty spirituality of the Gathas is not without a flaw. It is marred by the presence of the Gaush Urvan, the soul of the mythical ox who pleads for the maltreated cattle. This example, together with the reference to the mythical hero, Yima,¹ and to the fabulous Kinvat bridge ought to make us guarded in our estimate of the superiority of the Gathic religion over that of the rest of the Avesta.

In the prose Gatha, the three elements, earth, fire, and water are the objects of religious veneration.² The fire is personified as Atar, the son of Ahura Mazda, and is addressed in petition like a real personality.³ The fact that retribution is pronounced on those who treat it ill shows that the obligation of not soiling the fire, as laid down in the Vendidad,⁴ was already recognized. It is probable, but not open to proof, that similar obligations existed towards the other two elements, the earth and the water.

Another striking feature of the prose Gatha is the worship of the souls of the just, whether dead or alive or not yet in existence, and of animal souls as well.⁵ By these are probably meant the Fravashis, mentioned for the first time in the third prayer of the prose Gatha,⁶ and often identified with the souls of men.

In the other parts of Yasna, the nature of the Fravashis comes more prominently into view. It is generally argued that the Fravashi-cult had its origin in the remote ancestral worship of the Aryans.⁷ In Yasna 16:7 and many other places⁸ the word is used of the souls of the dead. But by a change, due perhaps to Babylonian influence,⁹ the idea of Fravashis outgrew the narrow limits of the Pitris of the Indian Aryans and of the Manes of the Latins, and embraced the notion of genii or angels, whose object it was to watch over their respective charges. In this sense every man and animal has its Fravashi, and in the thirteenth Yasht, devoted to the praise of these genii, even the sky, waters, earth, plants and fire are similarly provided for. And by a further exten-

¹Y. 32:8. ²Y. 36 and 38. ³Y. 36:3. ⁴Vend 7:25-27; 8:73-74. ⁵Y. 39:1-2. ⁶Y. 37:3.
⁷Zend-Avesta, II, p. 502-3; Avesta, p. CXIX. ⁸Cl. Y. 29:7. ⁹Avesta, pp. CXIX, CXXV.

sion, in which the protective character of the Fravashi has doubtless disappeared, Ormazd and the Amshaspands have their Fravashis as well.¹

The beneficial character of the Fravashis is abundantly shown in the Yasna. They were the dreaded enemies of the Daevas and were invoked as the "invincible, victorious Fravashis of the just."² They kept the laws of nature in orderly working. They brought the waters to the fertile meadows.³ They looked after the heavens and the earth, the rivers and the herds, and promoted the growth of the infant yet unborn.⁴ Hence, we find them invoked as "the good, the powerful, the beneficent Fravashis of the just."⁵ The thirteenth Yasht describes these offices much more completely than the Yasna, and tells of their readiness to rush in crowds to the assistance of the good man who invokes their aid.

Among the few Yazads mentioned in the lyric Gathas we find Sraosha, Obedience. His personality is much more strongly defined in the fifty-seventh chapter of the Yasna. Here he appears as the heavenly priest and warrior. He is worshipped as the first to offer the Haoma sacrifice to Ormazd and to sing the Gathas,⁶ as the protector of the weak against Aeshma and the Daevas, whom he puts to flight, smiting them with his weapons.⁷ His eternal watchfulness over the good creation is praised, and prayer is addressed to him to shield the faithful from the assaults of the Daevas and to give increase of prosperity.⁸

Scarcely less prominent than Sraosha is the river goddess Ardvi Sura Anahita, the High, Powerful, Undeiled One. Whether she is the personification of a mythical or of a real stream is not certain. It is not unlikely that some river of Iran may have given a basis for the personification which religious fancy converted in the course of time into something totally independent of its origin. Be that as it may, de Harlez sees in the offices of the goddess traces of Assyrian influence. In his view, Ardvi Sura, originally an Iranian water goddess, assimilated the characteristics of Mylitta, the Assyrian goddess of moisture and generation. This change he ascribes to

¹Y. 20:2; 67:2
and 20.

²Y. 1:18; 4:6.

³Yv. 6-14.

⁴Yv. 25 ff.

⁵Y. 65:6.

⁶Y. 67:1.

⁷Y. 26:1 cf. 60:4.

⁸Yv. 1-7.

Artaxerxes, who introduced statues of this goddess.¹ If such be the case, the sensual features of the Assyrian cult were carefully suppressed. Ardvi Sura Anahita is the goddess of chaste fecundity. She purifies the elements of human generation, provides for a happy childbirth, and gives milk to the mothers' breasts. She likewise brings fertility to the fields and causes the herds to increase.² The fifth Yasht, which glorifies this goddess, tells also of her great power to confound the Daevas.

There is another Yazad to which considerable prominence is given in the Yasna. It is Haoma, the personification of the sacred liquid offered in sacrifice. The so-called Hom-Yasht, comprising chapters 9-11:15, is devoted to his honor. His favorite epithet is "death-removing."³ In chapter 9, he appears to Zoroaster in the form of a beautiful youth, and in answer to the questions of the prophet, tells who were the first to worship him and what were their rewards.⁴ Vivanghant was the first, and in reward was born to him Yima, the illustrious shepherd, under whose reign there was neither heat nor cold nor old age nor death nor envy.⁵ The second was Athwya, who was recompensed by the birth of his son Thraetona. He slew the most powerful of Ahriman's creatures, Azhi Dahaka, the dragon with three throats, three heads, six eyes and a thousand powers.⁶ The third worshipper was Thritha, to whom was born Keresaspa, the slayer of the horned dragon, Azhi Svara, streaming with poison, which devoured horses and men.⁷ The fourth worshipper was Pourushaspa, whose son, Zoroaster, vanquished the demons with the Ahuna Vairya prayer.⁸ Haoma is then besought in a long series of prayers to bring manifold blessings to the faithful and to paralyze the wicked efforts of Daevas and of hostile men.

Along with these Yazads are worshipped many others in the Yasna, though they do not figure so prominently. Many of them are personified abstractions, as Rashnu and Arshtat, Truth and Loyalty, Verethraghna, Victory, Daena, Religion and others. Other Yazads are Mithra, the Friend, as his name implies, one of the ancient Aryan light-gods, invoked

¹ *Avesta*, p. cvi. ² Y. 65:1-2. ³ Y. 9:2; 10:21; 42:5. ⁴ Y. 9:1-2. ⁵ vv. 4-5. ⁶ vv. 6-8.
⁷ vv. 9-11. ⁸ vv. 12-15.

as the "lord of wide fields, with a thousand ears and ten thousand eyes,"¹ the dreaded enemy of the Daevas, the great judge and avenger of wrong, especially of violated contracts;² then objects of nature, as the Sun, the "swift-horsed, the eye of Ormazd;"³ the Moon, the Stars, and in particular the brilliant and glorious star Tishtrya.⁴ All of these Yazads, excepting the Stars taken collectively, are honored by special Yashts.

To the names of the demons mentioned in the Gathas very little addition is made in the rest of the Yasna. Besides the mythical dragons mentioned in the Hom-Yasht, Vidhotu is named the demon of death, who is said in Vendidad 5:8, 9 to kill those who perish in water or fire.⁵ The personality of Aeshma is strongly emphasized. He is called "Aeshma with the deadly weapon."⁶ Shaosha, the defender of the faithful, deals him a murderous blow on the head with his weapon, assailing him as he would a robber.⁷

The Visparad is little more than a supplement of the Yasna. Its twenty-four Kardas or chapters are unimportant for doctrinal study, being composed entirely of monotonous litanies of liturgical invocations, in which all the Yazads, without exception, are duly commemorated. Hence the name Visparad, All the Lords. This book does not represent an independent liturgy. Its prayers are never said alone, but serve as an adjunct to the prayers of the Yasna to give greater solemnity to the sacrifice. At such times its Kardas are interspersed through the Yasna, some chapters of which are then omitted to give place to the more elaborate elements of the Visparad.

THE VENDIDAD.

Almost equal in importance to the Yasna, and surpassing it in interest, is the book of the law, the Vendidad. As its name implies, (*vi-daevo-datem*, the law against the Daevas), it warns the faithful of the ways in which one falls under the power of the Daevas, and teaches the corresponding means of removing their baneful presence. In other words, it treats of the causes of contamination and the laws of purification.

¹Y. 1:3. ²Cf. Yasht 10. ³Y. 1:11 ⁴Y. 1:11. Tishtrya is the star Sirius. ⁵Y. 57:26.
⁶Y. 10:8; 27; 57:31. ⁷Y. 57:10 and 31.

Written in the form of a dialogue, it sets forth its various teachings as if they were the direct answers of Ormazd to the questions put by Zoroaster. These teachings, which are embodied in twenty-two Fargards or chapters, are not arranged in systematic form, nor do they all belong strictly to the subject-matter that is the object of the book to discuss. A few of them are altogether of a mythical character. Thus, chapter one tells how the sixteen lands created by Ormazd were successively blighted by the evil spirit Ahriman. In chapter two we read of the wonderful enlargement of the earth by Yima, and of the way in which he saved specimens of every kind of life from the killing snow and cold that laid waste the fair face of the earth. How Zoroaster resisted the seductions and assaults of the Dævas and learned of Ormazd the rite of purification, as well as the fate of the soul after death, as told in the nineteenth chapter, while the twentieth and twenty-second give account of the divine origin of medicine and of the deliverance of Ormazd by the heavenly prayer Airyaman from the 99,999 diseases created by Ahriman.

The remaining chapters are mostly devoted to practical rules of conduct. Their lack of systematic arrangement and their many repetitions and variations of the same topics give them the appearance of a patchwork composed by different hands. The contents may best be summarized by ignoring the order of chapters and by making a logical classification.

By far the most prominent subject in the legislation of the Vendidad is the proper treatment and disposal of the dead. This subject occupies most of chapters five to twelve, inclusive, as well as part of chapter three, and embraces the treatment of the corpse from the time of death to its exposure to the birds of prey,¹ the different lengths of mourning for the relatives,² the defilements from various kinds of contact with the dead and the modes of purification for persons and objects defiled,³ the prayers and spells necessary for their purifications,⁴ the crimes attaching to unauthorized attempts to purify,⁵ and to forbidden ways of dealing with corpses of men and dogs.⁶

¹Vend. 5:10-14; 6:14-51; 7:50-59; 8:4-13, 23-25.
28-35, 45-49, 73-77; 8:1-3, 14-22, 35-107; 9:1-122.
6:10-25; 7:20-27; 5:60-62; 8:23-25, 73.

²Ch. 12.

³Ch. 10-11.

⁴5:1-7, 27-38; 6:1-9, 26-43; 7:1-22

⁵9:47-57.

⁶3:8, 14-21, 36-42;

The proper isolation and purification of mothers of still-born babes and of women in their monthly sickness are also set forth, the former in chapters 5 and 7,¹ the latter in chapter 16.² Sexual intercourse at such times is branded as criminal.³

The proper way to dispose of the detached portions of the hair and nails occupies a whole chapter;⁴ so also special prayers against demons of sickness for women in labor.⁵

A number of chapters in whole or in part are devoted to teaching the sacred character of the animals especially effective against demons, namely, dogs, the hedgehog, the beaver, and the cock. Instructions are given on the care due these animals, and the penalties are laid down for the crime of killing or maltreating them.⁶

Lastly, scattered through many chapters are condemnations of different sins against chastity,⁷ religion,⁸ and justice,⁹ as well as a number of topics having a less direct bearing on the main purpose of the Vendidad. Among these may be mentioned the enumeration of certain kinds of contracts,¹⁰ rules for the probation and recompense of physicians¹¹ and for the recompense of the cleansing priest,¹² the praise of agriculture and cattle breeding,¹³ of prolific marriage, and the condemnation of asceticism.¹⁴

To appreciate properly the legislation of the Vendidad we must understand the religious mind in which it was conceived. It was a mind deeply influenced by the idea of dualism. To the Zoroastrian, creation was not all the work of Ormazd. Only what is good came from his hands. Evil, both physical and moral, was the counter-creation of the malignant Ahri-man, who from the very beginning was led by his wicked nature to oppose every good work of Ormazd. Thus the universe was divided into two great armies at continual war with each other. Ranged on the side of Ahri-man were the Daevas in the invisible order, and in the visible, winter, drought, disease and death, noxious plants and animals. Among the latter were serpents, lizards, toads and frogs, ants and flies, spiders and locusts.¹⁵ Hence to destroy them as far as possible was a

¹5:45-62; 7:60-72; ²16:1-11. ³15:7-9; 16:13-18; 18:67-76. ⁴Ch. 17. ⁵Ch. 21. ⁶Ch. 13, 14, 15, 3-6 and 19-51; 18:13-29. ⁷8:29-32; 18:60-65. ⁸4:46, 49-55; 15:2; 18:1-17, 30-59. ⁹4:1-43; 15:9-19. ¹⁰4:2, 4, 44-45. ¹¹7:36-44. ¹²9:37-44. ¹³3:2-6 and 23-33. ¹⁴3:33; 4:47-49. ¹⁵1:3, 5, 7, 14:5-6 and 18:73.

work beneficial to the good creation, a work pleasing to Mazda.¹ Penances for sins committed often included the destruction of a certain number of these khrafstras, as they were called.

It was against man, the noblest part of Ormazd's visible creation, that the powers of evil were especially directed. Ahriman could not create bad men as he created noxious animals and plants; but he could turn men into his agents and make them demons incarnate by persuading them to forsake the paths of truth and virtue. By deeds of wickedness men not only become demons; they cause other demons to multiply. Their very presence helped to stunt the growth of good animals and plants.² Hence the Daevas were ever trying to seduce the faithful into sin.

But even those who withstood the evil suggestions of Ahriman were not secure against his malignant influence. If he could not destroy their souls he could at least injure their bodies by inflicting them with different forms of disease, often resulting in death. He could do even worse than this. He could so defile the faithful worshipper of Mazda with the spirit of uncleanness and corruption as to blot out in him the glory of the good creation and cause him to blight every good thing with which he came in contact.

This contamination of the faithful was effected in several ways. One of the most common was the uncleanness produced in every woman by the monthly sickness, which was a creation of Ahriman's, and one of the most powerful sources of defilement.³ A menstruous woman, being possessed by an unclean spirit, was unfit to come near any clean object until the demon was driven forth by special purifications. Hence the heinousness of sexual intercourse at such times.

Another form of this uncleanness, even more to be dreaded, was that arising from contact with the dead. Not all corpses were the sources of this kind of demoniacal possession, but only those of Mazda-worshippers and of dogs. The wicked followers of the Daevas were possessed in life by the unclean spirits, so that at death their corpses had no further attrac-

¹ Priests always went about armed with the khrafstraghna, an instrument for killing such animals. Cf. Vend. 18:2; 14:8, also Herodotus 1:140.

² 14:5-6; 18:13. ³ 7: 26-27; 8: 31-32; 18: 62-64. ⁴ 1: 18, 19; 16: 11.

tions for them. But not having full power over the faithful, nor over the dogs, whose very look was more than the strongest fiend could bear, they seized the opportunity at death to enter into their corpses and contaminate them. There was one demon whose special office it was to take possession of all such corpses. It was Nasu, Corruption. On the death of every faithful Mazdean this demon lodged itself in the remains. The way to expel the fiend was to bring a dog close to the corpse and let it fix its gaze intently upon it. Before this ceremony, called by modern Parsus the *Sag-did* (Dog-gaze), it was dangerous to be near the corpse, for at the slightest contact the foul Nasu would rush out from its lurking place into the body of the person and pollute him from head to foot.

A similar form of uncleanness, but of a degree even more dreadful, was that contracted by a woman bringing forth a still-born babe, for her contact with the Nasu-stricken corpse was more prolonged and more intimate.

Such persons, defiled with Nasu, like the woman defiled with the demon of menstrual uncleanness, being sources of contamination, had to be isolated till they were exorcised and purified. This rite of purification, which lasted nine nights, was rendered effective by spells and exorcisms, accompanied by the *Sag-did*, and by sprinklings of *gomez*¹ and of water. These sprinklings were made systematically on all parts of the body, from front to back, from right to left, beginning at the head and moving gradually downwards, till at last the Nasu was expelled from the left toe. It was supposed to depart toward the north in the form of a raging fly.²

A less degree of uncleanness was that contracted by touching a corpse already submitted to the *Sag-did*. This kind of uncleanness, which was always communicated to the carriers of the corpse, could be removed by a simple washing with *gomez* and water. The purification of vessels, clothing, and other articles contaminated was effected in the same manner.

Corpses of men and of dogs remained unclean till they were reduced to dry bones. And as the three elements (earth,

¹Ox's urine.

²8:35-72; 9:1-36. The North, the region of cold and darkness, was the home of the evil spirits. Cf. Vend. 8:16, 21, 71; 7:2; 19:1.

water, and fire) were sacred parts of Ormazd's creation, it was a great crime to pollute these elements by burning or burying corpses or throwing them in water. The only proper way to dispose of the dead was to allow them to be devoured by beasts or birds on the top of hills, or, better still, within open towers called Dakhmas, built especially for this purpose. Some of the greatest crimes in the Zoroastrian code were offenses against this law of disposing of the dead. To carry a corpse alone was equally criminal, for in such instances the spirit of uncleanness took such forcible possession of the person that exorcism was utterly impossible. Death was the penalty for all such offenses.

As it was a good religious work to destroy as many Khrafstras as possible, so was it wrong to do anything that would lead even indirectly to their increase. Now it was thought that nail-parings and detached hairs when lodged in cracks in the floor and other lurking places bred various insects that ate up the corn in the fields and clothes in the wardrobe.¹ And so it was a religious duty not to throw them carelessly on the ground, but to bury them carefully in little holes, reciting over them certain formulas to keep off the daevas.

The multiplication of the Khrafstras could also be favored by maltreating the creatures of Ormazd that were thought to be especially adapted to their destruction. Foremost among these were the hedgehog, the beaver, and dogs of all kinds. To kill them or withhold them help and shelter when in distress was accounted a great crime. A preternatural power over demons was also ascribed to them. A good instance of this is the use they made of the dog to drive the Nasu from corpses and from persons affected with certain kinds of uncleanness. A similar power made the cock an object of religious reverence, for by his crowing he awakened the faithful at daybreak to their religious tasks and drove away Bushyasta, the long-fingered demon of sloth, who strove to keep the living world asleep and prevent the performance of good works.

From this summary it is plain that the religious code of the Vendidad was a logical outgrowth of the principle of dualism. While marred with superstitious exaggerations, it

¹172-3.

taught a standard of moral conduct that justly excites admiration both for its completeness and its depth. It did not rest satisfied with external conduct; it insisted on the conformity of the will to the right order established by Ormazd.¹ The vices to which the people of the Orient were so prone, prostitution, abortion, unnatural lusts, were forbidden under the severest penalties. Fidelity to contracts, chastity, kindness to the poor, and industry were especially inculcated. It is the noblest code of morality to be found outside of the Bible.

THE YASHTS.

The word Yasht, like Yasna, means worship, sacrifice. It is applied to the collection of poetic and imaginative prayers, abounding in legendary lore, that were composed at a comparatively late period, in praise and adoration of Ormazd and his chief Yazads. Strictly speaking, they are but twenty in number. But in the same collection are included four other chapters of a didactic character.

The Yashts extol the power of their appropriate Yazads to bring blessings to the faithful and to smite Ahriman and his agents of wickedness. The advantage as well as the duty of offering them sacrifice is indirectly set forth by the enumeration of the legendary heroes who sacrificed to them in petition for certain boons and who received their request.² This lesson of religious worship is given even greater force by the example of Ormazd himself, who did not disdain to offer sacrifice to some of these deities,³ though they all owe their existence to his own creative power.

Of these Yashts the most poetic and interesting are the fifth, the eighth and the nineteenth. The fifth Yasht, in honor of the water-goddess Ardvi Sura Anahita, has the most complete account of the legendary heroes who offered sacrifice. It may have served as the model for the others. Another interesting feature of this Yasht is the detailed description of the dress and ornaments of the goddess.⁴ The character of this description led de Harlez to the surmise that it was no mere creation of the author's fancy, but a description of a

¹Cf. Vend. 18:17.

²Cf. Yasht 5:16-118; 9:32; 10:124; 15:41; 16:3-15; 17:24-52.

³Yasht 5:16-19;

8:25; 10:124; 15:2-4.

⁴Vv. 120-129.

statue.¹ And as statues of Anahita were first introduced into Persia and Media by Artaxerxes Mnemon (404-361 B. C.), he concluded with a fair amount of likelihood that this Yasht was not composed before the fourth century B. C.

The eighth Yasht is the most poetic of all. It describes how the star-god Tishtrya manifests himself in the forms of a lovely youth, of a golden-horned bull, and of a beautiful white horse, promising an abundance of children, herds, and horses to those who gave him sacrifice. Then follows the description of the fierce battle which, as a white horse, he fights with the black horse-demon of drought, Apaosha. At first he is worsted after a three days' conflict, but strengthened by a sacrifice offered him by Mazda, he overcomes the demon, and plunging into the sea, churns the waters into a seething mass till the rain-clouds rise and bring refreshing moisture to the parched lands.

The nineteenth Yasht is chiefly occupied with the history of the kingly glory, a sort of brilliant nimbus created by Ormazd. A source of wisdom and a badge of authority as well, it abided with those destined to rule and teach the people. It was beyond reach of the unworthy, and passed from king to king when death or evil deed gave occasion for the change. The history of the transition of the kingly glory from Haoshyangha, the first king, through his long line of successors to Zoroaster and his royal protector Vishtaspa, embraces a number of interesting legends.

The last four chapters of the book of Yashts are quite different from the rest in character and contents. Of these, by far the most striking is the one which describes the different fates of the good and the bad soul after death. For three nights the departed soul hovers about its lifeless body, enjoying unspeakable pleasure or suffering the utmost misery, according as its earthly life was good or wicked. At the dawn of the fourth day the faithful soul is met by his conscience in the form of a beautiful young maiden, who praises him for his good deeds on earth. Passing in three steps through the regions of good thought, good word and good action, he enters into the paradise of boundless light, the home of Ormazd, and

¹ Avesta, p. cxviii. Darmesteter is of the same opinion. Zend-Avesta II, 364.

feasts on the heavenly food prepared for the blessed. On the other hand, the wicked soul is conducted through the three regions of bad thought, bad word and bad action into the hell of boundless darkness, where Ahriman bids him eat of the noxious, foul-smelling food set apart for the wicked.

This same doctrine finds summary expression in the nineteenth chapter of the Vendidad.¹

There is another side of Avestan eschatology, which, as belonging to the later portions of the Avesta, and more particularly to the Yashts, may be fittingly considered here. It is the developed notion of the renovation of the world.

The Gathas themselves, as we have seen, speak of the day when the powers of evil shall be destroyed and the earth shall be renewed. But there is nothing positive in these passages to show that the idea of the resurrection was in the mind of the author. It is not till we come to the later parts of the Avesta that we find the notion of the resurrection plainly connected with that of the final renovation. Even then there are but three independent passages that refer to the resurrection in unmistakable terms.²

In the first of these, Vend. 18, 51, the idea of the resurrection is only indirectly expressed: "O Spenta Armaiti,³ I give this man to thy keeping. Restore him on the day when the world shall be happily renewed." *Quoted*

The other two passages are direct and explicit. The one is Yasht 19:88-89 and runs as follows: "We sacrifice to the awful Kingly Glory, created by Mazda, which will abide with the victorious Saoshyant and his friends, when he will make a new world, above the reach of sickness and death, decay and corruption . . . when the dead shall arise, when immortality shall come to the living, when the world shall be fittingly renewed."⁴

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⁵Zend Avesta, III, 5. ⁶Ahriman.

hide himself beneath the earth ; beneath the earth will the Daevas hide themselves. The dead will arise, life will return to the bodies, and they will be endowed with breath."

Closely associated with the resurrection is the notion of the Saoshyant or Savior. It is he who will break the power of Ahriman and the Daevas and will lead in the universal reign of happiness and peace. He is destined to be the direct son of Zoroaster, whose seed, miraculously preserved in the Lake Kasava and guarded by nine thousand nine hundred and ninety-nine Fravashis, will cause the Virgin Eretat-fedhri to conceive while bathing in its waters. It is only in the Pahlavi literature that a full and connected account of the Saoshyant is given, but the chief elements are to be found here and there in the later portions of the Avesta.¹

THE KHORDA AVESTA.

The Khorda Avesta, a sort of Book of Common Prayer, is the least important and the least original part of the Avesta. The prayers, with but few exceptions, are made up of extracts from other books, especially from the Yasna and the Yashts, and thus betray their comparatively late origin. While omitting, then, a detailed examination of these prayers as unnecessary for our purpose, we may note, in passing, the liturgical object of the prayer called the Afringan Gahanbar, the Gahanbar Benediction. This rite was performed on each of the six Gahanbars, religious feasts of five days' length that were celebrated at different intervals in the year to commemorate the six great acts of creation. The order of these commemorations recalls strikingly the process of creation in the first chapter of Genesis, namely, the heavens, the waters, the earth, the plants, the animals, and man.²

III.—RESEMBLANCES BETWEEN THE BIBLE AND THE AVESTA. DISCUSSION OF THEIR ALLEGED AVESTAN ORIGIN.

The points of resemblance between the Avesta and the Bible are numerous and striking.

1. Like Jehovah, Ormazd is the supreme and all-wise spirit, the Creator of the visible and invisible universe, the Sustainer

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of its wonderful order, the source of all holiness and prosperity. This noble conception is marred, however, by the dualistic idea, according to which his supremacy is limited by the evil spirit Ahriman and his hostile creations.

2. Ormazd, like Jehovah, is not alone in the government of the world. He has a host of ministering spirits, the Amshaspands, the Fravashis and the other Yazads, to execute his plans for the maintenance of due order in the physical world and for the preservation of his holy law in the hearts of men.

3. As the perfect order of Jehovah's creation is marred by the evil designs of Satan and his agents, so the creation of Ormazd is subject to the blighting influence of Ahriman and the Daevas. In both religions evil spirits possess human beings and produce different forms of disease.

4. Just as Jehovah sends His prophet Moses to teach His holy law to the chosen people, and thus establish His kingdom on earth, so in like manner Ormazd reveals his holy law to Zoroaster and makes him his divinely authorized prophet to teach the law to men. Both religions thus claim to be divinely revealed. Each has as its founder a great prophet and law-giver, and to make the analogy still more striking, Zoroaster, like Moses, is no mighty warrior or king, but a man of weakness.¹

5. The Old Testament enkindles hope in the Messiah, who is to be born of a virgin, and who will establish the eternal reign of peace. The Avesta teaches that in the fulness of time a virgin will conceive of Zoroaster's seed, miraculously preserved in the waters of Kasava, and will give birth to the Saoshyant, who will destroy the powers of evil and bring about the final renovation of the world.

6. In regard to the state of the soul after death, Mazdeism is even more explicit than early Judaism. One of the most striking things in the earliest books of the Old Testament is the absence of appeal to rewards and punishments after death as a sanction of conduct and as a ground of religious consolation. Throughout the whole Avesta the future life, with its rewards and punishments, is constantly kept in view.

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resurrection. As we have already seen, it is open to question whether the earliest part of the Avesta, the Gathas, contains traces of this belief. It is only in the latest portions of the Avesta that the resurrection is referred to in unmistakable terms.

8. According to Genesis, God created the universe in six days. According to the Avesta, Ormazd created the world in six periods within the space of a year. The order of these creations, commemorated as we have seen by the six Afringan Gahanbars, very nearly coincides with that of Genesis, namely, heaven, waters, earth, plants, animals, man.¹

9. Corresponding with the deluge of Genesis is the winter of snow and cold in Vendidad.² Yima, the Mazdean Noah, saves life on the earth from utter destruction by building an underground garden, in which he puts choice specimens of men and of all kinds of animals and plants.

10. In the moral order the similarities are striking. In the Old Testament there are abundant instances to show that the law of holiness did not simply concern external conduct, but laid hold of the will and the heart.³ But it remained for the teaching of Christ to bring this feature out into striking prominence. Now, it is remarkable that the Avesta, even in its most ancient hymns, lays great stress on the internal element of the religious and moral life, and speaks constantly of good and bad thoughts, words and actions.⁴

The Mazdean, like the Jewish religion, teaches the dignity of labor, kindness to the poor, favors prolific marriage, denounces all forms of unchastity, especially those against nature.⁵

11. In both religions great stress is laid on the distinction between clean and unclean. The division of animal and plant creation into the creatures of Ormazd and those of Ahriman, finds its parallel in the Old Testament division of animals into clean and unclean.⁶ Both religions likewise teach that con-

¹Zend-Avesta, I, 37.

²Ch. 2.

³Cf. Gen. VI, 5. Deut. V, 21; XV, 9. Ezek. XXXVIII, 10. Prov. XII, 5; XV, 20; XXIV, 9.

⁴In Ps. XVI, 3-5, this threefold distinction is recognized.

⁵It is debated whether incestuous marriages of the first degree are favored by the Avesta proper, though it was practised at times in Persia. Cf. Darm. Zend-Avesta I, p. 126 seq.; West S. B. E. XVIII, p. 389 seq.; Contra, de Harlez, Avesta, CLXXI.

⁶Cf. Levit. XI.

natural phenomena in Mazd & ...

tact with the dead, childbirth, the menstrual flow in woman and the seminal flow in man are the sources of uncleanness.¹ The unclean communicates his defilement to whatever person or thing he touches. Especially heinous is sexual union with a woman in her monthly sickness.² In both religions there are laws of purification for persons and things defiled, an especial form of purification being required to remove uncleanness resulting from contact with the dead.³

12. One of the resemblances pointed out between the Avesta and the New Testament is the temptation of Zoroaster compared with that of our Blessed Savior. Ahriman, having tried in vain to kill Zoroaster, offers him the dominion of the earth if he will renounce the law of Mazda, but the saint repels the tempter and declares his readiness to accept death rather than prove false to his Maker.⁴

13. The other is the analogy pointed out by Bréal⁵ and others between the seven-headed dragon⁶ of the Apocalypse and the three-headed dragon of the Avesta, Azhi Dahaka. The identification of the apocalyptic dragon with "that old serpent who is called the devil and satan, who seduceth the whole world,"⁷ has also given rise to the surmise that the serpent of Genesis, too, has something in common with the Avestan dragon.

These are the main points of resemblance between the two religions, but to make the comparison complete we may note a number of analogies found in the Pahlavi literature, but derived doubtless from some of the lost nasks of the Avesta.

14. One of these analogies is the story of Mashya and Mashyoi, the first human pair, from which the human race is descended. Like Adam and Eve they sinned and fell under the power of the evil spirit.⁸

15. The Gaokerena, the White Haoma Tree, whose leaves, eaten by men at the renovation of the world, will give immortality, reminds one of the Tree of Life in Genesis. As the latter was guarded by cherubim, so the Gaokerena, growing in the water, is guarded by ten fish.⁹

16. The apportioning of the earth by the hero Thraetona

¹Cf. Lev. XII and XV. ²Lev. XV, 24; XX, 18. ³Cf. Num. XIX. ⁴Vend. 19:6-7.
⁵Mélanges, p. 126. ⁶Ch. 12. ⁷Apoc. 12:9. ⁸Bundahish, 15; S. B. E., V, 52 seq. ⁹Bund. 18:62; S. B. E., V, 65.

to his three sons, Airya, Sairima, and Tura, recalls the division of the earth by Noah between his three sons, Sem, Cham, and Japhet.¹

17. Finally, the story of Joshua stopping the sun is paralleled by that of Hushedhar, one of the future sons of Zoroaster. He stops the sun for ten days and nights and thereby wins the nations to the religion of Mazda.²

Having thus reviewed the many points of resemblance between the Avesta and the Bible, it remains for us to examine critically the question whether the latter is under obligation to the former for the possession of any of these common features.

It is well at the very outset to bear in mind a truth that is very often lost sight of in the comparison of different forms of religion. That truth is, that similarities of belief in different religions do not necessarily imply identity of origin, or indebtedness of one of these religions to the other. Where no historical influence can be shown, it is extremely rash to attribute to an earlier religion the credit of originating certain features that it has in common with a later one. By forgetting this principle writers have often been led into egregious blunders. Note, for example, the attempt to derive the teachings of the New Testament in great measure from those of Buddhism on the ground of the striking resemblances existing between them. The attempt is now recognized by the best Oriental scholars as an utter failure. The words of Prof. Rhys Davids on the subject are worthy of citation. He declares: "Very little reliance can be placed without careful investigation on a resemblance, however close at first sight, between a passage in the Pâli Pitakas and a passage in the New Testament. It is true that many passages in these two literatures can be easily shown to have a similar tendency. But when some writers, on the basis of such similarities, proceed to agree that there must have been some historical connexion between the two, and that the New Testament as the latter must be the borrower, I venture to think that they are wrong. There does not seem to me to be the slightest historical connexion

¹Dinkart VIII; Ch. 139; S. B. E. XXXVII, p. 28.

²Bahman Yasht, III, 45-48; S. B. E., V, 231-2.

ion between them. And whenever the resemblance is a real one . . . it is due not to any borrowing on the one side or on the other, but solely to the similarity of the conditions under which the two movements grew."¹

Now it is just such a mistake as this that writers like Dr. Mills and Dr. Everett commit when they conclude, the one that the temptation of Zoroaster furnished the model for the story of Christ's temptation,² the other that the dragon of the Apocalypse is identical with Azhi Dahaka.³ The story of Christ's temptation has no more dependence on the temptation of Zoroaster than on that of Buddha.⁴ In like manner, the Apocalyptic dragon has as little connexion with Azhi Dahaka as with the Babylonian dragon of Tiamat⁵ or the Egyptian serpent Apap.⁶

The great majority of the features that the Old Testament has in common with the Avesta are so plainly mentioned in the oldest parts of Sacred Scripture and are so closely knit with what is distinctive and essential in the Jewish religion as to leave no doubt of their independent origin. Such are the monotheism of the Old Testament, the revelation of the law through Moses, the promise of the Messiah, the moral teachings, the stories of the creation, of Adam and Eve, of the Tree of Life, of the Deluge, of the division of the earth among the three sons of Noah, of Joshua staying the sun.⁷ This much is admitted by all. But, as we have seen, many scholars declare that the Jewish conceptions of angels, demons, immortality, future rewards and punishments, and the resurrection are the result of Persian influence. To them Dr. Mills adds the distinction of clean and unclean. Their argument is as follows:

Before the period of the Captivity there is no evidence that these common doctrines formed part of the Jewish belief.

¹S. B. E., XI, p. 165-6. Cf. Oldenberg, *Buddha*, p. 126, n. 1; Kuenen, *Hibbert Lectures*, 1882, p. 334-7.

²*Nineteenth Century*, 1894, p. 52-53.

³*New World*, 1885, p. 15.

⁴Cf. Oldenberg.

⁵Lenormant, *Hist. Ancienne de l'Orient*, V, p. 243.

⁶Tiele, *Geschichte der Religion im Alterthum*, p. 33; de la Saussaye, *Religionsgeschichte*, I, p. 283.

⁷See above Nos. 1, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17.

But during and after the Captivity they receive recognition in the Sacred Writings. Now, this was the very time when the Jews were brought into close contact with the Persians, whose religion, as set forth in the Avesta, taught these very doctrines in unmistakable terms. And so the only natural inference is that the Jewish religion is indebted for this part of its creed to the Persian.

The argument, at first sight, looks plausible. A close examination, however, shows it to be far from convincing.

In the first place it should be noted that some of these tenets, while presenting points of resemblance, are yet, in other respects, so utterly at variance as to make it doubtful whether the one could have been directly borrowed from the other. Take for instance the notion of unclean animals in Leviticus. How different it is, in spite of striking resemblances, from that of the Vendidad. In Leviticus, the unclean as well as the clean animals are recognized as God's creatures. The distinction of clean and unclean is based largely on physical differences. In the Vendidad, on the other hand, the unclean animals are all those created by the evil spirit. Nor is the application of the notion of clean and unclean the same in both legislations. Thus Leviticus forbids as unclean the eating of the camel¹ and the swine,² but allows the eating of locusts and grasshoppers.³ On the other hand, locusts and grasshoppers were an abomination to the Mazdean,⁴ while camels⁵ and swine⁶ were looked upon as clean.

If we compare the notion of Satan with that of Ahriman we find the one by no means identical with the other. Both agree in that they are hostile to God and bent on seducing man and doing harm to God's creation. But here the parity ends. Satan is a fallen creature of God, destined to live forever, but shorn at last of his power to do evil. Ahriman is a spirit evil by nature, uncreated like Ormazd himself, but destined to final destruction. Satan's power for evil is only what God chooses to allow him. Ahriman's is independent of Ormazd and is more dreadful. Satan can only mar what God has created. Ahriman can do more. He can create demons,

¹XI., 4. ²XI., 7. ³XI., 21, 22. ⁴See above. ⁵Vend 22:3. ⁶Shayast la Shayast II., 58, in S. B. E., V. 200.

noxious animals and plants. So different, in short, is the notion of Satan from that of Ahriman that Ewald, who attributes the development of Jewish doctrine partly to Zoroastrian influence, declares of Satan: "But the whole conception is Hebrew: to trace it to Persian sources is groundless and unhistorical."¹

But the theory under review has far greater difficulties than these to contend with. It is plain that if it is to make good its claims to trustworthiness, it must establish beyond doubt two very important points. It must demonstrate, first, that the Persians, in the period of contact with the Jews, held the religious tenets which they are supposed to have contributed to the theology of the Old Testament; secondly, that no trace of these doctrines can be found in the books of the Old Testament written before this period of contact.

Now, it is significant that neither of these points is capable of rigorous proof; nay, the evidence against the second point is so strong as to render the theory in the highest degree improbable.

First of all, the important question presents itself, when did the Jews, who formed the Old Testament, come into close contact with the Persians? This is a question which is often overlooked, and yet its solution is of the greatest value in the present discussion. Thus it is often taken for granted that the Jews were brought under Persian influence during the Captivity. We have already quoted Dr. Everett, who considers it a generally admitted truth that the Jews of the Captivity received their notion of Satan from the Parsees. But it is plain that during the Captivity the Jews were exposed to Babylonian, not to Persian, influences. During this entire period the relations between these two monarchies were strained. It was not till Cyrus overthrew Babylon in 539 B. C. that intimate relations between the Persians and the Jews of Babylon were possible, and even then we must allow for a certain length of time before the religion of the Persians could begin to exert its influence on that of the Jews. It is thus out of the question to speak of Persian influence before the end of the Captivity, 536 B. C., nor is it at all likely that such

¹Old and New Testament Theology, p. 72.

influence could have made itself felt at so early a date. But for the sake of argument, we may assume that the period of Persian influence began at the close of the Babylonian captivity.

Now, what sort of religious influence could the Persians of that period have exerted on the Jews? Did they themselves include in their religious belief those doctrines which the Jews are declared to have borrowed from them? This capital question does not admit of a positive answer. Those who speak so confidently of the indebtedness of the Old Testament to Persian theology generally take it for granted that from the time of Cyrus onward the religion of Persia was identical with the religion of the Avesta. But this very point has never yet been demonstrated. On the contrary, it has been seriously called in question by scholars of great ability. Professor Sayce¹ and Halévy² have both put forth the thesis that Cyrus was no Mazda-worshipper at all, for Babylonian cylinders have been found in which he is put on record as a worshipper of Babylonian gods.³ To this conclusion Professor Cheyne has also given full assent, and says: "We now know that the Aryan and Zoroastrian element did not obtain supremacy in the Achaemenian empire till the accession of Darius, too late to exercise any marked influence on Jewish modes of thought."⁴

But even if we admit with Kuenen⁵ and others that Cyrus, like Darius, was a Mazda-worshipper, it by no means follows that the Achaemenian kings were Zoroastrians.⁶ The original home of the Avesta is still a matter of dispute among Iranian scholars. Some place it in Media, others in Bactria or some other eastern province of Iran.⁷ But one thing is certain, it did not take form in Persia. Neither the language of the Gathas nor that of the later Avesta can be classed with the Persian dialects.

The religion of the Avesta was thus an importation into Persia, doubtless insignificant at first, but rising gradually in importance till it finally overshadowed the old belief and be-

¹Cf. Academy, Oct. 16, 1880, pp. 276-7. ²Revue des études juives, No. 1, pp. 41-63.

³Cheyne, Prophecies of Isaiah, II, pp. 289-91, also I, pp. 305-306; de Harlez, Avesta CXXIII.

⁴Prophecies of Isaiah, II, p. 394.

⁵Hibbert Lectures, 1882, p. 320.

⁶This is patent in the case of Cyrus. The worship of strange gods was an abomination to the Zoroastrian.

⁷Cf. de la Saussaye, II, pp. 17-18.

came itself the religion of state. When this important movement was accomplished is still a problem for Iranian scholars. But according to many, it did not take place before the time of Artaxerxes. Inscriptions of this king and of his predecessors, Xerxes and Darius, are still extant on the royal tombs at Nackhs-i-Rustem and on the rocks of Alvand, Behistun, and on the ruins of Persepolis, Murghab, Khorkor and Susa.¹ While professing to be faithful followers of Anramazda, they make no mention of the Amshaspands or of Ahriman, and at the same time provide for their burial in tombs, a hideous abomination for the Zoroastrian. In the face of such evidence de Harlez, and even Mills, conclude that the state religion of Persia during this period could not have been that of the Avesta. In his work on the Avesta² he submits this question to a long and detailed examination, and sums up the results of his study as follows: "The conclusion which plainly results from this long investigation is that in all the texts of antiquity touching on the religious belief and practices of the Persians, one may look in vain for a word pointing to the influence of the Avesta within the empire of the Achæmenidae. On the contrary, everything goes to show that its prescriptions were entirely unknown, that the people were ignorant of its rites and ceremonies. The religion of ancient Persia was Iranian, but not Avestan."³

Dr. Mills, who treats the subject more succinctly in his introduction to the Gathas,⁴ thinks the religion of the inscriptions may have been a form of Mazda-worship similar to that of the Gathas, "but that it was the later and fully developed Zarathushtrianism, provided with all the regulations of the Vendidad, seems out of the question."⁵ His embarrassment in accounting for the unavestan language and practices of Darius reveals itself, when he says, "He was either a heretical schismatic departing from a sacred precept, or he was following the creed of his fathers, a Mazda-worshipper, but not of Zarathushtra's order, or if a Zarathushtrian, then a partial inheritor of Zarathushtra's religion at an undeveloped stage, when burial was not as yet forbidden by it; and at the same

¹Mills, *New World*, 1895, p. 47; Ragozin, *Media*, pp. 282, 369.

²Pp. ix-xviii, cexi-cexlii.

³p. cexlii.

⁴S. B. E. xxxi, p. xxx-xxxii.

⁵P. xxx.

time he neglected also prominent doctrines of the Gathas."¹ His final conclusion seems to be that Darius and his chieftains adhered to a more ancient and simple form of Mazdaism, while the masses were captivated by the novelties of the later Zoroastrianism.² It is plain to see that his statement in regard to the religion of the masses is a supposition on his part. He does not support it by a single proof. On the other hand, the inscription of Darius on the rock of Behistun bears witness to the fact that before as well as after the short usurpation of the throne by the Magian Gomates, the religion professed by Darius was the widespread religion of state. In this inscription, after narrating how with Anramazda's help he overthrew the Magian Gomates, Darius proceeds: "The empire that had been wrested from our race I recovered, I restored to its place, as in the days of old, so I did. The temples which Gaumata the Magian had destroyed I rebuilt. I restored to the state the sacred chants and worship and entrusted them to the families which had been deprived of them by Gaumata the Magian."³

We see then, how far from the certainty of an established truth is the hypothesis that the religion of the Avesta prevailed in Persia under Cyrus and his immediate successors. It is evident that there is need of a more solid basis before one can proceed with any degree of trustworthiness to point to the teachings of the Avesta as the sources of Jewish theology.

Another important consideration, often overlooked, is this: It is now generally admitted that while the Gathas may date from the eighth century, or, according to some, from a much greater antiquity, the rest of the Avesta is comparatively recent. Even Geldner, who gives a high antiquity to the Gathas, placing them in the fourteenth century B. C., admits that the latest parts of the Avesta may be no earlier than the fourth century, B. C.,⁴ and de Harlez gives reasons to show that much of the later Avesta was written after the fifth or fourth century B. C.⁵ Spiegel held that the whole Avesta was not written before Alexander the Great. And Mills himself says of the Avesta, exclusive of the Gathas: "Placing, then, the

¹P. xxxi. ²P. xxxii.

³Cf. Kuenen, *National and Universal Religion*, p. 320; Ragozin, *Media*, p. 366.

⁴Cf. *Ency. Brit.* 9th ed. vol. XVIII. p. 654. ⁵*Avesta*, p. cxciil.

oldest portions of the later Avesta somewhat earlier than Darius, we are obliged to extend the period during which its several parts were composed, so far as perhaps to the third or fourth century before Christ, the half-spurious matter contained in them being regarded as indefinitely later."³ Now, remembering that the home of the Avesta was not Persia, but some other province of Iran, we have grave reasons to suspect that the writings of the later Avesta could have reached Persia in time to exercise any important influence on the formation of Jewish theology.

This consideration tells with especial force against the assertion that the Jews took their belief in the resurrection from the Avesta. As we have already seen, there are but three reliable testimonies in the Avesta to the belief in the resurrection, and they all belong to the later development of Zoroastrianism. The least explicit of these, Vendidad 18:51, occurs in a section which is unique in character and which, from its total lack of connection with what precedes, may be safely set down as an interpolation. At any rate, the nature of its contents points to an origin, at the very least, as late as that of the first chapter of the Vendidad, which Mills places at about 500 B. C.²

It is to the other two testimonies, Yasht 19: 88, 89, and Fragment IV., that Mills appeals to show that the Bible is indebted to the Avesta for the doctrine of the resurrection. But it is to be observed that the dates he assigns to these two texts, 500 B. C. and 300 B. C. respectively,³ are, like that of Vendidad, 18:51, quite inadequate to prove the point at issue, for long before Avestan texts composed in 500 B. C. could become familiar to the Persians and through them to the Jews, the notion of the resurrection was plainly set forth in the prophets Ezekiel and Isaiah.

Having thus seen that solid evidence is lacking to show that the Jews under Cyrus and his immediate successors were brought into acquaintance with the teachings of the Avesta, nay, that the very existence of the doctrine of the resurrection

³ B. E., XXI, p. xxxvii.

² "Nineteenth Cent.," 1894, p. 50.

³ Ibid., p. 560, de Harlez claims that Yasht 19 belongs to the Avestan literature of most recent date. Avesta, p. cxlviii.

in the Avesta of that period is beyond the reach of demonstration, let us turn to the early writings of the Old Testament and test the truth of the assertion that before contact with the Persians under Cyrus, the Jews were ignorant of the distinction of clean and unclean, of angels, of demons, of the doctrines of immortality, the resurrection and retribution after death.

As has already been pointed out, the time of contact cannot be put earlier than the close of the captivity, 536 B. C. Hence the writers belonging to the period of the captivity may be used as witnesses no less than those of an earlier age. For the sake of argument, we shall confine ourselves to those parts of Scripture which in the eyes of all but the most radical scholars have a solid claim to an antiquity greater than 536 B. C.

First, it is undeniable that the recognition of clean and unclean things existed among the Jews long before their contact with the Persians. For even those who take Leviticus 11-15 to be part of the Priests' Code admit that these chapters embody pre-exilic usage.¹ The distinction of clean and unclean is found in the fourteenth chapter of Deut., a book recognized by radical scholars to be not later than 621 B. C.² Allusion is made to it in the book of Judges,³ when the mother of Samson is warned not to "eat any unclean thing."

If the early distinction of clean and unclean in the Old Testament admits of easy proof, still more patent is the early Jewish belief in angels. Indeed, so abundant are the references to angels in the most ancient parts of the Old Testament, that it is all but incredible that any one should ascribe the Jewish angelology to the Avestas. The very notion of guardian angels, prevalent in the rabbinical age and derived by some with the utmost assurance from the Avestan Fravashis, is implied in the numerous Old Testament accounts of angels providing for the safety and welfare of individuals. It is two angels who protect Lot and his family and save them from the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah.⁴ It is an angel of the

¹Driver, *Introd.*, p. 155. In his *Religion of Israel*, Kuenen says: "The precepts concerning clean and unclean which occupy so large a space in it (i. e., the redaction of Esdras) are of Israelitish origin." Vol. III, p. 36, London, 1895.

²Driver, p. 81.

³XIII, 4, 7.

⁴Gen. XVIII.

Lord who comforts Hagar on both occasions of her distress.¹ It is an angel of the Lord who stayed Abraham's hand as it was uplifted to sacrifice his son.² It was an angel of the Lord that appeared to Gideon and promised assistance to smite the Midianites.³ It was an angel that fed Elias in the wilderness.⁴ The 90th Psalm does but sum up the protective ministration of the angels as exemplified in these numerous texts, when it declares: "For he hath given His angels charge over thee, to keep thee in all thy ways; in their hands they shall bear thee up, lest thou dash thy foot against a stone."

It is plain from this mass of evidence, which is far from exhaustive, that the conception of angels and of guardian-spirits as well was not foreign to the early developments of Hebrew doctrine. To seek the origin of guardian angels in the fantastic Fravashis of the Avesta is utterly uncalled for.

But, it is urged, is not the notion of the "seven spirits" who "stand before the throne"⁵ who are "sent forth into all the earth"⁶ taken from that of the "seven Amshaspands" mentioned in the Yasht devoted to the Fravashis? "We sacrifice to the good, powerful, beneficent Fravashis of the just; to those of the Amesha Spentas, the sovereign beings with benign eye—who have, all seven, the same thought, all seven, the same word, all seven, the same action."⁷ As de Harlez has shown,⁸ this analogy is by no means exact. For the Amshaspands, in the ordinary sense, are but six. It is only by reckoning Ormazd himself among them that they can be called seven. If, in like manner, we were to include God among the spirits that stand before the throne we should have eight, not seven. It is out of the question then to see in the notion of the seven spirits a result of Avestan influence. Much more natural would it be to explain this unexpected and awkward combination of Ormazd and his six Amshaspands as an unsuccessful attempt to imitate the Jewish conception of the seven spirits. The fact that it finds expression but twice in the whole Avesta, and that too in the very latest parts, seems to prove this assumption.

¹Gen. XVI, 9; XXI, 17. ²Gen. XXII, 11-15. ³Judge VI, 11-23. ⁴III Kings, XIX, 4-7.

⁵Vv. 11, 12. Driver says this psalm "may be presumed to be pre-exilic (Introd., p. 363); though Cheyne on very insufficient grounds thinks it may belong to the time of Esdras (Bampt. Lect., p. 73.)

⁶Tobias XII, 15. ⁷Apoc. V, 6. ⁸Yasht 13:32; 19:15-16. ⁹Rev. Biblique, Apr. 1896, p. 160.

The evidence for early Jewish belief in the evil spirit, in demoniacal possession and demoniacal causes of disease, while not so abundant as the evidence for belief in angels, is still ample enough to show that the Jews were familiar with these notions long before the close of the Captivity, that is, before the time of contact with the Persians.

The story of the temptation in the third chapter of Genesis involves the notion of the evil spirit seducing Eve under the form of a serpent. But since the cogency of this inference is called in question by some, we can appeal to other ancient passages where the belief in evil spirits is brought plainly into view. Thus in the Song of Moses the unfaithful Israelites are said to have sacrificed to devils, and not to God.¹ The first book of Kings relates how Saul was afflicted with an evil spirit.² But most striking of all is the figure of Satan in the book of Job.³ Now, as the book of Job, even in the opinion of radical scholars like Kuenen, Davidson and Cheyne,⁴ belongs to the period of the Captivity, it is itself a sufficient refutation of the assertion that the Jews were ignorant of the devil until they came in contact with the Persians. It does but bear out the statement, already quoted, of the acute scholar Ewald: "The whole conception (of Satan) is Hebrew; to trace it to Persian sources is groundless and unhistorical."⁴

Nor need we look to Persian or Avestan theology for the origin of the Jewish belief in demoniacal disease and possession. The power of the devil to take possession of men and to inflict disease is clearly implied in the story of Saul's affliction by the evil spirit and in that of Job's disease produced by Satan.

The presence of an Avestan demon in the book of Tobias⁵ is often appealed to as proof that the Jewish notion of the devil was borrowed from the Persians. With much better show of reason might one argue that the Babylonian night hag, Lilith,⁶ which figured so prominently in rabbinical

¹ Deut. XXXII, 17. Cf. Lev. XVII, 7. ² I. Kings, XVI, 14-23. ³ I, 10-12; II, 7. Cf. Driver, pp. 405-8.

⁴ Cheyne, *Bamp. Lect.*, p. 271, says: "Nor can it be shown that that poetical masterpiece of the Exile, the Book of Job, presents any undoubtedly Iranian affinities. If anything there has been borrowed, it has been so Hebraized as to be undistinguishable from genuine Hebrew material."

⁵ Tobias III, 8.

⁶ Cf. Lenormant, *Hist. de l'Orient*, V, p. 276.

demon-law, and which receives mention in Scripture¹ long before the Asmodeus of Tobias, points to the religion of Babylon as the source of Jewish belief in the devil.

The attempt of some Catholic apologists to disprove all connection between Asmodeus and Aeshma Daeva of the Avesta on the ground that the former is a demon of impurity while the latter is a demon of violence, does not commend itself to sound judgment.² For Asmodeus nowhere appears in Tobias as tempting to impurity, but rather as killing the bridegrooms as soon as they have exposed themselves to his power through unrestrained desire. Hence the name Aeshma Daeva, Asmodeus, the Violent Demon, is peculiarly suited to his character. It is easy to suppose that the writer of Tobias, wishing to give a name to the demon he put in his story, took one ready to hand, as supplied by the religion of the Avesta, just as the Jews of a later period called Satan Beelzebub, after the god of Accaron.³ It is plain that such an action does but presuppose the belief of the writer in the devil. To hold that the notion of the devil first came into Jewish theology with the book of Tobias is an anachronism.

We have thus found evidence enough in the early Scriptures to show beyond reasonable doubt that before contact with the Persians the Jews recognized the distinction of clean and unclean, and believed in the existence of good and bad spirits. It remains to be seen if they were likewise acquainted with the doctrines concerning the life after death.

It must be confessed that the early books of the Old Testament are singularly deficient in reference to the future life. One would naturally expect that the chosen people, so weak in faith and so prone to sin, would have had repeatedly and solemnly impressed upon them the powerful sanction of future rewards and punishments. And yet, in the very books which treat of the laws of moral and religious conduct, prosperity and misfortune in the present life are the only motives to which appeal is made. In those early parts of Scripture that deal with the trials of the just and the prosperity of the

¹ Isaiah XXXIV, 14. Cf. Cheyne, *Prophecies of Isaiah*, I, 197.

² Cf. *Revue des Religions*, 1889, p. 202. Curious to note, Max Müller, following Bréal (*Mélanges*, pp. 123-4), makes the opposite mistake of taking Aeshma Daeva to be the demon of concupiscence. "Chips From a German Workshop," I, p. 145.

³ IV Kings I, 2.

wicked, the promise of the resurrection and of future rewards would have come most suitably as a strength and consolation. The fact, then, that clear and explicit mention of these doctrines is not made in the earlier parts of the Old Testament is taken by many as safe evidence that they did not, from the first, form part of the popular belief. Revealed at first vaguely to the minds of the chosen few, they gradually assumed more definite shape, till, at length, they burst into clear view and became the common possession of the people. They were revealed only in germ; their fulness of import was recognized only after a long period of development.

Still there is evidence in the more ancient parts of the Old Testament to show that the notion of immortality was not altogether absent from the minds of the early Jews. In the first place their belief in the existence of good and bad spirits is scarcely conceivable without a corresponding belief in the persistence of the soul after death. Again, the notion of immortality is implied in the assumption of Enoch¹ and of Elias.² The prohibition against seeking information from the dead,³ as well as the story of Saul consulting the spirit of Samuel,⁴ shows that in the minds of the ancient Israelites all did not end with death. The yearning for the future beatific life finds expression in a number of the Psalms,⁵ and notably in the book of Job,⁶ which, as we have seen, can solidly claim an antiquity as great as the time of the Captivity. And in the remarkable words of Osee,⁷ the prophet of tottering Israel, "For he hath taken us and he will heal us; he will strike and he will cure us. He will revive us after two days. On the third day he will raise us up and we shall live in his sight," as well as in the prophet Ezekiel's⁸ famous vision of the revived bones, we have allegorical language that naturally implies the conscious idea of the resurrection, the idea which culminates in the beautiful promise in the twenty-sixth chapter of Israel: "Thy dead men shall live; my slain shall rise again. Awake and give praise, ye that dwell in the dust."⁹ Even if, for the sake of argument, we grant the contention of

¹Gen. V, 24.²IV Kings, II, 11.³Deut. XVIII, 10.⁴1 Kings, XXVIII, 7-20.⁵Ps. 15:10, 11; 16:15; 22:4; 48:16. Cf. Cheyne, *Bamp. Lect.*, p. 389, seq.⁶XIX, 25-26, Cf. Driver, p. 394.⁷VI, 2. ⁸XXXVII, 1-10. ⁹Verse 19.

scholars like Delitzsch, Dillmann, Driver and Cheyne, that this prophecy belongs to the early post-exilic period,¹ it surely antedates the earliest positive proof of the resurrection idea in the Avesta.²

The limits of this essay do not allow a discussion of the view supported by eminent scholars, as Spiegel, Justi, de Harlez, Halévy, and others, that the Gathas were composed only in the eighth or seventh century B. C., and that their religious conceptions are in part the product of Semitic influence exercised by the Israelite captives whom Sargon transported into Media after the fall of Samaria."³ Neither is there room to examine the startling theory put forth by Darmesteter that the Gathas can not claim an antiquity greater than the first century of our era, and that the Avestan religion, while, remotely ancient in its main features, shows traces of Jewish, no less than Brahmanic, Buddhist, and Greek influences.⁴

Whether such views be accepted or not, they show, at all events, that Iranian scholars are by no means unanimous on the question of the relations of the Old Testament with the Avesta.

The argument of this essay may be summed up as follows: If the Bible is indebted to the Avesta for its teachings concerning ceremonial purity, angels, demons, and the future life, the earliest date to which we can assign such an influence is the period immediately following the capture of Babylon by Cyrus, when for the first time the Jews were brought into close contact with the Persians. But far from being demonstrated, it is still a matter of grave doubt whether the Persians of that period professed the religion of the Avesta. Moreover, there is sufficient evidence in the exilic and pre-exilic Scriptures to show that the doctrines in question, while lacking the fullness of import of later times, were already known to the Jews before Persian, still less, Avestan influences were possible. The natural conclusion is that the attempt to trace these important features of biblical theology to the Avesta as their origin, must be set down as a failure.

CHARLES F. AIKEN.

¹Cf. Driver, *Introd.*, p. 210.

²Cheyne says of this text: "The vague and incidental character of the reference in this passage is itself a warrant of its underived origin." *The Prophecies of Isaiah*, I, 157.

³Max Müller makes a partial concession to this theory when he says that the monotheism of the Avesta may have come from Jewish sources. Cf. *Gifford Lectures*, 1880, p. 48-49.

⁴*Zend-Avesta*, III, pp. xx-c.

EMPIRICAL UTILITARIANISM.¹

- Principles of Philosophy. Paley's. London, 1785.
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation; and Deontology.
Jeremy Bentham. Edited by Sir J. Bowring. Edinburgh, 1843.
Dissertations and Discussions. John Stuart Mill. London, 1859.
Utilitarianism. John Stuart Mill. London, 1863.
Autobiography. John Stuart Mill. London, 1873.
Westminster Review. Passim, 1824-1829.

The Utilitarian principle that pleasure is the object of desire is sustained broadly in:

- The Science of Ethics. Leslie Stephen. London.
The Emotions and Will. Chap. XV: The Moral Sense. Alexander Bain. London.
Outlines of Psychology. James Sully. New York, 1891.
Microcosmus. Hermann Lotze. Translation. Edinburgh.

The system is criticised in:

- Types of Ethical Theory. James Martineau. London, 1882.
History of European Morals. W. E. H. Leckey. London, 1890.
Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy. John Grote. London, 1870.
The Methods of Ethics. Henry Sidgwick. London, 1890.
Pure Logic and other Minor Works. W. Stanley Jevons, London, 1890.
The Data of Ethics. Herbert Spencer. London, 1879.
L' Idée Moderne du Droit. A. Fouillé. Paris, 1892.
La Morale Utilitaire. Carrau. Paris, 1890.

In the preparation of this essay the writer has derived considerable assistance from Mr. W. S. Lilly's *Right and Wrong*, London, 1893, and from M. l'Abbé Maurice de Baetes' *Les Bases de la Morale et du Droit*, Paris, 1892.

Nearly seventy years ago, shortly after the term Utilitarianism had been accepted to designate a new form of an old theory of ethics, a celebrated writer, who frequently allowed his love of antithesis to carry him beyond the bounds of good taste, wrote that, though quibbling about self-interest and motives and objects of desire, and the greatest happiness of the greatest number is but a poor employment for a grown man, it certainly hurts the health less than hard drinking

¹The principles of modern Utilitarianism and the supporting arguments are best found in the above works.

and the fortune less than high play. It is not much more laughable than phrenology, and is immeasurably more humane than cock fighting. In the interval that has elapsed since these words were written, Utilitarianism, after rising to a commanding eminence in English thought, has been relegated by most ethical teachers to the realms of rejected systems. Its inconsistencies and shortcomings have again and again been laid bare by critics of opposite schools, so that today it has as few patrons as phrenology or that once popular pastime with which Macaulay set it in favorable contrast.

But, though it is long since exploded as a system, much of its once far-reaching influence still endures. No student of present day literature, in which the jargon of altruism so widely abounds, can fail to recognize that in many minds the principle of the greatest happiness of the greatest number is looked upon as an adequate philosophical basis for the loftiest morality. It is not, therefore, superfluous, even to-day, to expose the unreality of Utilitarianism.

The doctrine which makes of utility the supreme criterion of right and wrong is not of recent origin, for we find its characteristic tenet taught in the old Cyrenaic school, which held pleasure to be the end of life, and recognized no distinction of quality between various kinds of pleasure. Epicurus, insisting that a truly happy life must be one guided by reason, taught that, while happiness is the end of life, this happiness is constituted, not by the aggregate of passing moments of gratification, but by that prudent direction of life which so regulates conduct as to obtain from all sources of experience the maximum of agreeable feeling. Modern hedonism, gradually developing through the successive modifications made by Paley, Bentley and John Stuart Mill, differs from the old chiefly because it professes to take for its standpoint, not the individual, but society or mankind. The old hedonism was egoistic, the new altruistic. Paley progressed but little beyond the old hedonistic lines, recognizing no difference in pleasures, except in their continuance and degrees of intensity, and his utilitarianism is still egoistic. Bentham admitted a variable value, but laid down no principle by which to discriminate higher from lower pleasures; and he advanced

towards the altruistic position. John Stuart Mill, rejecting the narrow and obviously false principle that all pleasures are alike in quality, endeavored to give the system a wider basis by distinguishing between higher and lower pleasures, and holding that quality is of more importance than quantity. Besides, he makes the happiness which is the end of conduct, not the individual's, but society's. The introduction into hedonism of these two principles produces and ruins utilitarianism. He fails to reconcile egoism with altruism, or to show any basis for distinguishing between higher and lower pleasures. The entirely empirical value given to morality in Mill's system was observed by Herbert Spencer, who endeavors, by bringing the theory of evolution to bear on conduct, to rehabilitate utilitarianism and give its morality a necessary character by deducing from the laws of life and the conditions of existence what kinds of actions necessarily tend to produce happiness.

These two philosophers have not evolved from their own principles any practical code of morality. They have appropriated the existing one, founded on natural, and developed under the influence of supernatural religion. Ardent advocates of a positivist philosophy, which denies or ignores all religion, they reject those fundamental principles which sustain the moral law. Then, that the entire structure may not tumble into ruin, they set themselves to the task of constructing out of their own creeds a support to fill the vacuum left by the rejected cornerstone. Though Mill taxed Mr. Spencer with being a foe to utilitarianism, and the Spencerian theory of ethics is founded on the doctrine of evolution, with which Mill has no concern, yet their leading principle is the same: happiness constitutes the good, and the right and wrong of conduct are decided by the criterion of pleasure and pain.

The utilitarian theory bears some resemblance to Christian morality. In Christian ethics, too, it is laid down that happiness is the end of life. The happiness to be derived from virtue here, and the greater happiness expected as its future reward, are undoubtedly, with most Christians, a strong determinant towards moral conduct. On the other hand the fear of pain, in the form of punishment, acts as an important

factor in dissuading them from evil. The Catholic moralist refuses to agree with Kant, who teaches that moral good is to be possessed exclusively out of a motive of reverence for it, and that if it is aimed at for any other reason conduct ceases to be righteous. The Catholic theologian condemns the Calvinist, who holds that works performed with a view to eternal reward are bad. Murder, robbery, fraud, promiscuous sexual intercourse, both the utilitarian and the Christian moralist will unite in condemning on the ground that such actions are injurious to others and subversive of society. Does Christian ethics, then, write itself down utilitarianism disguised? It does not; for, whilst they agree on these points, they are profoundly different in their genesis, in the position which they assign to happiness in the order of finality, and in the force with which they address themselves to the individual conscience. "A theory of morals," says Mr. Leckey,¹ "must explain not only what constitutes a duty, but also how we obtain the notion of their being such a thing as duty. It must tell us not merely what is the course of conduct we ought to pursue, but also what is the meaning of the word 'ought' and from what source we derive the idea it expresses."

The object of the present essay is to demonstrate that, while the Christian theory of morality responds adequately to this demand, empirical utilitarianism, based on a wrong hypothesis concerning the end of man, and the connection between happiness and conduct, fails to establish any ultimate standard of right, and can show no basis of moral obligation.

THE ELEMENTS OF MORALITY.

In the common language of mankind there are no words of more frequent occurrence than "good" and "bad," "right" and "wrong;" "this thing ought to be done;" "you have no right to that object;" "A behaved nobly; B's conduct was disgraceful." Such phrases as these are constantly in everybody's mouth; and whilst the application of them is one of the most abundant sources of disagreement, nobody fails to recognize, and all are agreed upon, the ideas conveyed. There are men to be found whose moral judgment is so unen-

¹European Morals, chap. I, p. 5.

lightened that they take as good conduct which the common verdict of mankind brands as wicked. This fact proves, not that such men are without the notion of right and wrong, but that they misapply it in their practical judgment of conduct. An enterprising Bedouin will rob, perhaps kill, a defenseless traveller without scruple; yet at the same time he will feel bound to respect the life and property of an enemy who has succeeded in putting himself under the aegis of hospitality. The standard which this man has of right and wrong is perverted; but a standard of some kind he evidently recognizes and applies. A thief will steal your purse without ceasing to believe that it rightly belongs to you, and that he ought not to deprive you of your own. This notion of the difference between right and wrong giving rise to duty and obligation lies at the root of all morality.

Let us examine the elements which go to make it up. Everybody admits that it is wrong to lie, not that it is wrong merely for A to lie or B or C, but that it is wrong, independently of the question of who the liar may be. There is a something in the action which makes it wrong—it is wrong objectively. Similarly I perceive that for anybody to betray the confidence of his friend in order to gain some advantage for himself is wrong, no matter who are the persons concerned. In the investigation of what constitutes morality we must find out in what consists this objective element which makes action right or wrong. Again, if I use my own property for my own needs, everybody says I have a right to do so. On the other hand, if I take without the owner's permission what belongs to somebody else and spend it in amusement, the verdict of reason is that I have acted unjustly in violating rights which I was bound to respect. Here we have a recognition of objective rights and obligations; this is the second element of morality to be accounted for. When a man advertently and willingly commits a wrong action we consider that the malice of the action reflects on him; whilst if he does something that we judge praiseworthy we recognize that he is deserving of praise. In both cases the character of the action reflects upon the agent. Here we have a third element—that of imputability. Furthermore, on imputing a fault to the operator, we

look on him as being bound to answer for the consequences of his act—hence another element, responsibility. Every convention, every law that men have framed for social life, every judgment that we pass upon our own or others' conduct connotes the existence of objective morality, imputability, and responsibility. In all regulations made for the constitution and harmonious development of society there is assumed the objective existence of rights on the one side, and on the other the obligation of respecting them.

Let us first look into the element of the objective morality. Since we can judge an act to be right or wrong, we evidently have some standard whereby we discriminate between one kind of act and another. To judge that a thing is right is nothing else than to declare it conforms to some recognized criterion; to find an action wrong is simply to affirm that it deviates from some standard of right. This harmony with the standard constitutes a character of rectitude in the act. Now, the conduct which enjoys that character has in it something attractive which draws us to it. We perceive in it a potency of adding to our perfection and happiness; and for this reason it is something to be sought after. This power of adding to and perfecting the agent makes the act a good for him; and the characteristic from which it flows is the moral good of the action. Furthermore, we see that this quality of goodness is present in varying degrees, coming home to our reason with a varying momentum. One act may possess the character of goodness in a high degree, yet be such that, though I omit it, my conduct is not out of harmony with the standard of rectitude. The good here is optional; however attractive or ennobling it may be, I am not bound to embrace it. On the other hand, I sometimes have no alternative,—either I must do the good or my conduct fails of righteousness. In this case there is a hypothetical necessity: I must act thus if my conduct is to be righteous. This hypothetical necessity is the necessity of moral obligation. If morality is to have any practical weight in the guidance of conduct, it is evident that its efficiency depends chiefly on the influence that the element of obligation will have when two opposite courses stand before a moral agent, who is to embrace one and reject the other. To leave out or minimize the character of moral obligation is to deprive

morality of all practical weight. A moral standard, unexceptionable in its loftiness, may be set up, but if there is no obligation to conform to it, its influence will be unfelt where it is most needed. And the weight with which obligation will bear in every particular case will depend on the directness and force with which the antecedent of the hypothesis on which obligation rests is proved :

“If I am to conform my conduct to the standard of moral rectitude, I must act thus now. I ought to conform my conduct to that standard. Therefore I must act thus now.”

It is the business of an ethical system to establish the authority of the above minor beyond dispute.

Having disintegrated objective morality into its elements of (1) rectitude, (2) goodness, (3) obligation, let us do the same with rights. There is no end to the literature that has been inflicted on us to explain the origin and scope of the term right. But the attempts have ended more frequently in the production of fog than in the diffusion of light. Though the definition has raised endless controversy, nobody fails to grasp the idea which underlies the term. We observe a man riding a horse; he has physical control of the animal: is it his? The physical power will not be received by anybody as an argument sufficient for an affirmative answer. The point to be considered is, has he any moral claim to it, any tie that binds it to him as belonging to him, so that everybody else is restricted from depriving him of the object. If such a moral power is vested in him, then, though the animal should escape from his control, it remains his property; he has a right to it. This right is made up of two correlative elements, the owner's moral power over the object, and the restriction imposed on everybody else of respecting that power. An ethical system must render a satisfactory account of the origin of this power and its inviolability. The foregoing analysis, though exhibiting only obvious results, is by no means unnecessary. Men of unquestioned mental power and uprightness of character, but holding suicidal philosophic principles, have been driven, in order to maintain consistency with their original position, to propound systems of ethics which utterly lack the first requisites of a moral code. We shall proceed to an examination of Mill's Utilitarianism.

I.—EXPOSITION OF THE SYSTEM.

The Utilitarian theory of morals, as laid down by Mill, is to be found in the essay entitled *Utilitarianism*, among his “*Dissertations and Discussions*.” In order that no statement or position not his own may be attributed to him we shall take his own exposition. Before entering on the subject, he refers to the taunt levelled against his creed, that the doctrine of pleasure being the end of life degrades man to the level of swine. He replies that it is not the Utilitarians, but their accusers, who represent human nature in a degrading light, since the accusation implies that men are capable of no pleasures except those of which swine are capable. Pleasure, he remarks, is not confined to sensual satisfaction; there are intellectual pleasures; pleasures of a still higher order, resulting from the exercise of benevolence. All these pleasures are included by Mill in the notion of happiness, which he constitutes the end of conduct. We shall see whether he can offer any consistent basis to distinguish between baser and nobler pleasures, while remaining within the limits of his system. In the following passages he lays down the Utilitarian creed:

a. “The creed which accepts, as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain and privation of pleasure. To give a clear view of the moral standard set up by the theory, much more requires to be said; in particular, what things it includes in the ideas of pleasure and pain, and to what extent this is left an open question. But these supplementary explanations do not affect the theory of life on which this theory of morality is grounded—namely, that pleasure and freedom from pain are the only things desirable as ends; and that all desirable things (which are as numerous in the Utilitarian as in any other scheme) are desirable either for the pleasure inherent in themselves or as means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain.”¹

¹*Utilitarianism*, c. II.

b. "It is quite compatible with the principles of utility to recognize the fact that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others. It would be absurd that, while, in estimating all other things, quality is concerned as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be supposed to depend on quantity alone. If I am asked what I mean by difference or quality in pleasures, or what makes one pleasure more valuable than another, merely as a pleasure, except its being greater in amount, there is but one possible answer. Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all, or almost all, who have experience of both, give a decided preference, irrespective of any moral obligation to prefer it, that is the most desirable pleasure."

c. "I must again repeat what the assailants of Utilitarianism have seldom the justice to acknowledge; that the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct is not the agent's own happiness but that of all concerned; as between himself and others Utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator."

d. "If the end which the Utilitarian doctrine proposes to itself were not, in theory as in practice, acknowledged to be an end, nothing could ever convince any person that it was so. No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness. This, however, being a fact, we have not only all the proof which the case admits of, but all that it is possible to require, that happiness is a good; that each person's happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness a good to the aggregate of persons. Happiness has made out its title as one of the ends of conduct, and consequently one of the criteria of morality."

e. ¹"It has not by this alone proved itself to be the sole criterion. To do that it would seem, by the same rule, necessary to show, not only that people desire happiness, but that they never desire anything else. Now, it is palpable that they do desire things which, in common language, are decidedly distinguished from happiness. They desire, for example,

¹Utilitarianism, c. IV.

virtue and the absence of vice, no less really than pleasure and the absence of pain. The desire of virtue is not as universal, but it is as authentic a fact, as the desire of happiness." "But does the Utilitarian doctrine deny that people desire virtue, or maintain that virtue is not to be desired? The very reverse. It maintains not only that virtue is to be desired, but that it is to be desired disinterestedly for itself." "This opinion is not, in the smallest degree, a departure from the happiness principle. The ingredients of happiness are very various, and each of them is desirable in itself, and not merely when considered as swelling an aggregate."

This doctrine is reducible to the following propositions:

1. Happiness, that is pleasure, and the absence of pain, constitute the good of man, and the end of human conduct.
2. Consequently actions are good if they tend to increase pleasure or diminish pain, bad if they have a contrary tendency.
3. Pleasure must be estimated according to quality, as well as quantity.
4. By happiness, that is the aggregate of pleasure, is meant, not the agent's own happiness, but that of all concerned.

The first of these propositions is evidently the foundation of the system; if it is true, the second follows as a consequence; the third and fourth are but explanations of the term "happiness" in the first. If it is false, the theory is wrong from its base. The charge of selfishness has been brought against the system. Nothing can be more opposed to selfishness than the postulate of Mill, that Utilitarianism requires a man, when weighing the conflicting claims of his own and other's enjoyments, to be strictly impartial and hold the balance with the even hand of a disinterested spectator. "The Utilitarian morality," claims Mill, "does recognize in human beings the power of sacrificing their own greatest good for the good of others." This is a doctrine in which self-sacrifice is carried to the extreme. It seems to justify Mill's assertion that "in the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth we read the complete spirit of the ethics of Utility. To do as you would be done by and to love your neighbor as yourself constitutes the ideal perfection of Utilitarian morality."¹

¹ *Op. cit.* c. III.

On the sources of obligation Mill speaks with an uncertain note. He recognizes that there is a weakness here in his system, but not greater than in any other: "If the view adopted by the Utilitarian philosophy be correct, this difficulty will always present itself until the influences which form moral character have taken the same hold of the principle which they have of the consequences; until by the improvement of education the feeling of unity with our fellow creatures shall be (what it cannot be denied Christ intended it to be) as deeply rooted in our character and to our own consciousness as completely a part of our nature as the horror of crime is in an ordinarily well brought up young person."¹

The charge of atheism has been pressed, perhaps too far, against Utilitarianism. It is not atheistical if we accept utility as a subordinate standard depending for its validity on an ulterior one. Utility is certainly the characteristic feature which proclaims the goodness of some conduct; and, by its absence, the worthlessness of other. Mill maintains that a utilitarian may accept this criterion as the practical guide of conduct, deriving a sanction from the revealed will of a Supreme Ruler of the universe, if the utilitarian believes in the existence of such a Ruler. "The principle of utility either has, or there is no reason why it might not have, all the sanctions which belong to any other system of morals. These sanctions are either external or internal. Of the external it is not necessary to speak at length. They are the hope of favor and fear of displeasure from our fellow creatures or from the Ruler of the Universe, along with whatever we may have of sympathy or affection for them; or of love and awe of Him inclining us to do His will independent of all selfish consequences." When we come to examine Mill's account of the nature of moral obligation it will be manifest that this assumption is, for Utilitarianism, a self-contradiction. It must be judged on its pretensions to being an independent system, able to show within itself, without any appeal to another standard, the least radical difference between right and wrong, and to establish from its own principles the obligation binding the will to do good and shun evil. It claims to be, not a

¹ Ibid.

judge dependent on a supreme authority, but the supreme authority itself. The chief sanction in the system is that of conscience.

"The internal sanction of duty, whatever our standard of duty may be, is one and the same ; a feeling in our own mind, a pain more or less intense on the violation of duty, which, in properly cultivated moral natures, rises, in the more serious cases, into shrinking from it as an impossibility. The feeling, when disinterested and connecting itself with the pure idea of duty, and not with some particular form of it, or with any of the merely accessory circumstances, is the essence of conscience, though in the complex phenomenon, as it actually exists, the simple fact is, in general, all incrustated over with collateral associations, derived from sympathy, from love and still more from fear ; from all the forms of religious feeling, from the recollections of childhood and of all our past life ; from self-esteem, desire of the esteem of others and occasionally even from self-abasement."¹

The primary thesis to be demonstrated, directly or indirectly, for the establishment of Utilitarianism as a sound system of morality is that happiness in the sense in which Mill understands the word constitutes the good. We shall find that Mill, so far from doing so, tacitly admits that there must be some other criterion of right and wrong more fundamental than the pleasure and pain standard, and some other end of conduct than pleasure and pain. Notwithstanding its loud profession of benevolence, the logical outcome of Utilitarianism is to reduce all benevolence to mere selfishness, to banish the very possibility of self-sacrifice and to confound vice and virtue so completely as to reduce morality to chaos. The sanction of conscience becomes a nullity, and no foundation for moral obligation remains.

II.—IS HAPPINESS THE END OF CONDUCT?

In one sense happiness is undoubtedly the end of conduct. Following Aristotle, the scholastics taught that happiness, *beatitudo*, the possession of the Supreme Good, and ultimate perfection of reason is the end of conduct. But it is not this psychical state of active possession that Mill means by the

¹ *Ib.*, c. III.

term. By it he understands the sum of agreeable feeling, the happiness called by the scholastics *bonum delectabile*. The question, therefore, as far as Utilitarianism is concerned, is confined to the consideration of happiness in this sense understood. The question of ultimate ends, Mill observes, does not admit of proof in the ordinary acceptation of the term; for to be incapable of proof is common to all first principles. He, therefore, proposes to prove his first principle by an appeal to the faculties which judge of fact. As the proof that an object is visible lies in the proof that people actually see it, so the proof that agreeable feeling is desirable lies in the fact that people actually do desire it, and he thus concludes that happiness is desirable. (cf. p. —.) With this conclusion we quite agree. Happiness is a good, therefore desirable. Then he proceeds to the all-important pith of the proof. Having shown that happiness is one of the ends of conduct, and consequently one of the criteria of morality, he attempts (p. —) to prove that it is the sole criterion, for whatever else is desired is desired only on account of the happiness which it brings. Virtue is desired, first, as a means to happiness, afterwards it becomes an end in itself with those who are virtuous. In proof of this he adduces the example of music and money. Music, he says, is not looked upon as a means to a collective something called happiness, and on that account desirable. It is desirable in and for itself; besides being a means, it is a part of the end. Money, at first desirable only as a means, afterwards is desired for itself, when there is no longer any desire of the ends to which it was, at first, looked on only as a means. The statement that virtue is not only desirable, but that it is desirable in itself, Mill declares to be, in not the slightest degree, a departure from the utilitarian standpoint. To which we reply that the statement is fatal to the system. The issue to be solved is the establishment of the ultimate criterion of right and wrong; to determine what it is, is the last analysis that constitutes conduct virtuous or not virtuous. What is the utilitarian principle? It is that nothing is good except so far forth as it tends to happiness; the happiness giving character constitutes the goodness.

Now, in the above reasoning, there is assumed another standard of good and bad, anterior to and consequently more fundamental than utility; and this assumption is evidently incompatible with the principle that utility is the supreme criterion of right and wrong. Virtuous conduct carries with it its own desirability, or, in other words, virtue is desirable for itself; that means it has a character of goodness in itself—it is to be desired not as a means, but for itself. Now, this is directly opposed to the doctrine that nothing is good except because it is useful, that is, capable of serving as a means to the end, happiness. “There is no contradiction whatever,” replies the utilitarian; “We hold that virtue, or moral goodness, is itself a part of happiness; the part is embraced in the whole. Therefore, it is no contradiction to say that happiness is the end, and virtue is an end.” The fallacy is concealed, but it is present. Why, we ask the utilitarian, is an act of virtue, or moral goodness, desirable? “Because,” he replies, “it brings me happiness. I aim at it because I perceive an element or character in it that will confer happiness.” Very good. There is, then, a character in the good action, or in virtue, which appeals to you as something that will bring happiness. Now another question: What constitutes, in the good action, that happiness-producing character which is present in one, absent from other actions? You cannot answer, utility, or the happiness produced, because the utility follows from the presence of this undefined something; so it evidently cannot be the cause of it. The happiness follows for you because the act is good. What constitutes that good which is productive of the happiness? You admit that in some conduct there exists this quality, and that in others it is absent,—the result of its presence being the causation of happiness. This result, happiness, is an extrinsic sign that it is present. What is the intrinsic constituent? What is the criterion by which you judge of its presence or its absence? When you have found what constitutes that good whose presence or absence divides conduct into right and wrong, rendering one attractive as happiness-giving, you have reached a standard deeper down, in the nature of things, than the question of

utility; you have reached the fundamental criterion of morality.

The admission that virtue is good and desirable for its own sake is fatal to Utilitarianism, for it implies a distinction between right and wrong antecedent to all considerations of utility. Mill's entire argument involves a confusion between two closely associated but distinct ideas, goodness and happiness. In one passage he argues that having proved happiness to be a good, he has proved it something desirable. The postulate in this contention is that the good is the object of desire, which is true, else where his doctrine is that happiness is the object of desire. It never seems to have occurred to him that happiness, pleasure, or agreeable feeling, is not something objective, but subjective, a result in the agent of some functional play. Good obtained is the cause, happiness the result. Instead of taking as his primary principle, "nothing is desirable but happiness," he should have started from the undoubted truth, "nothing is desirable but the good." By good is meant not merely moral good, but whatever has in it the potency to satisfy any of our expansive faculties; but nothing is true good unless it has the note of moral goodness, when considered as the object of human action.

The illustration which Mill draws from our love of music lends no aid to the utility theory. Music, as he admits, is a good in itself. In other words, it is desirable. It is of a nature to satisfy and complete one of our faculties. In music there are two elements which are apprehended by two different faculties. There is the material sound caused by the vibratory waves with a rythmical movement, naturally adapted to gratify the sense of hearing. Besides this there is the æsthetic element of the harmony perceived by the intelligence to which it affords gratification. These two elements make music a good of these faculties; happiness, agreeable feeling, is the result to these faculties when they attain this good. This is a parallel to the case of virtuous conduct; from the good flows the happiness. For the same reason money, too, can be pursued for itself, independent of all consideration of it as a means. The diseased judgment of the miser may esteem money as a good in itself, whilst a sane man will value it only

as a means to an end. The miser sees in it a potency that draws his desire. In the money as in virtue and music there is an intrinsic characteristic which when recognized by the reason draws the will into pursuit.

But a utilitarian may object that we can pursue anything for the happiness derivable from it. Music is sought solely for the pleasure resulting from it. This is true. Among the endless varieties of things, acts, conditions, experiences, which are apprehended by the reason as goods, happiness or agreeable feeling is one, and as such it may become the object of our desire and the aim of our action. But the fact that we can make the pleasure derived from various sources (music, amusement, food, etc.) the object for which we pursue such good and succeed in obtaining pleasure, is not a fact that universally obtains. In the matter of morals it has no existence. We may go to hear an opera, exclusively for the pleasure we derive from it, and if the prima donna's throat is in good condition, the orchestra efficient, and all circumstances favorable to comfort we shall not be disappointed. But if we practise virtue merely to experience the satisfaction that is to result from a consciousness of our own benevolence we are sure to be disappointed. If the pleasure of virtue is to be attained virtue must be practised for itself, not for the pleasure. Virtue is no longer virtue if not practised for its own sake. Dives, let us suppose, alleviates the pressing wants of Lazarus, not that he desires the well-being of Lazarus, but that he may enjoy the agreeable consciousness resulting to himself, from the knowledge that he has increased the sum of human well-being by the amount represented by the conversion flavor of Lazarus from a minus to a plus quantity. He desires that the flavor of his viands may be heightened by the accompanying glow which comes from the still small voice's verdict of *well done*. Has Dives any reason to expect that the self-approbation of virtue will attend his act? There is no doubt of the result—the satisfaction of virtue attends only on virtue practised for virtue's sake. Nobody bears stronger testimony to this truth than Mill himself. In his *Autobiography* he describes how the truth dawned upon him that to pursue happiness for its own sake was a course sure to defeat its object.

After passing through a protracted slough of despond, he finally realized that personal happiness is to be attained by not making it the end. "These only are happy, I thought, who have their minds fixed on some object other than their own happiness; on the happiness of others, on the improvement of mankind, even on some art or pursuit, followed not as a means, but as an ideal end. Aiming thus at something else, they find happiness by the way." Thus, his own experience taught him the error of the happiness theory. When he reached the conclusion that happiness is to be found, even in any art or pursuit followed as an ideal end, but not to be reached when sought directly as an end, the truth stood palpably before him: the good is the object of human desire. Yet even then, so hopelessly was he enthralled by his empirical philosophy, that he did not perceive the meaning of his conclusion. Like another Cato, he still prefers the lost cause. Utilitarianism must be maintained; so he shifts his ground; happiness is still the end of life, not the agent's own happiness, but the happiness of others. Let us follow the system into its last refuge.

It may be remarked that if Mill on his new platform maintains that the happiness of others is the universal end (some of his followers certainly do) the assertion which is quoted above is contradictory, for he puts the happiness of others, as an end, on the same level as "art or any other pursuit" followed for itself. Passing over this contradiction we come to the question: What is the end for which a utilitarian is to pursue the happiness of others, an art, or any other pursuit? Besides the end of his action externally he must have an intention of his will to some purpose. If the utilitarian answers his own happiness he falls back on Mill's original and abandoned position. If he replies that the end is to be pursued for itself he admits that it is the objective goodness, of the object of pursuit, which is the end of conduct, a conclusion directly opposed to the fundamental principles of Utilitarianism.

Again, the much-extolled principle of altruism, that the happiness of others is the end of conduct which when pursued is to assure the individual's own happiness, involves a

sophism of the most glaring character. My happiness, I am told, is to consist in increasing as much as possible the happiness of others. If such is the case, the rule must hold good all round, and the happiness of everybody is to be in promoting somebody else's happiness. The happiness of society is only the aggregate of individual happiness. But if my happiness consists in promoting yours, which in its turn lies chiefly in extending mine, then I am to be happy because you are happy that I am happy, because you are happy, without Utilitarianism pointing out any good whence all this endless action and reaction is to take rise. When Utilitarianism endeavors to make out its case by substituting the general for individual happiness as the end of conduct, confusion is but worse confounded. Mill failed to prove the assumption on which his system rests; on the end depends the criterion; the standard, therefore, of morality is not pleasure and pain. To anyone sifting the contradictory notions and illogical arguments advanced to substantiate the doctrine, it becomes plain that Utilitarianism has lied unto itself.

III.—OBLIGATION.

It is, says Mill, a necessary part of moral philosophy to show the origin of obligation. After observing that the customary morality is the only one which presents itself to the mind with the feeling of being in itself obligatory, he holds that when another system (Utilitarianism) would maintain that this morality derives its obligation from some general principle (the happiness principle) the corollaries (the particular dictates of morality) seem to have a more binding force than the original principle. The reasoning of a man is, as he puts it, "I feel that I am bound, not to murder, rob, betray or deceive; but why am I bound to promote the general happiness? If my own happiness lies in something else, why may I not give it the preference? It is only justice to Mill to acknowledge that he always put the case against himself straightforwardly. Utilitarianism can give no satisfactory answer to the query. If my own happiness lies in something else, that will not tend to the general good, that may even be subversive of it, what binds me, if I accept the utilitarian creed, to avoid

what will be conducive to my own happiness? If morality cannot show the existence of a binding obligation, with a solid basis, giving it an indisputable claim to check the tendencies of our nature to embrace the immediate enjoyment, then any excess of human passion is quite lawful, since nothing exists to forbid it. I may rob, murder, betray and deceive if there exists no obligation to avoid murder, robbery, treachery and deceit. This difficulty, we are told, must always remain until the influences which form moral character have rendered everybody eminently virtuous. (Cf. p. —.) Let us illustrate the gist of this answer. A gentleman, who finds much charm in the theory that the attainment of the highest possible measure of pleasure is the end of life, consults a utilitarian guide, philosopher and friend to have a practical question of conscience settled. He states his case. "Happiness, I understand, is the end of life, and we are constrained always to act for happiness. Now, the possession of a certain diamond ring, belonging to a friend of mine, would naturally increase my happiness. I propose to obtain it as soon as I have the good fortune to meet its present owner in a lonely spot on a dark night, when I shall probably have to use some physical force detrimental to his well-being before I obtain the article. This conduct of mine will not be for the general happiness, but it will be for my own. Now, is there any obligation binding me to prefer the general happiness? I see none." The philosopher consults his Mill (Utilitarianism, Chap. III) and finds the solution. "Well, there is a difficulty at present about making evident to you the binding force of our fundamental principle, and that difficulty will continue until, by the improvement of your education, the feeling of unity with your fellow-creatures, shall be as deeply rooted in your character and to your consciousness as completely a part of your nature as the horror of crime is in an ordinarily well brought up young person." "I thank you," replies the other. "The feeling of unity with my fellow-creatures is but slightly developed in me at present, so I shall take the ring. Doubtless my mode of life will tend to bring out in my nature that feeling of unity which I lack. If it should not reach perfection in me, it may in my son or my grandson, who, owing to the

spread of education, will perceive that all his acquaintances are seeking his welfare, and he, not his own, but theirs.' The utilitarian foundation, therefore, of obligation is not yet developed to the point of establishing an obligation over an unwilling mind, but it will when the improvement of education will have made this feeling of unity so strong that we must see the general happiness to be our necessary end with the same directness that we now see it is wrong to lie. Now, we have no basis of obligation; then, none will be needed.

The external sanctions available for utilitarianism are two, one derived from God, if the utilitarian believes in God—the other from our fellow creatures. Can the sanction depending on our relation to God be consistently invoked by utilitarianism? It cannot. This sanction rests upon an obligation of conforming our conduct to the Divine will. How can I perceive this sanction to bear on my conduct? By assuming that a conduct of utility is consistent with, and an opposite conduct repugnant to, that will. How am I to judge whether such or such act of mine will be agreeable to the Supreme Ruler or not? I have no means of arriving at a knowledge of this question (revelation is not to be invoked in the construction of natural ethics) except by my reason's accepting the universal order established in creation as the expression of His Will. Then, I will judge useful conduct to have Divine Sanction, because useful conduct is consistent with the universal order established in creation. That is to say, to reach the Divine Sanction I must go below the question of utility and reach a criterion more fundamental—the agreement of conduct with the required order of things as perceived by reason. This is a question more profound than all considerations of pleasure or pain, and the standard to which recourse is had lies below—that of utility. It is again evident that Mill confuses the relationship between the agreeable and the good. He sets up the experience of agreeable feeling as the end, and when seeking for sources of obligation binding us to pursue that end he invokes the obligation which we are under of pursuing the good. Utilitarianism denies the existence of the good independent of any consideration of utility and agreeable feeling. Make this postulate the basis of an ethical system,

and such system is shorn of all source of obligation. Mill has affirmed that in the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth we read all the philosophy of utilitarian ethics,—to do as you would be done by and to love your neighbor as yourself. He forgot that this rule does not contain all the ethical philosophy of Jesus of Nazareth, who did not make the mistake of laying down a code of benevolence without any grounds on which the obligation may stand. The law of universal benevolence is a secondary and derivative one, coming from the first and greatest: "Thou shall love the Lord thy God," which confers on the subordinate law a binding force. The essential vice and weakness of Utilitarianism lies, precisely, in the attempt to set up the second table of the decalogue as independent and self-sustaining, whereas all the validity of the laws governing our conduct towards our fellow-men depends upon the law which regulates our duty to the Creator.

The external sanction consisting of the rewards and punishments that we have to expect from our fellow-men, Mill, rightly, does not much insist on. It chiefly depends on the efficiency of law and police, and on the views prevalent in any society concerning morality. Some years ago to kill a man in a duel, far from receiving the condemnation of society, was considered an honorable distinction, whilst to decline a challenge to the attempt was an indelible shame. The obligations arising from the sanction of society may enforce vice instead of virtue. If, then, Utilitarianism has any real sanction, this must come from the internal source,—conscience; and that sanction we shall next examine.

IV.—CONSCIENCE.

Conscience, according to Mill, is essentially a feeling in our own mind consequent on the violation of duty. If this be conscience, then the utilitarian may say with Launcelot Gobbo: "By my conscience, my conscience is but a hard sort of conscience," since it is heard from only to reprimand, and extends no meed of approbation for virtue exercised. The feeling of conscience, then, arises in our own mind consequent on a perception of duty violated. Before, therefore, that conscience can make itself felt, the duty must be recognized as such—with an obligation, an "ought" of binding force.

If there is no "ought" there is no duty shown by reason ; if there is no duty recognized there is no violation, and no subsequent condemnation, and no feeling of pain. "It would pain me to do this act." Why would it pain you? "Because it would be a violation of duty." Whence comes the "ought" that creates the duty? If you cannot show the origin of the duty you cannot show any cause for the pain in which consists the utilitarian conscience. This sanction, then, presupposes an obligation ; yet it is advanced by Mill as the chief origin of obligation. That one course of conduct brings remorse, while another is followed by no such result, implies that there is an essential character absent in one, present in the other. One is such that I ought to embrace it—the other I ought not to do ; but of this essential character Utilitarianism gives no account. A utilitarian, acting strictly within the limits of his creed, contemplates an act agreeable to himself but injurious to others. Since injury to others is an injury to society, he as a member of society may indeed reap a slight measure of the evil consequences. However, on weighing both sides, his own pleasure on the one side, the evil to society, including his own problematical dividend out of the whole, on the other, he concludes that the balance of happiness declares in favor of the action. Happiness is the necessary, the only end of conduct. There is no duty binding him to an opposite course. Therefore, he will violate no duty and suffer no consequent pain—and this is the be-all and end-all of the utilitarian conscience.

Mill saw the lame and impotent character of the conscience sanction in his scheme, and he sought to palliate the absurdity by a *Tu quoque* argument. "This sanction, so far as it is disinterested, is always in the mind itself ; and the notion, therefore, of the transcendental moralists must be that the sanction will not exist in the mind, unless it is believed to have its origin out of the mind, and that of a person able to say to himself, 'This feeling which is restraining me, and is called my conscience, is only a feeling in my own mind,' he may possibly draw the conclusion that when the feeling ceases the obligation ceases ; and that if he find the feeling inconvenient he may disregard it, and try to get rid of it. But is this dan-

ger confined to the utilitarian morality? The fact is so far otherwise that all moralists admit and lament the ease with which, in the generality of minds, conscience can be silenced or stifled. The question, need I obey my conscience? is quite as often put to themselves by persons who never heard of the principle of utility as by its adherents."¹ Very different, indeed, is the force with which this difficulty bears on the utilitarian theory and on a true system of morals. For a man who sticks consistently and exclusively to utilitarian principles, the introspection which detects the entirely subjective character assigned to moral obligation, dissolves all grounds of duty. The conduct injurious to others, if sufficiently pleasant for oneself, is not recognized as any violation of duty. Conscience is not silenced or stifled, but allowed full play, with the result that reason can perceive no duty violated, and conscience has nothing to condemn. A utilitarian may say:—"But I, in my own conduct, do recognize that, for instance, it is my duty not to rob my neighbor, and if I do so my conscience will condemn me." True; if "collateral associations, derived from sympathy, from love, and still more from fear, from all the forms of religious feelings, from the recollections of childhood, from the recollections of past life," lead you to judge that your neighbor's well-being is to be considered before your own immediate pleasure, you embrace the right path. But it still remains true that the man who prefers his own pleasure can take the injurious course, without finding any utilitarian principle to convict him of wrong-doing. And in the determination of your will the scale has been turned by something else than the happiness principle; some form of religious feeling, most probably, has had a large share in the formation of your conscience, so that, fortunately for yourself, your practical morality is at variance with your theoretical Utilitarianism. When treating of the true system of ethics it will be made apparent that, though the reproving voice of conscience is neglected, there is another office of the internal monitor which is always fulfilled.

Mill makes another attempt to get rid of his embarrassment. Taking a simple thread of fact and weaving it through a wide

¹Utilitarianism, c. III.

warp and woof of gratuitous assumption, he produces a utilitarian conscience, warranted proof. The fact, which is fully conceded, is that there exists among men a powerful and widely diffused natural sentiment of benevolence. The theory which he spins, belonging to the realms of prophecy rather than moral philosophy, is that when once the general happiness is recognized as the ethical standard, this powerful natural sentiment will constitute the strength of the utilitarian morality. When once the general happiness is recognized as the ethical standard! If Utilitarianism is good for anything it ought to be good and valid now. If it is valid now, it must contain a force binding on conscience in the man who is inclined to be vicious, as well as in his virtuous brother. Instead of giving us a present sanction, Mill treats us to the version of the dreamer in *Locksley Hall*. There is a good time coming, if we but wait a little longer, when the natural bent of everybody will be, not his own, but society's welfare. When universal benevolence will have displaced every instinct of selfishness; when Utilitarianism will have taken hold of human life and "colored all thought, feeling and action in a manner of which the greatest ascendancy exercised by any religion may be but a type and foretaste." In short, when human nature shall be no longer what it is to-day, a mixture of good and evil propensities, with the evil, in many cases, largely predominant, then will come into play the sanction of the Greatest Happiness morality. This is an entrancing prospect.

"Forward, forward let us range;

Let the great world spin forever down the ringing grooves of change."

But let us also ask, however timidly, what are we to do in the meantime? It seems a pity that this efficient sanction, so badly needed now, will be available only when no longer required in that glad age when all men are to be virtuous, as Falstaff was a coward, upon instinct. How is Utilitarianism, to-day with no sanction or basis of duty, no "ought," going to raise man to that delightful condition? The progress of society, under the influence of a morality enforced by the internal sanction of conscience, resting upon the most awful ex-

ternal sanctions, has been slow, laborious and fluctuating. Utilitarianism, without lever or fulcrum, proposes to raise mankind to a level which has been the ideal of Christian virtue, an ideal which has been but seldom reached and never permanently maintained by any social organization. The task recalls the fact of Baron Munchausen, who tells how he lifted himself into Gibraltar by his boot straps. The progress in morality which has been made, from the condition that prevailed in Europe at the period of the barbarian invasion, has been the result of an ethical doctrine, widely different from the utilitarian principle. The morality which effected this change took for its starting point the ground that between right and wrong exists a distinction independent of all likes or dislikes, absolute and unchanging, based upon the eternal opposition between truth and falsehood. It brought that distinction to bear on conduct by the help of a sanction coming from conscience, derived from the will of a Supreme Legislator, whose decrees are to be obeyed. Instead of eliminating from human life the beauty of self-sacrifice, it followed the natural judgment of reason, which proclaims that self-sacrifice, distinct from and usually opposed to self-interest, is one of the chief elements of virtue. This feature of the old morality is well expressed by Carlyle: "It is a calumny to say that men are roused to heroic actions by ease, hope of pleasure, recompense, sugar plums of any kind in this world or the next. In the meanest mortal there lies something nobler. The poor, swearing soldier, hired to be shot, has his honor of a soldier, different from drill regulations and the shilling a day. It is not to taste sweet things, but to do noble and true things and vindicate himself under God's heaven as a God-made man, that the poorest son of Adam dimly longs. Show him the way of doing that, the dullest day drudge kindles into a hero. They wrong man greatly who say he is to be seduced by ease. Difficulty, abnegation, martyrdom, death, are the allurements that act on the heart of man. Kindle the inner genial life of him, you have a flame that burns up all lower considerations." (Hero Worship.)

What would have been the result if Utilitarianism had been the only guide of morals when the bulwarks of the Roman

empire went down before the barbarians? The morality which, as a whole, is received by civilized nations to-day is the outcome of what Mill and his school call the transcendental view. Finding this code in possession they try to explain it on utilitarian principles. These fail to explain; they certainly never could have produced. A code of morality is wanted, not so much to encourage those who, of their own accord, are walking in the right path, as to restrain others who prefer to follow the wrong one. Utilitarianism, if it were all it professes to be, could, at best, but say to the virtuous man: *macte virtute*; for the man who does not aim at virtue it has no message whatever.

V.—RIGHTS.

The origin of right is an important part of ethical inquiry. The idea must be thoroughly investigated in order to have a clear understanding of the measure of our duties towards others and of our claims upon them. In the chapter entitled "How Utilitarianism is Connected with Justice" Mill gives us his views on the subject. After an analysis of the various relations in which the notion of justice is found he summarizes his doctrine:

"The idea of justice supposes two things—a rule of conduct and a sentiment which sanctions the rule. The first must be supposed common to all mankind and intended for their good; the other (the sentiment) is a desire that punishment may be suffered by all those who infringe that rule. There is involved in addition the conception of some definite person who suffers by the infringement, whose rights (to use the expression appropriate to the case) are violated by it." "I have throughout treated the idea of a right residing in the injured person and violated by the injury, not as a separate element in the composition of the idea and sentiment, but as one of the forms in which the two other ideas clothe themselves. These elements are a hurt to some assignable person or persons on the one hand and a demand for punishment on the other. An examination of our own minds will, I think, show all that these two things include, all that we mean when we speak of violation of a right. When we call anything a person's right

we mean that he has a valid claim upon society to protect them in the possession of it. If he has what we consider a sufficient claim, on whatever account, to have something guaranteed to him by society, we say he has a right to it. If we have a desire to prove that anything does not belong to him, as a right, we think this is done as soon as it is admitted that society ought not to take measures for securing it to him, but should leave him to chance or his own exertions." "To have a right, then, is, I conceive, to have something which society ought to defend me in the possession of. If the objector goes on to ask why it ought, I can give him no other reason than general utility."¹

Let us now examine the number of elements comprised in this idea of right.

1. Right is a form in which clothe themselves these two elements—a hurt to some person or persons and a desire for punishment.

2. These two elements include all that we mean when we speak of the violation of a right.

3. When we call anything a person's right we mean that he has a valid claim upon society to protect him in the possession of it.

4. Society ought to protect him in the possession of it, for the reason of general utility.

A concrete example will expose the character of this explanation of rights: John Doe steals Richard Roe's horse; Richard has a right to the horse. How is this right constituted? First, we have a definite person injured—the owner of the horse. Second, there is a demand for punishment. These are what we mean. Mill tells us, when we speak of the violation of a right. When we speak of Roe's right to the horse we mean, too, that he has a valid claim upon society to be protected in the possession of it. Now it is clear that the two first mentioned elements suppose the existence of the valid claim in Richard Roe. If this valid claim were not vested in him the horse would not be his and there would be no injury inflicted, and consequently no demand for punishment if it were taken from him. If he has the claim society ought to

¹Chap. V.

protect him in the possession of it. Mr. Doe has no such valid claim to the horse. Consequently, when society, represented by the judge, will come to look into the transaction it will find that Mr. Roe, who will prove his valid claim, has been injured; that there is a demand for punishment of the enterprising utilitarian, Mr. Doe, who, unfortunately for himself, allowed his judgment to unduly magnify the amount of happiness represented by the horse. The judge will insist that the horse be restored to the person to whom it belonged—that is, to him who had the valid claim. Ultimate proceedings will probably result in Mr. Doe's going to prison, where, if his mind is of an ethical turn, he may employ his leisure to investigate a point which Mill has left entirely in the dark: Whence did it arise that the other man had the valid claim, and what is the nature of the valid claim? Everything else follows from the existence of this element—the injury inflicted, the demand for punishment, the necessity that society should see that the injury be repaired, and that the thief be punished. In other words, the valid claim is the right itself, and Mill has made no attempt to explain its origin or nature. He merely shows certain consequences which flow from its existence, and that is all that he can do, for his system affords no basis of right. Start from the principle that the necessary end of conduct is agreeable feeling, with pleasure and pain as the criterion of right and wrong; then, as you will have rejected all moral obligation, so you will have left no foundation for human rights.

VI.—CONSEQUENCES OF UTILITARIANISM.

The world at large has always looked upon self-sacrifice as an essential part of virtuous conduct. The goodness of a beneficent action is not measured without reference to the self-sacrifice which it implies. A physician who loses his life in a vain attempt to stop the spread of cholera is none the less a hero because his efforts have been unsuccessful. Let us suppose a child's life is in danger, in a burning house, without any bystander showing an inclination to attempt a rescue. Somebody offers a reward of a thousand dollars to anybody who will save the child. This proposal brings out a volunteer,

who first insists upon a guarantee that on the performance of the service his reward will be paid. Now, we should not consider his conduct by any means on a level with that of a man who would, without any prospect of reward, rush into the danger to rescue the child. Yet the material act in both cases is the same. If utility is the sole test of goodness, the conduct of each should be equally noble and virtuous. It is the element of disinterestedness which constitutes the special goodness of the one act over the other—an element which has no place in the utilitarian scheme. Utilitarianism eliminates from conduct every vestige of self-sacrifice. If I seek the happiness of others I must seek it for some motive of my own, and there can be no other motive for a utilitarian than happiness or agreeable feeling. "Each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, seeks his own happiness," is Mill's dictum. In every action, then, whatever the outward or objective end may be, the agent's own interest is the end to which that other is a means. He may exchange one kind of happiness, such as safety, comfort, property for some other, just as the man in the above illustration exchanges his safety for the prospect of a thousand dollars. This may be prudence, enlightened self-interest, but it is not self-sacrifice.

The devotedness and disinterestedness with which an action useful to others is done is always taken into account in the moral judgment of the act. But utilitarianism would change all that. The heroic examples of men who have sacrificed possessions, peace, life itself in devotion to a principle challenges the respect of men divided from them by centuries, by racial and religious differences. Such an estimate of conduct, however, we are asked to believe, is grounded on a mistake. There is no such thing as self-sacrifice. Prudence and sagacity there are in abundance, occupied in the calculation of which conduct is the most beneficial to the actor himself. The Three Hundred die at Thermopylae, Regulus returns to his Carthaginian dungeon, a Sister of Charity catches the fatal plague from a patient—glorious heroes of self-sacrifice, is the verdict of men. "Soft," says Utilitarianism, "no enthusiasm; you have here but examples of enlightened self-interest." However loudly this creed may boast that it gives an honored place

to benevolence, yet by the necessity of logic, utility, as the constituent of good, comes inevitably down to a level of selfishness from which the moral judgment of mankind turns in disgust. Deny that—

Because right is right, to follow right,
Were wisdom in the scorn of consequence,

and our admiration of the nobility and heroism of self-sacrifice is but a mental aberration. While Utilitarianism will destroy virtue, it will, by way of compensation, elevate to the rank of virtues actions which few utilitarians would call by that name. If utility constitutes moral good, then, no matter how unworthy an act may seem to be, that act is virtuous and good, if it is useful. Utility is the constituent of the good—when the cause is present the effect must follow. A railroad promoter, by swindling some of his business associates, accumulates enough capital to build a railroad through an undeveloped district. The new road proved an inestimable benefit to a large population and materially helps the general well being,—an object which the speculator had in view, even during the operations by which he obtained his money. The amount of happiness that the successful rogue has given rise to far outweighs the disadvantage caused to his few dupes. His conduct is useful, therefore it must be virtuous. Utilitarianism, indeed, seems to be accepted by society when taking a practical view of such cases, for—

In the corrupted currents of this world,
Offence's gilded hand may shove by justice,
And oft 'tis seen the wicked prize itself
Buys out the law;

but, withal, the prize is none the less wicked, and the rascal none the less a rascal for being a successful one.

Again, if resultant happiness is the measure of virtue, the wealthy man who gives a thousand dollars to some deserving public charity exercises a thousand times more virtue than a poor washerwoman who, out of her hardly-earned wages, badly needed by herself, gives a dollar. The utilitarian principle is not in harmony with the ethical view taught in the parable of the widow's mite. The measure of evil in conduct is no longer to be measured by any intrinsic essential wrongness, but entirely by the extent of the disadvantages that will result from

it. An adulterer sins with a willing accomplice ; he takes such precautions in every respect that his wrongdoing remains entirely secret. There is no injury to the community from bad example, no pain of mind to the injured husband, for he knows nothing of the fact ; so the diminution of happiness is reduced to a minimum. Now, if the evil of conduct is in direct ratio to the production of pain, the wrong of adultery in this case is infinitesimally small. On the other hand, many a husband and father who is faithful to his wife and provides as best he can for the wants of his family, may yet, by his bad temper, cause daily unhappiness which amounts to a total far greater than what is caused by the adulterer ; his conduct must, therefore, be more immoral than adultery. Or, a man may lose his fortune through an indiscretion and thus bring upon his family permanent distress ; his conduct makes strongly for discomfort and suffering, consequently it is vicious. Tried by the utilitarian code, Lord Steyne is dismissed with a caution to be more circumspect in future, while poor old Joe Sedley is branded as a villain of the deepest dye. In short, the classification which Utilitarianism would make of virtues, vices, characters, dispositions, motives upsets all recognized notions of morality. Dispensing with the first table it would cling to the second ; but they refuse to be divorced. Morality can be safeguarded only by recognizing the good, independent of questions of pleasure and pain, as the end of human conduct ; and the ethical system, which ignores this fact, leads not to morality, but to its negative ;—

“ Hold thou thy good ; define it well ;
For fear divine Philosophy
Should pass beyond her mark, and be
Procureess to the Lords of Hell.”

Some of Mill's followers have sought to evade these consequences by two different arguments. One is that an action injurious in its nature, but not actually injurious in the particular circumstances under which some one perpetrates its contemplation, is to be avoided, because, says Austin, “the question is, if acts of this class were generally done, or generally forborne or omitted, what would be the result to the general happiness or good?” It is not so nominated in the bond. Utility alone is set up as the test of right and wrong.

I have to consider the results of this, my own individual act, with all its consequences to myself and others. If things were so that one of its consequences would be that everybody else would forthwith do likewise, then I should have to consider the result of this universal conduct upon the general good. But my act is going to have no such effect, so I need not trouble myself with making absurd suppositions. The end is small, if any; my prospective happiness is great; society is not concerned in the question; I am a utilitarian, and for me the act is moral and admissible. The other is that an act, even though in certain circumstances no evil may arise from it, may be forbidden by the fact that its perpetration tends to engender a habit of committing such acts. What is the grand aim of Utilitarianism? To draw men into the habit of regulating their conduct by the utility standard. Now, in an action of this kind, I may apply that standard with the nicest discrimination, and, if one act creates a habit, then I may expect as a result of this one, a more pronounced tendency to employ, in the future, this same convenient standard. If the utilitarian could urge that the morality of conduct may be measured by the agent's motive there might be some help to assist him out of the difficulty. But this view he himself has ruled out of court. He holds that there is but one motive of conduct—happiness. "The motive," says Mill, "has nothing to do with the morality of the action, though much with the worth of the agent. The motive makes a great difference in our moral estimation of the agent, especially if it indicates a good or bad disposition, from which useful or hurtful actions are likely to arise." How far can the motive, then, make a difference in our appreciation of the agent? Chiefly as far as it indicates to what extent we may look for similar acts in the future. That means, if it means anything, that the motive may be considered, not to test whether the agent is acting virtuously or not in the present instance—that is, settled independently of the motive, but to judge whether one may look to him for a continuation of such useful acts in the future.

We have brought to a close the examination of Utilitarianism, with the result that its failure to take the place of religion as a foundation for morality is shown to be evident, complete and disastrous.

JAMES J. FOX.

NEW HANDBOOKS OF PHILOSOPHY.

This is an age of the revival of philosophies, and these philosophies are expressed through literature. The form of literature which at present dominates the greater part of the reading world is the novel. It has become a handbook of philosophy, and nearly every novelist feels that he is unworthy of his avocation if he cannot find a philosophical theory for his practice. In a word he philosophizes his philosophy.

The French critics, who have exquisitely refined the tools *tière*, who is a Darwinian, but not a "naturalist," is using of their trade, are largely responsible for this; and M. Brunet the material offered by the novel as a great part in his work of showing that literature is both a theory and an art. He is fond of the word "evolution," but he is keen and broad-minded enough to see that literature is not science, though the causes which lead to its creation may be treated in a philosophical manner. In spite of the passion of his nation for analysis, his methods are synthetical. As M. Jules Lemaitre says:¹ "M. Brunetière est incapable, ce semble, de considérer une œuvre, quelle qu'elle soit, grande ou petite, sinon dans ses rapports avec un groupe d'autres œuvres, dont la relation avec d'autres groupes, à travers le temps et l'espace, lui apparaît immédiatement, et aussi de suite."

The power of doing this,—and nobody who knows M. Brunetière's work can deny that he does it admirably,—implies the possession of an enormous amount of territory, from whose fastnesses he can draw at will. This territory he has conquered thoroughly; he has examined every acre and even yard of it most minutely; and in the splendor of his conquest and his use of it, he is superior to those great critics that preceded him,—Sainte Beuve and Edmond Scherer. If one, however, applies his synthetical method to his position as a critic, one at first thought groups with him two authors who, at a second

¹ *Les Contemporains* (sixième série.)

glance, seem to have little resemblance to him. And these are Louis Veillot and W. H. Mallock. And, applying to him, too, his theory of evolution, we discover, with hope, that the result of Sainte Beuve and Scherer and a great group of lesser critics is a man who, in his desire for "a principle of authority has been led on various occasions to make concessions to Catholicity, which may very well seem excessive."¹ Brunetière is hardly a Neo-Catholic, he is not less of a Pessimist than he was, and it is a question whether he does not hold Buddhism² as of at least equal value with Christianity, yet it is consoling to know that, while the apostles of science and work and the preachers of aestheticism and idleness place annihilation as their conclusion, a logical and great critic looks with longing, but as yet perhaps without solace, to the one religion of infallible authority. M. Anatole France, who is M. Renan bathed in extract of violets, would prefer the Paradise of Mohammed; M. Brunetière looks forward to a Nirvâna, but he cannot accept the quiescent state and the absence of the karma,—for him soul-activity will never cease; he is too practical for mysticism, too scholastic for impressionism. As a logician who halts, he is like Mallock; as a dogmatist who will not tolerate unreason, he is like Veillot; hence his "concessions," hence his problems. The sarcasm and invective of Louis Veillot against the schools of philosophy in letters that he detested were not much more fierce than are the attacks of Brunetière on the "scientific naturalistic" school. His evolution is in progress, and it is evident that the Darwinian who finds, the older he grows, the need for a solid philosophical and moral background for his science and art, is gradually losing his respect for Schopenhauer and his tendency to regard Christianity and Buddhism with equal sympathy. The man who refused to calumniate the Middle Ages and accused the writers of the eighteenth century of having invented their darkness has not been slow to discover that the abuse of Darwinism and the teaching of Schopenhauer have helped to produce the manifestations he most abhors in literature.

¹Irving Babbett: *Atlantic Monthly*, June, 1897.

²*La Philosophie de Schopenhauer: Questions de Critique*: 1886.

It is remarkable that England and America, while they show us the results of the philosophical tendencies in literature, offer such a small amount of serious criticism. The seeker who would analyze the influences that make partisans of thought must turn to the French, who have a way of settling questions without circumlocution. Besides, in France art is a religion, and while the artist there takes himself seriously, the artist in other countries—always excepting the German musician,—wastes a good deal of his mental force in trying to believe that he is serious. Consequently, French literary art dominates the form of expression which, for want of a better name, we call the novel. The march of events and the complexity of modern life have become so sublime and amazing, that Melchior de Vogüé expresses a truth we all know when he says of the progress of Germany: "It would require a Shakespere, doubled by a Montesquieu to describe the life of this country during the last three years." Similarly the life of all civilized countries, as depicted in history—which, when not a mere collection of annals, is as personal as fiction—requires that the author should be something more than a lyrical romancer. There must be in him a stronger element than the mere desire to chaunt or to recite great events. As depicted in the novel, which is not only the history of the mind, but the essentials from which the historian must, in the future, draw much of his material, life is no longer a mere spectacle, with red fire flaming here and there and the torch-bearing Hymen at the end. Whether it is well that a form of expression, which was gay at times, more often at least cheerful and always exciting, should have become a vehicle for the consideration of all sorts of problems, is not the question at present. But in no age has the art of fiction received such careful attention and analysis. Even in England where, in Miss Austin's time, the novel was dropped behind the sofa or the sideboard when visitors came and a compilation of sermons immediately taken up, it has been, for at least fifty years, the favorite tool of men who wished either to construct or destroy. Newman, Wiseman, Lord Beaconsfield, Charles Kingsley, Carlyle—all resorted to fiction; and no doubt a posthumous novel by Mr. Gladstone will be discovered, since

this is the only form of thought expression he seems so far to have neglected.

M. Brunetière, while crediting Protestantism with the morality of the English novel,¹ declares that in France the novel serves as a destructive force to batter uncomfortable institutions or to attack unpleasant persons, but that he doubts whether it will ever become, as in the hands of Dickens, Thackeray, and George Eliot, an instrument for higher things. He notes the distinction between the moral teaching of George Eliot—"the moral of the good bad books"—and the morality of Thackeray, which is "insupportably preachy, narrow and prudhommesque." She teaches the morality of Herbert Spencer; "there is no higher morality," Brunetière says, "none more Utopian;" and he compares it, with gentle scorn, to the morality of Madame Craven and Miss Yonge.

For serious criticism of literature one must go to France, where literary manifestations are not only considered from the point of view of art, but from the point of view of philosophy; but even M. Brunetière, whom some of us Catholics have adopted with enthusiasm, perhaps a little too ardent, does not, as a rule, take that view of morality of which we approve. We love him most reasonably for his hatreds;—we find at the end of the century a critic making the same fight against false philosophy in literature that Veuillot and Brownson made, with a much greater power of having himself heard. We cannot help seeing, from the example of M. Brunetière, that a serious student of literature must devote great attention to the development and scientific causes of the novel, but that, in so doing, he finds himself helpless unless he can find some fixed standard of philosophy, morality, and art to which to appeal. The present intellectual position of M. Brunetière is due to this fact: he must accept the theories of the "impressionists," like MM. Anatole France and Jules Lemaître, grope along until he finds a basis which will be popular and still have a "scientific" appearance or admit that the absolute exists, and that the absolute, the ultimate tribunal, is God. M. Brunetière and the schools of critics about him are living proofs that art

¹ "C'est ainsi qu'il manquera probablement toujours au naturalisme français ce que trois siècles de forte éducation protestante ont infusé de valeur morale au naturalisme anglais."—*Le Roman Naturaliste*, p. 241.

cannot live for art alone, nor science for science alone, and that the very denial of God and dogma is essentially an affirmation.

Psychology will some day or other give us the key to what we call temperament. Until then we shall be forced to listen to endless theories on the consciousness and intentions of Shakespeare and to hear the modern doers of various kinds of work wasting many words in striving to justify the result of natural bent, early training, and the demands of their time upon them, by formulating philosophies for it all. M. Zola, not admitting the manifest truth that he took advantage of the popularization of science in order to make an effect which accorded with his natural tendency, invents a philosophy of "scientific naturalism." Carlyle, who invented a style for the purpose of effect, too, and took advantage of dyspepsia in order to accent it, might, had the process been in fashion in his time, have made a scientific apology for himself in much the same way. But he was of his years. M. Zola, in attempting to be effective, was, he thought, obliged to be coarse and incorrect in his style; to be heard, too, he must make a sensation, and grovel in the filth at the feet of the people. Unconsciously, he was following a tendency which forced Hugo to be violent and truculent in his protest against aristocratic classicism, to commit brutal acts in his dramas; for it is certain that when literary art in France "appeals directly to the people—being innately cultivated, chiselled, exquisite, in a word, aristocratic,—it becomes exceedingly coarse, declamatory and incorrect."¹

M. Zola will admit no force unknown to him in his method, though we know he finds room somewhere for his guess at heredity. Yet, if he were a true analyst, he would see that the reaction from classicism in his own case is only romantic after all. While M. Zola shrieks, like Caliban, at scholasticism, he is forced to give a metaphysical reason for his nastiness, just as modern poets often feel themselves obliged, out of consideration for science, to explain their involuntary rhythms by an elaborate appeal to physics. In fact, he is forced by the demand that everything shall be re-

¹"*Le Roman Naturaliste*," p. 242. La théorie de l'art pour l'art est essentiellement latine.

ferred to philosophy, whether divine or not, to flee for dignity to the thing he most detests. He is like an actor hating all things classical, who would attempt to increase his height when topped with a tall hat, by shoeing himself with the cothurnus!

Having written a certain number of novels, founded on a hypothesis which attracted him, he now goes forth in search of a philosophy. The syllogism, the soul of scholasticism, haunts him, as it haunts every other man brought up in scholastic methods. He wrote "*Le Rêve*" in order to show that he could be moral and "chaste." It was a conscious effort; he went against his tendencies, and he pointed to it with pride. It was even more difficult to find a philosophy which would explain him, not as a mere writer, an intuitive observer, a magical expressor, but as a scientist. It is necessary to accentuate this here in order to show that the position of the novel and the novelist has entirely changed in the last fifty years. It has become something that must be reckoned with and which deserves as much study as any other great social phenomenon.

Science and work are the key-words of M. Zola's system. From his experimental philosophy he gets these axioms: "Man must be scientific; man must work." Tolstoi, who has also arranged his various philosophies in the form of novels, comments on this, from his point of view, in 1884: "The most part of what is called religion," he says, "is only the superstition of the past; the most part of what is called science is only the superstition of the present." Tolstoi goes on to say that even before he heard Zola's formula given to the youth of France, he was surprised at the fixed impression, above all in Europe, that work is a species of virtue. "I had always believed it was pardonable only in a being deprived of reason, as the ant in the fable, to elevate work to the rank of a virtue and to glory in it. M. Zola is sure that work makes man good. I have always remarked the contrary." Work, even when it is not entirely selfish,—he continues—"work for work's sake, makes men, as well as ants, hard and cruel. "Even if work be not a vice, it can not, from any point of view, be regarded as a merit."¹

¹Zola, Dumas, Guy de Maupassant; Leo Tolstoi. Translated into French by E. Halperrine Kalminsky.

One observes a great difference between the teachings of Zola and those of Count Tolstoi, both eminent writers of the modern handbooks of philosophy. With one, religion is a superstition and science a living light; with the other both are largely superstitions. Authors like Sir Walter Scott and Manzoni, believed that their work was to illuminate life rather than to explain it.

If M. Zola claimed only to be a teller of tales and said frankly that he "wallowed" because there are many persons who find his wallowing interesting enough to be paid for, we should have no concern with him here. If M. Brunetière treated literature,—and the literature of the novel particularly,—only as a means of producing effects, his critical studies would have no claim on attention in this paper. But both these gentlemen turn irresistibly from the modus of their work to its philosophy, and draw from it ethical conclusions. M. Brunetière, logically following his method, must come in time to see that a system of ethics which can be preached with confidence must have an infallible foundation. M. Zola, following his method as logically as he can, will never end by turning the impossible into the possible. To make processes which go on in the soul as evident as the lungs of a cat are in the hands of an experimenting surgeon the soul must be touched by a steel scalpel.

The chief experimental scientific novelist, who is M. Zola, breathed jubilantly when he discovered Claude Bernard's "Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine." He had at last a standard to which he could mould his own. Bernard holds that the spontaneity of living bodies is not opposed to the employment of experiment.¹ "The end of all experimental method, the boundary of all scientific research, is thus identical for living and for inanimate bodies; it consists in finding the motions which unite a phenomenon of any kind to its nearest cause, or, in other words, in determining the conditions necessary for the manifestation of this phenomenon." He has no hope of ever finding the "why" of things; he can only know the "how." "The experimental novel is a consequence of the scientific evolution of the cen-

¹ Bernard as quoted by Zola, in "The Experimental Novel," translated by Belle M. Sherman.

tury." M. Zola says: "It continues and completes physiology, which itself leans for support on chemistry and medicine; it substitutes for the study of the abstract metaphysical man the study of the natural man, governed by physical and chemical laws, and modified by the influence of his surroundings; it is, in one word, the literature of our scientific age, as the classical and romantic literature corresponded to a scholastic and theological age."

It would be useless to give so much space to M. Zola's "determinism," if he were the only exponent of it. Fallacious as it seems to men of faith, to men who hold firmly to the supernatural, it has a specious quality of insinuation for folk of unfixed principle, whether it be covered by Grant Allen's Hedonism or Hardy's Pessimism; in a phrase, almost any jargon may pass if it be concealed by that blanket word—scientific.

The experimental scientific novelist is a student of diseases. He takes the body in the clinic and cuts into the ulcer; he will not permit his disciples to smoke a cigar in his dissecting room,—it might create an illusion, and all palliative illusions are idealistic! Idealism is the enemy. "Let us compare, for one instant, the work of the idealistic novelists to ours," M. Zola says, "and here this word idealistic refers to writers who cast aside observation and experiment and base their works on the supernatural and irrational, who admit, in a word, the power of mysterious forces outside of the determinism of the phenomenon."

The author who admits the supernatural is as odious to the "scientific experimentalists" as is the vivisector who believes in a soul which he cannot see or touch. The "scientific experimentalist" is a doctor of letters, whose occupation is gone when health reigns. Nevertheless, the novelist who places himself before his subject on the table of the clinic must have an idea. Readers of M. Zola will naturally wonder in what way this personal idea or hypothesis differs from the "theory" of the idealistic novelist; he does not answer this question. Jules Verne, whom the superior "scientific experimentalist" doubtless holds to be rather frivolous, occurs to one's mind in glancing at this elaborate exposition; he has

ideas; he uses them as search lights to find strange combinations of facts in his imagination, and no doubt he will be quite willing to accept these combinations as truths if they are ever proved. The naturalistic experimental novelist would treat the story of Lancelot and Guinevere in this way: First, there is the idea, which is, that in an effete state of society, where idealism is rampant, sin is supposed to exist. King Arthur, Guinevere, Lancelot, are combinations of phosphorus, oxygen, nitrogen and whatever else chemistry finds them to be. Arthur does not count; the experimental scientific novelist could hardly deal with him; Lancelot and Guinevere follow certain inevitable physiological laws. Tainted with idealism, they fancy that they sin, not knowing that the experimental novelist has effaced sin. The consequence is that the consciousness of sin, which is "scientifically" impossible, produces a false and morbid condition in the whole Round Table, and the poor creatures, who had not even read Paul Bert's nice little scientific primer, die miserable deaths in convent cells, sacrificed to idealism. Hamlet might be treated in a similar manner,—the hallucination of the old-fashioned ghost on the subject of the "sins done in his days of nature" being the disease for the experimental treatment of the scientist.

But may any process be scientific, the results of which can not be verified? May any method be scientific which can be applied only by one man? The Keely Motor may be to us magic or charlatanism; if it be clearly explained, so that its processes can be squared with natural laws; if experts can repeat its processes, it becomes scientific, and ceases to be "magical."

It is plain that the creation of a novelist or a poet can never belong to science. Let us presume that you find your Becky Sharp,—exactly like *your* conception of Thackeray's intriguer,—are you sure that she is really *his* Becky Sharp? *You* may think she is. In the processes of physics, chemistry and physiology, experimentalism is not founded on your thought or mine. Literature is compact of imagination. Imagination may be the prophet of science, but it is not science; it can never be science; it soars beyond what the experimentalist calls the rational. Mr. Coventry Patmore puts it,—“The more lofty,

living and spiritual the intellect and character become, the more is need perceived for the sap of life which can only be sucked from the inscrutable and, to the wholly rational mind, repulsive ultimates of nature and instinct."¹ The experimental scientific novelist either ignores this truth or treats it as an aberration. Some men—a few—are born with their hearts on the right side. They are abnormal; they answer, in the opinion of the gentlemen of this school, to the idealist in life and letters. The idealist has lived for many centuries; the scientific novelist's mission is to exterminate him, and the scientific experimentalist "is always a little Atlas who goes² stumbling along with his eyeballs bursting from his head under his self-imposed burden." It is a merciful thing that he does not discover that the world he thinks he holds has become only a goitre under his chin, which, unhappily, does not stop the action of his jaws.

That M. Zola's philosophy is taken seriously in France, M. Brunetière's fulminations show,—and M. Brunetière has kept them up for a long time. That there are many cultivated persons who believe that criticism may exist without canons, the success of M. Anatole France and M. Jules Lemaitre shows,—and M. Anatole France and M. Jules Lemaitre have been writing for a long time. M. Zola is bewildered by Darwin, and he seizes Claude Bernard as the raft to which he clings in a sea of inconsistent romance. When he discovers that the raft is water-logged, he will grasp the later support offered by the dictum of M. Le Dantec,—that beyond the laws of physics and chemistry there is nothing affecting the senses of living, observing beings, transcending the laws governing gross matter, and, he will add, there can be nothing. MM. France and Lemaitre have not even the decency of pretending to reverence science. "I am sure only of my impressions," M. Lemaitre says. M. Gaston Deschamps, who has brilliancy and common sense, laughs a little at them both, while gravely remarking that Guy de Maupassant, though not "a philosopher by profession, was saturated with philosophy and science."³ Always partridges—and philosophy!

¹ *Religio Poetae*, p. 123.

² *Ibid.*

³ *La vie et les livres*: Gaston Deschamps.

Critics of the type of M. Brunetière are rare in England and our own country. There are Saintsbury and Dowden; there are Stedman, Richard H. Stoddard, Howells, Hazeltine and Irving Babbett. They do not seem to be so serious as their French colleagues, perhaps because their work is not looked upon nationally as great or important. Of these Mr. Howells is most colored, both in his creative and analytical products, by the modern French. He is a naturalist, too,—but he confines himself to the nerves; he is a specialist in slight nervous difficulties. Nobody of taste can deny his charm, which is strongest when he forgets the theory that realism, of a decent sort, is to regenerate the world.

The haste with which books are reviewed prevents grave and careful criticism; and most of our reviewers are, from defects in philosophical training and lack of time, only impressionists of the sketchiest kind. It ought to be remembered that books go on living, for good or ill, years and years after they are forgotten by the critics. They disappear and become white paper again, but their seeds remain and germinate forever and forever.

The English, whose taste in novels largely dominates ours, have borrowed from France the idea of making their works of fiction into tremendously philosophical treatises. In fact, the French schools, to which we owe the later Henry James¹ and the new methods of Harold Frederic,² have permeated Hardy and Meredith, Mrs. Humphrey Ward, Mr. Grant Allen, and half a dozen others.

It is difficult to account for Miss Marie Corelli; she was, no doubt, struck out of the brain of a mahatma by a flaming comet.

Pessimism and evolution and experimental naturalism are apparent, more or less, in all. Even Stevenson does not concern himself with God and the supernatural motive. "The naturalistic writer," says M. Zola,³ "believes that there is no necessity to pronounce on the question of God. He is a creative force, and that is all. Without entering into a discussion as to the subject of this force, without wishing still

¹The Experimental Novel, p. 401.

²The Other House.

³The Damnation of Theron Ware.

further to specify it, he takes nature from the beginning and analyzes it. His work is the same as that of our chemists and physicists. He but gathers together and classifies the data, without ever referring them to a common standard, without drawing conclusions about the ideal." It seems like a blunder,—which in literary criticism means a crime against good taste,—to intimate that the adorable Stevenson should be submitted to analysis. There can be no question that Miss Wedgewood is right when she calls him "non-moral";¹ she is just, too, when she points out the fact that between the direct moral tone of George Eliot, for all her Herbert Spencerism, and Stevenson and Meredith, there is a marked difference. Meredith, the chief novelist of our year, is an "experimentalist"; he chooses his subjects and tries to produce re-actions. God may exist "as a creative force," but Meredith has not found it necessary to consider that. Diana of the Causeways, Lord Ormont's Aminta, the persons in "Richard Feveril," are treated as a demonstrator of anatomy handles his bones,—and the experimental lecturer makes epigrams that have light, but no warmth. The philosophy of Meredith is Epicureanism restrained in expression by the reticence of a distinguished patrician of letters. And neither in "Marius the Epicurean" nor in "Gaston de Latour" can Pater conceal in his art the trail of the bad old aestheticism.

The text on which Mr. Hardy seems to have based the philosophy of his latest works is from Schopenhauer: "There are two things which make it impossible to believe that this world is the successful work of an all-wise, all-good and, at the same time, all-powerful Being. First, the misery which abounds in it everywhere; and, second, the obvious imperfection of its highest product, man, who is a burlesque on all he should be."

If Mr. Hardy were an actual realist, not a mere experimentalist, the world would be only a spring-board from which his creatures ought to plunge into a sea of nothingness. And he, doubtless disagreeing with Schopenhauer in regarding suicide as unjustifiable, should not to be hard-hearted enough to expect them to live under the hopelessness which he has heaped

¹ *Ethics and Literature*. Julia Wedgewood. Contemporary review for January, 1897.

upon them. Life is bad, sad, he teaches us; women are young and we imagine they are beautiful, but the allure is only that a man be snared into marriage and be unhappy ever afterward. Nature is fair and cruel, and everywhere suggestive of the worship of Phallas; and what matters it all?

Hardy and Meredith are consummate artists, and nobody will refuse that adjective to Stevenson's art. But let us remark, in all coldness, without partisanship, if necessary, that in the nineteenth century after the birth of Christ, the false philosophies of the vanished world again appear, and the intellectual and cultivated Christians of our time receive them without much question, with no apologies, with no protest, under the form most insidious, most permeating. With Stevenson life is a problem, for which he has no solution. To live bravely, not thinking of the end, is his motto. The slightest hurt to the smallest creature is, in his code, more terrible than the pride of Lucifer. Men and women are good and bad as they have been made good or bad; their souls may not exist as souls, but their karma—the essence of their acts influenced by the acts of their ancestors—exists, and it determines their earthly fate. Stevenson has more skill than Sir Walter Scott; he, like Hardy and George Meredith, can tell a story better than Cervantes. Le Sage and Fielding and Manzoni are bunglers in their art compared to these new men. But there is nothing predicting that they will live as Hamlet and "Promessi Sposi," "The Bride of Lammermoor" and "The Newcomes" and "Adam Bede" will live. Even the fundamental passions fail of effect if there are no gods to whom to appeal. Persephone in Hades is not a fit subject for poetry, with Jupiter dead and no golden harvest and no blue flowers in the corn above her, bathed in the sunshine, for which she longs. Heine's yearning pine is naught without the splendid vision of the sun-flooded land of the palm. There are no finer artists in words than Flaubert and De Maupassant and Meredith and Hardy and Stevenson; we may admire the carving of the statue of Mercury without burning incense to the cult it represents. But, while the art is fine, there is a lack of depth beyond it; the sea of eternity sends no winds to the land where its creatures live. They pretend not to have heard that Pan is dead or that the Galilean has conquered.

Mrs. Humphrey Ward is a professional philosopher. She teaches consciously ; she analyzes persons in order to construct others. She is a "modern," too, an experimentalist, a scientist; her human interest saves her in spite of her didacticism. She is pagan rather than positivist; a rather conventional pagan; studying, in the breakfast cap of a British matron, the sports of the arena. She could have taught Marcus Aurelius much that would have opened his eyes. One is sure, however, that her head would have been cut off early in the week if she had pre-existed as the story-telling princess of the Arabian Nights. Mr. Henry James is an experimentalist, and he dallies with the scientific method. He has the advantage of a manner of late so impartial that one may begin his novels at the end and not know that one has finished them when the commencement is reached. With him, too, God is an abstraction. Mr. Crawford makes no philosophical claims. He is the manager of "a pocket theatre," yet his grasp on the eternal verities is sure, and he philosophizes didactically on every possible occasion; a huge book could be made of his *dicta*. He abhors the experimental novelist, and evidently has the old aristocratic prejudice against science as a tool of democracy, a leveller, in fact.

To return to M. Brunetière, it is permissible to point to him as a type—by no means an entirely satisfactory type—of a class of men that we badly need in English-speaking countries. There are many who explain Dante to us, some with insight, more with unction. There is none at present willing and capable of interpreting the meaning of this wonderful literary and social and philosophical phenomenon, the novel, none able to appreciate its value or its strength, or to pluck out the heart of its false philosophies. It is a force, a tyranny, a terror. It may be made to serve as a key to problems that the world faces shivering.

It is not science, but it deserves scientific treatment. The province of the highest art is not to idealize, but to perfect. Science, which deals only with the exact and rational, loses its dignity when used by an artist to conceal the betrayal of his best.

MAURICE FRANCIS EGAN.

ERIGENA AND AQUINAS.

It is with a view of suggesting a study in development, and not for the purpose of comparing systems of thought, that the names of Erigena and Aquinas are brought together in the present article. Philosophy, like every other vital product, is subject to certain laws of progress and decay. At decisive moments in its history great minds appear, and though it must be conceded that their appearance is not fully accounted for, yet systems and schools are, to a large extent, the outcome of antecedents which it is in the power of the historian to determine. Every philosophical movement is, in a manner, the product of the past, and becomes in turn the inspiration of subsequent movements. This is admirably illustrated in the history of the philosophy of the Schools. The great Schoolmen of the thirteenth century are not comets wandering aimlessly and appearing unaccountably above the philosophical horizon. No one who has studied the period can fail to recognize in St. Thomas and his contemporaries the continuators of a movement begun in Alexandria and extended in the ninth century to the schools of the West. The thirteenth century, it is true, will always be regarded as the golden age of scholasticism; the ninth, tenth, and eleventh were the period of preparation, the fourteenth and fifteenth the epoch of degeneration and decay. From Hales to Occam scholastic thought reached its highest development and found its most fitting expression. But the importance of the thirteenth century and the success which its writers attained suggest all the more imperatively the necessity of searching the preceding ages for the beginnings of such noteworthy growth. It is only when we compare it with the efforts of the first School philosophers that we are able to see in its true proportions the work accomplished by St. Thomas.

The title "Scholastic Philosophy" is now found at the head of a section or paragraph in every text-book of the history of philosophy, and is understood to designate the epoch which,

roughly speaking, extends from the ninth century to the fifteenth. The writers whom it is made to include seem at first sight to have nothing in common save the name itself. They are School philosophers,—sprung from the race of masters who in the ninth and tenth centuries presided over the schools in court and cloister, and who, as far as the limited curriculum of the schools allowed, affixed to the text of their logical treatises those commentaries which were to form the starting point of mediæval metaphysics. All divisions in history are necessarily arbitrary, and it is not doing violence to facts to group all the Christian philosophers from the days of Charlemagne to the fall of Constantinople under the name "Schoolmen," a title which points to the institution whence the whole scholastic movement began.

But the name is not the only link which binds together the philosophers of the School. There are bonds more intimate, characteristics of method and doctrine which they possess in common. Of these characteristics, the gradual adaptation of the philosophy of Aristotle as the basis of a rational exposition of Christianity has been suggested as the one that dominates the scholastic period. This trait certainly divides the scholastic era from the patristic; but though Aristotelianism triumphed in the schools it was not always in the ascendant among the School-philosophers; Erigena, Anselm and Henry of Ghent were Platonists, while Abelard and others divided their allegiance between the Lyceum and the Academy. Again, it is suggested that belief in the agreement between philosophy and theology is the characteristic of the scholastic period and the inspiration of the whole movement. This is certainly a trait of the period, a principle which is more deeply rooted in School-philosophers than their leaning towards Aristotle; but it is a trait which is found also in patristic systems.

Before attempting to cite Erigena and Aquinas as two moments in the unfolding of the scholastic idea, we must answer the question which the preceding paragraph suggests. In what does the scholastic idea consist? What is the soul of the scholastic movement? The gradual Christianizing of Aristotle is but a secondary trait. To put reason and revelation in harmony was the aim of the Fathers as well as the School-

men. But the patristic apologetics and patristic philosophy leaned towards authority. The rights of reason were acknowledged, but reason was often transfigured into a faculty of mystic intuition. With the ninth century, however, a new era dawns, and the agreement between reason and revelation assumes a new aspect. Erigena, it is true, lingers round the portals of the Museum; Neo-Platonism dominates his thought and vitiates his method. Yet he is the first in a long line of dialecticians who will give to reason, in the stricter sense of ratiocinative faculty, her full share in the honors which she must divide with revelation. In their broad outlines, therefore, the scholastic idea and the patristic idea are identical; but between them there is one important difference which we cannot overlook, if we would grasp the meaning of the scholastic movement. Logic is the only inheritance that the first Schoolmen received from pagan antiquity, and by applying logic to the mysteries of faith these innovators determine the character of the whole period. Thus while the adjustment of reason and revelation, of science and faith, is the great aim of the scholastic as it was of the patristic period, it is peculiar to the Schoolmen that they regarded dialectic as the sole instrument by which that aim was to be accomplished.

Bearing in mind the aim and the method of scholastic philosophy, it is evident that we must judge the different epochs of scholasticism according to the meaning which each attached to the underlying principle itself and to the perfection with which each worked it out in detail. Erigena and Aquinas, exemplifying as they do the first rude beginnings and the final culmination of the scholastic movement, exhibit the scholastic idea in two very distinct moments of development.

Erigena's starting point is that of his favorite author, the Pseudo-Dionysius: "The Over-Being of God is the Being of all Things." In nature and in grace, in the realm of reason as well as in that of revelation, God is not only the greatest, He is the sole object of knowledge. In the first chapter of the "*Liber de Proedestinatione*" St. Augustine is quoted, "*Sic, enim, creditur—non aliam esse philosophiam, id est Sapientiae studium, et aliam religionem*" (*De Vera Religione*, Cap. 5).

Philosophy, Erigena adds, is true religion, for philosophy aims at expounding the laws of that religion by which God, the supreme cause, is adored in humility and studied by reasonable inquiry. Hence, true religion is true philosophy, and true philosophy is true religion (Col., 358).¹ Thus, at the outset of the scholastic movement the agreement between philosophy and theology is resolved into the identity of the two sciences. And Erigena carried the principle into practice: Scripture and tradition are sources of argument in philosophy, while the mysteries of religion are placed within the reach of human reason. But here we must be careful to grasp the exact thought of the court philosopher. Abelard, in later times, confounded theology and philosophy; he brought the authority of the Fathers and of the Scriptures to bear on philosophical problems, and shocked the pious mystics of his age by his daring application of dialectics to the mysteries of faith. Yet, Abelard's position and Erigena's are antithetical, for, while Abelard was rationalistic in his tendencies, Erigena inclined to mysticism. Confident in the untried power of the human mind, Abelard practically set no limits to the possible conquest of dialectical reasoning. Erigena sees no possibility of attaining truth unless we are enlightened by the Author of all light, Who alone is worthy of our contemplation. For Abelard, all theology is philosophy; for Erigena, all philosophy is theosophy.

In support of this view of Erigena's position regarding the relation of philosophy to theology, it is sufficient to turn to the first book of "*De Divisione Naturae*," where being and not-being are defined in terms of our cognitive powers. Whatever we can comprehend is; whatever we cannot comprehend is not. To the question, What can we comprehend? Erigena replies that we can comprehend merely the qualities and other accidents of things (Col., 443)—the real nature of things being hidden and God alone being able to open up the secrets of the universe. The curtain is drawn and the hidden truth revealed in that Theophania or divine apparition which will constitute the never-ending glory of the blessed, but which is also vouchsafed here below to those who make themselves worthy of it

¹ The references are to Migne's edition, *Patrologia Latina*, vol. 122.

(Col., 449). Here we have the central idea of Erigena's theory of knowledge. Its mystic tendency is evident. It answers the question, Why are philosophy and theology one science? They are one because knowledge of the *noumenon* is possible only by a revelation or, at least, by an intuition of the illumined intellect.

Let us now turn to Aquinas, and see how he defines the relations of reason to faith. The opening chapters of the "Summa contra Gentiles" lay down the Thomistic doctrine, which may be reduced to the following three points:

I. There are truths, as for example the mystery of the Blessed Trinity, which transcend human reason. Such truths belong exclusively to theology. This is the first and most tangible indication of the distinction between theology and philosophy.

II. There are truths concerning God which human reason unaided can attain. Such, for example, are the existence and the unity of God. These truths are demonstrable by reason, yet they are revealed. But in theology, we believe on authority: in philosophy, we assent on intrinsic evidence. Even, therefore, on the common ground of truths immediate between philosophy and theology there is no possibility of confounding the two sciences. The light of reason and the light of revelation are distinct, and scientific knowledge, which is illumined by the one, and belief, which is guided by the other, must also remain distinct. (Cf. Summa Theol., I, I, 1 ad 2um.)

III. Finally, truths concerning God, whether they are within the reach of human reason or are purely supernatural, cannot contradict the great body of doctrines which belong to the natural sciences and to philosophy. This was a settled conviction with all the Schoolmen. It was assumed as axiomatic, and under one form or another inspired every contribution to scholastic philosophy. St. Thomas undertakes to prove it. Our natural knowledge has God for its author. The principles of science, the germs of all knowledge, are planted in the mind from the beginning, and thus, when we acquire knowledge, when others teach us or when we imagine that we are teaching ourselves, it is God, who, in a special

sense, is our teacher. When, therefore, God reveals truths which are beyond our natural ken, it were blasphemous to suppose that He should contradict His own teaching.

The relations existing between reason and revelation may, therefore, be summed up in these words: Distinction and Continuity. The domain of theology is distinct from that of philosophy, yet between them there is no break; the one is the continuation of the other. Where reason ends faith begins; beyond the region of systematized knowledge lies the realm of the incomprehensible, where faith rules alone. St. Thomas, however, did not make the limitations of human knowledge the foundation of his system as the modern agnostic does. He did not set those limits so close around us as Mansel and Spencer have striven to set them. But he recognizes the principle that the human mind is limited; that knowledge is not coextensive with truth; though he differs radically from the anti-Christian agnostic when he insists that beyond the region of knowledge is faith, not nescience.

If we now proceed to compare the central idea of scholasticism, as understood by Erigena and by St. Thomas respectively, we perceive at once the immense distance which separates the two philosophers. The thought is, in substance, the same, yet it is strangely different in its two aspects. It has undergone an evolution. The concept of theology and philosophy as homogeneous has yielded to the concept of the heterogeneity of the two sciences, and while a violent severance of reason from faith, such as the sixteenth century witnessed, must be judged a lamentable deterioration, the passing from uncritical oneness to harmonious heterogeneity, the change which the scholastic idea underwent in the progress from the ninth century to the thirteenth, must be regarded as a true evolution. The factors in this change have been many and complicated. The rationalizing spirit of Roscelin and Abelard has been offset by the mysticism of St. Bernard and the Victorines. Every system has directed its efforts towards harmonizing faith and science. The thought that revelation is reasonable and that reason is divine, has wandered through the ages seeking an appropriate expression, until Aquinas voiced it in a system of formulas simple in expression, yet rich in contents and easily

applicable to the great problems of the mind. It took three centuries to show that rationalism and mysticism destroy one of the two terms to be reconciled, and that the formula which preserves both yet holds that both are harmonious parts of a yet greater system, has solved the problem.

In order to appreciate the superiority of the stand which St. Thomas has taken, let us see how Erigena applies his principle to the most characteristic of all the contents of his philosophical system. At the outset of his treatise, "*De Divisione Naturae*," he cites St. Gregory in support of the proposition that "the being of all things is the over-being of God" ("*Esse omnium est superesse Divinitatis*"). He distinguishes, it is true, the fourfold function of philosophy to divide, to define, to demonstrate, and to analyze; but in practice he neglects the latter two. He divides nature, he defines with infinite pains the different meanings of being and not-being; but when he comes to speak of God in nature he does not prove his position, nor does he analyze with sufficient care the mode of God's presence. He takes up the current definition of creation and explains that all things come from nothing—that is to say, from God, who, since He is above all understanding, may be said to be not-being. This Supreme Being is in all things, because He is the essence and substance of all things. And, adds our philosopher, whoever carefully examines the words of St. Dionysius will see that this is so (Col., 681). The whole truth is summed up in the words "*Deus omnia in omnibus*," a formula which is not clear to the average intellect, because of the heritage of mental darkness which has come down from Adam; but its truth will appear in its native evidence when the clouds of sin are dispersed and the soul, with Paul, is lifted up in contemplation (Col., 685). There is a certain fascination in climbing with Erigena these giddy heights; there is a vagueness which Friedrich Schlegel and others have mistaken for sublimity; but we look in vain for precision of thought or for demonstration other than the argument from authority. A few quotations from the Pseudo-Dionysius and we are turned adrift on the wild waste of pantheism.

Altogether different is St. Thomas' handling of the same

problem. In the "*Summa Theologica*" (I., 8) he inquires, "Does God exist in created things?" The reason from authority is prefixed as usual, but at the very outset of the body of the first article we are asked to make a most important distinction: God is in all things, not as their essence nor as part of their essence, but as an agent is in his work. Then follows a demonstration based on propositions previously established: God is being in its fullness; therefore, wherever being is it is dependent on Him, therefore He is in all things as cause. In the "*Summa Contra Gentiles*" the problem is further elucidated by the distinction between formal and efficient cause. In book I, chapter XXVI, the words of Pseudo-Dionysius, "*Esse omnium est superesse Divinitatis*," are explained to mean that in all things is an image or likeness of the being of God; it cannot be that the being of God is the formal cause of all things.

It has been urged that St. Thomas leaves the problem far from a satisfactory solution. But this, at least, must be conceded by all—he honestly endeavors to apply human reason to the problem of God's existence in things. He is not content with merely appealing to authority and holding out the promise of clearer vision through mystic enlightenment. St. Thomas is the thirteenth century representative of the dialecticians, whose cause was championed by Abelard in the eleventh. He is the continuator of the movement on which St. Bernard and the Victorines looked askance. He is the advocate of the rights of reason; he believes in applying the sharp edge of distinction before undertaking to answer a general question. If, then, as modern pantheists maintain, the solutions of the Schoolmen are unsatisfactory, their method, at least, is deserving of praise. The first metaphysicians of Greece besought their disciples to disregard sense and to follow the guidance of reason. This, we say, is but to bid men use their prerogative and rise above the brute creation to which sense allies them. And yet many philosophers still need the admonition, "use your reasoning powers." It is no longer a contest between reason and opinion as it was in the days of Parmenides. Reason is now the admitted guide in philosophy, but the reason to which appeal is commonly made is simply the power of per-

ceiving truths immediately evident. Now, intuitive perception of truth is not the distinguishing birthright of man ; it is a power belonging to higher natures, and man possesses it only in a very restricted sense. To reason from truth to truth, to pass from the known to the unknown, to judge by means of middle terms, in a word, to reason, is the "specific difference" of man. Discursive thought is man's proper instrument of knowledge.

The soul
Reason receives, and reason is her being,
Discursive or intuitive. Discourse
Is ofttest yours ; the latter most is ours,
Differing but in degree, of kind the same.

The student of Spencer's "First Principles" cannot fail to remark that the author, while aiming at defining the knowable, is guilty of an unwarrantable *ignoratio elenchi* by practically ignoring the ratiocinative faculty. His constant appeal is to our power of intuition, to what may be called the faculty of intellectually visualising truth. He does not invite us to reason and conclude, he challenges us to perceive, and if we confess our inability to represent the whole truth in consciousness we are told that we can know nothing about it. Thus is knowledge limited by ruling out man's greatest faculty of knowledge, and reason's flight is stayed by the maiming of the right wing.

Where mysticism and rationalism fail, where agnosticism confesses its impotence, the method of scholastic dialectics accomplished permanent results. Not only in the problem of God's presence in the universe, but throughout the whole range of speculative thought, reason and revelation were regarded as distinct without being opposed. The syllogism is applied to every problem, distinction is freely employed, and the result is a return to the primitive conviction that these two, faith and knowledge, "make one music, as before, but vaster." It is because St. Thomas accomplished this work in a pre-eminent degree, because he sets before us definitely the principles which justify this method and applies them to the vast fields of knowledge and faith, that he is chosen as representing the Schoolmen of the Golden Age. And, in proportion as St. Thomas' position is judged superior to that assumed by Eri-

gena, will we be justified in regarding thirteenth century scholasticism as a true evolution of the scholasticism of the ninth.

The philosophical significance of this central idea of the scholastic movement is not recognized by all historians, and yet, if we look at it carefully we shall see that the relation of faith to scientific knowledge is of interest, not merely to the Christian apologist, but also to the student of synthetic philosophy. To believe is to know, and knowledge in all its departments must be consistent with itself. The greatest achievements of philosophy have consisted in establishing a continuity between the different departments of knowledge. Philosophy begins by analysis, but aims at final synthesis. The crowning triumph of Greek thought was the doctrine that mind and matter, though distinct, are not opposed; that they are united in the one substantial compound, man, while the "topsy-turveydom of Cartesianism" arises from ignoring the legacy of Greek speculation and postulating an antagonism between mind and matter. Scholasticism never aimed at improving on the central doctrines of Aristotelianism, but it was content to add to Aristotelianism from a source all its own. It took up faith and scientific knowledge and showed that they are distinct yet harmonious parts of a greater organic whole which we may call knowledge. This is the synthetic view which gives philosophical significance to the *Summæ Theologiæ* of the thirteenth century. Had the Schoolmen been less successful; had their project failed completely and irretrievably in its application to detail, the very fact of conceiving such a project and of outlining the method by which it should be realized, would entitle them to an honored place among the greatest names in the history of human thought.

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ANGLO-SAXON IN AN ENGLISH CURRICULUM.

Modern scholarship, acting upon the sound principle that the past explains the present, becomes more and more attentive to the study of origins. Races, creeds, arts, institutions, laws, languages, customs, however ancient and obscure, are traced back into the recesses of history, and their embryonic records shed a clear light on all after-growth and development. The flora and fauna of the intellectual and moral world are thus examined in root and in germ, and the result invariably enlarges the domain of science.

Obviously the modern English scholar who would possess more than a superficial knowledge of his subject, will go back to the origins of the English language and become familiar with its earliest growth and development. "A sufficient reason," writes Archbishop Trench, "why we should occupy ourselves with the past of our language is that the present is only intelligible in the light of the past, often of a very remote past, indeed. There are in the English language anomalies out of number, which the pure logic of grammar is quite incapable of explaining; which nothing but an acquaintance with its historic evolutions, and with the disturbing forces which have made themselves felt therein, will ever enable us to understand, not to say that unless we possess some such knowledge of the past we cannot ourselves advance a single step in the unfolding of the latent capabilities of the language without the danger of doing some outrage to its genius, of committing some barbarous violation of its very primary laws."¹ These primary laws are a part and parcel of the primitive language; they are found in the Anglo-Saxon, out of which the English language evolved. And if we would discover where modern English secured its grammatical framework, as well as the most useful part of its vocabulary, we must go back at least five hundred years beyond the Norman Conquest. As Professor Craik observes: "The earliest historically known past with regard to the English language is

¹Trench. *English, Past and Present*, p. 7.

that it was the language generally if not universally spoken by barbaric invaders, who, upon the breaking up of the Empire of the West in the fifth century, came over in successive throngs from the opposite continent, and after a protracted struggle acquired possession of Britain. They are stated to have consisted chiefly of Angles and Saxons. The "Angles," of which term our modern 'English' is only another form, appears to have been always recognized among themselves as the proper national appellation. They both concurred in calling their common country 'Angle-land,' or England, and their common language 'English.' The English language is recorded to have been known by that name and to have been the national speech of the same race, at least since the middle of the fifth century. Call the old English either Angles or Saxons, it makes no difference; it is clear that the names of 'England' and 'English' the country and the language have each retained ever since."¹ Accordingly, the place that Anglo-Saxon should occupy in a curriculum of English study is precisely the place that embryology occupies in the curriculum of the biologist. It is the root and germ of the English flower.

At once the question arises whether this germ-relation that Anglo-Saxon bears to our speech reaches beyond grammatical framework and vocabulary and affects English literature as such. In other words, admitting its philological value, should we attach any importance to Anglo-Saxon literature as a literature? Does it aid the English student in subsequent work upon his special literary subject? Before dealing with its value from a philological standpoint, it may be well to estimate briefly its literary importance. The mass of writing that has been preserved in Anglo-Saxon is considerable, but only a small portion of it can be regarded as coming under the head of literature. Although interesting and valuable, much of what has been printed from old Saxon manuscripts has no claim to the title of literature. In this catalogue may be ranked the six volumes of the *Codex Diplomaticus*, dry and barren as a scholastic treatise; the Epic of *Beowulf*, a considerable poem quantitatively, but with very little poetic value; *Caedmon's Paraphrase*, a slight improvement on *Beowulf*, yet

¹Cralk. *History of the English Language*, vol. I, p. 31.

without a true artist's touch or insight; and so on through "Judith," "The Chronicle," the Homilies of Ælfric and the mass of translation extending from Bede to Alfred. The advent of Christianity brought new ideas and a strong literary stimulus, but the barren Saxon mind was never creative, and in appropriating the wealth of Latin and Hebrew literature it made the transfer with anything but artistic grace. So that Anglo-Saxon writings,—an agglomerate mass of some forty volumes,—cannot be regarded as literature in any strict sense of that term. "The soul of literature is artistic expression and beauty of form, and of both, the written remains of the Anglo-Saxons are wholly or all but wholly destitute."¹ On that account, therefore, Anglo-Saxon can have no place in a curriculum of literary studies. Its value and importance lie altogether in another direction.

It will be readily granted that English scholarship has to do, not only with English literature, but with the English language as well. And the study of Anglo-Saxon promises the most abundant harvest of information with respect to the etymology and fundamental laws of our present speech, and an inexhaustible mine of material for the further enrichment of our native tongue. Here is the germ relation which Anglo-Saxon bears, a relation classified in an admirable manner by Professor Marsh:² "I have ample reason for believing that a grammatical knowledge of other tongues is not essential to the comprehension and use of our own. Greek and Latin could be advantageously replaced by the Anglo-Saxon or primitive English. An overwhelming proportion of the words which make up our daily speech is drawn from Anglo-Saxon roots, and our syntax is as distinctly and as generally to be traced to the same source. We are not, then, to regard the ancient Anglican speech as in any sense a foreign tongue, but rather as an older form of our own, wherein we may find direct and clear explanation of the grammatical peculiarities of modern English. With reference to etymology, the importance of the Anglo-Saxon is too obvious to require argument. It is fair to admit, however, that etymology of many of our words must

¹Craik, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 33.

²Marsh. *Lectures on English*, p. 105. In this connection see Klipstein, *Saxo Grammaticus*; Grimm, *Deutsche Grammatik*.

be sought elsewhere, for we have borrowed our scientific, metaphysical and aesthetical phraseology from foreign sources, while the vocabulary of our material life is almost wholly of native growth. Yet the most instructive and impressive etymologies are those which are pursued within the limits of our own tongue. The native word at every change of form and meaning exhibits new domestic relations and suggests a hundred sources of collateral inquiry and illustration, while the foreign root connects itself with our philology only by remote and often doubtful analogies. It comes usually with a fixed form and settled meaning, and thus, as regards further development, will no longer have a history."¹ Accordingly, from the standpoint of etymology alone, Anglo-Saxon must be considered invaluable to the English scholar.

Not less useful is it in accounting for the grammatical structure of the English language. It is true that Anglo-Saxon grammar was modified by contact with the Latin and Romance tongues; inflections were brushed away; new idioms were introduced; freedom of verbal collocation was restricted; employment of the present participle in both absolute and dependent phrases, in accordance with Latin usage, became general. Nevertheless, as Max Müller² observes, "whatever there is left of grammar in English bears unmistakable traces of Teutonic workmanship. What may now be called grammar in English is little more than the termination of the genitive singular and nominative plural of nouns, the degrees of comparison and the persons and tenses of the verb. Yet the single 's' used as the exponent of the third person singular of the indicative present is ample evidence that, in a scientific classification of languages, English, though it did not retain a single word of Saxon origin, would have to be classed as Saxon, and as a branch of the great Teutonic stem of the Aryan family of speech." Keeping in mind that the grammatical framework of modern English is still purely Anglo-Saxon,³ we may briefly summarize those grammatical laws which have come down unchanged: all the relations that subsist between the words and groups of words of which an English sentence

¹Marsh. Hist. Eng., Vol. I, p. 106.

²Max Müller, *Science and Language*, p. 86. Vide Klipstein, *op. cit.*

³Mason, *English Grammar*, p. 5.

is built up, namely, the predicative relation, the attributive relation and the adverbial relation, have been in existence since the earliest Saxon times.¹ Modern English owes to Anglo-Saxon the remnants of inflective terminations in the noun, the verb, and the pronoun; likewise its articles, its numerals, its chief store of particles in words of relation and in conjunctions; also the comparative and superlative forms of the adjective and its adverbial formations.² The Anglo-Saxon has bequeathed the facility of compounding words and a considerable number of forms of derivation; and lastly it has chiefly determined the formation of English periods.³ From a grammatical as well as an etymological standpoint, the study of Anglo-Saxon is all-important to the English student, for as we canvass its bequest of grammatical law and of vocabulary, the vital relation it sustains to our modern English speech becomes more and more evident.

Here it is important to notice the Saxon element in our English vocabulary. The New Oxford Dictionary, now in course of publication, promises 250,000 words, and of this number Dr. Weisse estimates 22,220 as of Saxon origin.⁴ According to his computation, hardly one-tenth of our vocabulary is Saxon. If we examine, however, the classic English words or the vocabulary in actual use at the present time among the English people, the Anglo-Saxon or native element will be found to largely predominate in either case. The following table, carefully prepared by Professor Marsh, gives the percentage of Anglo-Saxon words employed by classical English writers:⁵

The English Bible	uses 60 per cent. of Anglo-Saxon,	40 of other words.
Shakespeare	" 60 " " " "	" 40 " "
Milton (Paradise Lost)	uses 33 per cent. of Anglo-Saxon,	67 of other words.
Chaucer	" 88 " " " "	" 12 " "
Spenser	" 86 " " " "	" 14 " "
Milton (L'Allegro)	" 90 " " " "	" 10 " "
Addison	" 82 " " " "	" 14 " "
Hume	" 73 " " " "	" 27 " "
Gibbon	" 70 " " " "	" 30 " "

¹ Kellner, *English Syntax*, p. 27.

² Maetzner, *Englische Grammatik*, Vol. I, p. 9.

³ Koch, *Grammatik der Englischen Sprache*; Vorrede.

⁴ On the proportion of Saxon words see Müller, *Science and Lang.*, Vol I, p. 84; Schmitz, *Englische Philologische Studien*, Vol. I, p. 231; Kluge, *Char. Eng. Sprache*, Vorrede.

⁵ Marsh, *Lectures on English*, p. 123, 124.

Webster (Daniel)	uses 75 per cent. of Anglo-Saxon, 25 of other words.					
Macaulay	75	"	"	"	25	"
Browning	84	"	"	"	16	"
Ruskin	73	"	"	"	27	"
Tennyson	87	"	"	"	13	"
Longfellow	87	"	"	"	13	"
Bancroft	78	"	"	"	22	"
Prescott	77	"	"	"	23	"
Irving	77	"	"	"	23	"
Channing	75	"	"	"	25	"
Pope	80	"	"	"	20	"
Swift	72	"	"	"	28	"

This tabulated percentage establishes the fact that the best English writers habitually employ, in both poetry and prose, a larger proportion of Anglo Saxon words than of foreign words. It also establishes that the best writers of our century use more Anglo-Saxon words than the writers of any preceding century, notwithstanding the extraordinary increase of our vocabulary from foreign sources. The natural sciences, philosophy, theology, will doubtless continue to increase this foreign annex; but the examination of our literature indicates unmistakably that the literary element in our language is the Saxon element. English authors of the highest rank employ Saxon words in preference to foreign ones, as the increasing percentage of Saxon in modern words of pure literature amply testifies.

During the past quarter of a century the study of Anglo-Saxon in the principal universities of Germany, England, and the United States has brought about a revival of many obsolete Saxon words, and the effect of this increasing study is visible in the style of the best prose and, more especially, poetic compositions of the present day.¹ Our vocabulary is capable of great enrichment from the storehouse of the ancient Anglican speech, as fully one-fifth of the original Saxon is still obsolete.² A revival of taste for Anglo-Saxon will recover these precious native coins and put them once more in circulation. The pedantry of Saxon purists may sin after the fashion of the stilted classicism of Johnson or the Gallic imitations of Gibbon; yet on that account the sensible scholar will not seek to arrest the movement which makes for the recovery of buried Saxon treasure belonging to our native language.

¹Marsh. *History of English*, p. 90, sqq.

²Sharon Turner. *History of the Saxons*, Vol. IV, p. 520.

For the Catholic student Anglo-Saxon cannot be introduced too early into the curriculum of English, as its presence is needed to counteract the influence of prolonged Latin study. So readily do Latin words and idioms come to the composer of Catholic colleges and seminaries that the composition is too frequently Johnsonian English. Familiarity with the 22,000 Saxon words in our vocabulary would remove this defect. Moreover, for the preacher in the pulpit, one word is not as good as another. The colloquial language of the English-speaking world contains 90 per cent. of Anglo-Saxon. The common people to whom the preacher talks may be said to employ and understand only the Saxon element of our speech. So that the Latinized sermon, however rich in Thomistic quotation, however strong in Aristotelian logic, becomes meaningless to the common mind because of its Latin words and idioms. The reformers who translated the English Bible knew the value of employing a vocabulary "understood by the people."¹ They used the Saxon word whenever it could be pressed into service; hence the beauty and strength and charm of the King James' Version. Catholic preachers who speak about the "*Invention* of the Cross" when they mean "the *finding* of the Cross" and "the *mansions* of the Israelites in the desert" when they mean "the *stoppages* of the Israelites," can ill afford to make a foreign-born vocabulary the medium of their thought. To the common mind the pulpit thundering forth the polysyllabic epithets of Latin rhetoric is "full of sound and fury signifying nothing." The sermon that tells upon the sinning, unlettered multitude is the sermon of a Father Burke or a Cardinal Newman, in which more than 80 per cent. of the words employed are of Saxon origin.

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¹Tillotson, Dissertations, Vol. I.

ANALECTA.

With the present number of THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY BULLETIN the undersigned begins the publication of a series of rare, unedited, historical documents, replete with interest and curious details. They refer to one of the most eventful periods in the world's history, namely, the deliverance of European civilization from the invasion of the Moslems in 1683 by the famous John III, Sobieski, King of Poland,¹ and their utility as elements of history is obvious.

If noble actions are consigned to oblivion for want of records, and the interest religious and cultured men should take in diffusing the light of knowledge and disseminating truth, it becomes the office of the expounder of the Gospel, the prerogative of the impartial historian, the imperative duty of the honest thinker and the inspiration of the Christian writer, in behalf of a higher spiritual and secular education and for the love of God and mankind, to consecrate themselves to the work of that school of moral and intellectual progress which leads the mind to pasture in fields rich in resources and abounding in possibilities. Thus, the tendency will be to uphold Christianity, which carries civilization along with it, and enables man to fill the wide hiatus that would, under other conditions, remain unoccupied between the spiritual and temporal worlds.

The history of Poland² presents a most remarkable record of national character, summed up in the splendid deeds of the heroes of the great Slavic race, constituting a common patrimony of the nation's proud inheritance.

The manful struggles of the Poles for liberty have been the subjects of discussion and universal admiration even amongst

¹1673-1696; born in 1629.

²The history of the reunion in a single nationalized body, composed of Slavic and Lettic elements, is, properly speaking, the history of Poland. To the former belong the Russians, mostly Slavs, as also the Poles, Bulgarians, and Servians; the latter, a subdivision of the Slavic group, are connected with the Indo-European family and inhabit the vast region of Livonia, the Baltic province of Russia in Europe, and Eastern Prussia. The language of the Letts, reduced to writing in the sixteenth century, a type of the Lithuanian tongue, is the least altered of the Aryan group. Its approach to the Sanscrit and that of the many Slavic dialects extant all over European Russia, Austria, and Prussian Poland, is accounted for by modern philologists through the supposition of a common origin of these nations.

those who most abhor revolutionary upheavals. In the great conflicts of opinions among men they are all agreed that the violation of any natural right affecting either the individuality of a person or the nationality of a people, under the false premises of expediency, is a point on which there can exist no possible discrepancy. Therefore, the wrongs of Poland always excite general interest and sympathy among the peoples of the world, and evoke unqualified indignation against the powers who so cruelly dismembered a nation that did so much for liberty, humanity, and civilization. What a fatal mistake was made when Europe consented to the partition of Poland, and opposed subsequent attempts at its return to nationhood! Readers of the *BULLETIN* will recall that remarkable conversation between Napoleon at St. Helena and his Irish surgeon, Barry O'Meara, in which the great soldier said: "In the course of a few years Russia will have Constantinople, the greatest part of Turkey, and all of Greece. This I hold to be as certain as if it had already taken place. Almost all the cajoling and flattering which Alexander practised towards me was to gain my consent to effect this object. I would not consent, foreseeing that the equilibrium of Europe would be destroyed. . . . A hundred years hence I shall be applauded, and Europe, especially England, will lament that I did not succeed. When they see the finest countries in Europe overcome, and a prey to those northern barbarians, they will say: 'Napoleon was right.'"

In the light of present events in the east, is not this Napoleonic idea the forerunner of a cataclysm near at hand?

For nine centuries the Poles contended with Germany on the west, and the Tartars and Muscovites on the east. The wars subsequently waged against Turks and Swedes were only in fact the last stages of the long and sad drama which resulted in the triumph of Germanism and Muscovite-Russian power and the denationalization of Poland in 1772, 1793, 1795, by the three most powerful nations¹ in Europe.

During the short reign of Prince Michael Wisniowiecki,² elected King of Poland³ (1669), the Turks invaded the country in 1672. Alarmed at the success of the Sultan's army he con-

¹ Austria, Germany, Russia.

² Descended from the House of the Jagellons; its dynasty began in 1386 and ended in 1572.

³ Poland became an elective monarchy in 1576, ending in 1628.

cluded the ignominious treaty of Budczacz,¹ which was rejected by the Polish senate.

The King resigned the command of the army and placed its destinies in the hands of Sobieski, who met the Turks at Chocim (November, 1673) and routed them with great slaughter.

"My comrades," exclaimed the noble warrior, pointing to the brilliant camps before him, "in half an hour we shall lodge under those gilded tents;" whereupon he boldly dashed upon the enemy and made good his famous words. This victory immortalized the name of Sobieski throughout Europe, and "The day at Chocim" resulted in his election as King of Poland May 19, 1674; he was crowned in 1676. A feature of the coronation ceremonies was a form obliging the newly elected King to proceed to the Stanislas-Kirche² and stand at the foot of the altar where Boleslas II³ murdered the saintly Bishop of Cracow⁴ for no other offense than the prelate's remonstrance with the King against his tyranny.

Sobieski, obedient to custom, but fired with indignation at so cruel a reminder of an infamous act, declared that "the crime was atrocious; that he was innocent of it; detested it, and asked pardon for it by imploring the protection of the holy martyr upon himself and his Kingdom." This great soldier was married to a French woman, one of the maids of honor to the wife of Casimir, widow of Zamoyski, Palatine of Sandomir, and daughter of the Marquis d'Arquien, who, according to Bernard Connor,⁵ "was very ingenious and beautiful."

Owing to her influence, Sobieski, who seemed at first unwilling to yield to Leopold's⁶ entreaties for aid against the Turkish and Tartar invasion of 1683, led by Kara Mustapha⁷ and Ibrahim Pacha,⁸ entered into an alliance⁹ with Austria.

The Moslem hordes swept over Austria and besieged its

¹ A town of Galicia (Austrian-Poland).

² A church in the city of Cracow still called by that name in honor of St. Stanislas.

³ Surnamed the Bold; born in 1042; son of Casimir I, whom he succeeded in 1058; excommunicated by Pope Gregory VII and deserted by his subjects, fled from the country and found refuge in a monastery at Carinthia, Hungary, where he died about 1070.

⁴ Stanislas Szczepanowski; canonized by Gregory VII; buried in the cathedral at Cracow, where his beautiful monument still stands.

⁵ Physician and philosopher; born in Kerry, Ireland, 1666; died in 1698. Studied medicine in France, thence went to Poland, and notwithstanding his youth was selected as first physician to the King (Sobieski).

⁶ Leopold I, Emperor of Germany and Hungary; born, 1640; died, 1705.

⁷ Grand Vizier of Mahomet IV (1680); died, 1683; Mahomet IV, son of Ibrahim, ascended the throne in 1649; deposed, 1686; died, 1692.

⁸ Considered by the Turks as one of the ablest generals of his day.

⁹ The unpublished articles of this remarkable alliance will appear in a subsequent number of the BULLETIN.

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Among the trophies which fell into the hands of the victorious Poles was the sacred standard of Mahomet, claimed by many writers not to be the real one taken. Its presentation, however, to the Pope, as will be seen by the remarkable document following this article, in which reference is made to the "Grand Standard," the real standard that was "inclosed in an ark of gold, with the Koran and the prophet's robe," and displayed in battle, the one that was sent to and suspended in the church of Loretto, where, affirms Connor, "I have seen it," fully authenticates its genuineness.

JOSEPH SMOLINSKI.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

Occasional Papers selected from the Guardian, the Times, and the Saturday Review (1846-1890), by the late R. W. Church, M. A., D. C. L. Macmillan. 2 vols., 8°, pp. 492, 416.

Some fifty-four essays and reviews make up these two volumes, the *reliquiae* of Dean Church, one of the most scholarly gentlemen of the Anglican body, and a writer of the most exquisite and idiomatic English. They cover a wide range of mental activity,—book reviews of Carlyle, Merivale, Stanley, Ranke, Thierry, Milman, Lecky, Brewer, Mozley, Renan, and Mrs. Ward; appreciations of Frederick Maurice, Bunsen, Mark Pattison, Bishop Wilberforce; studies on Epictetus, Guicciardini, Bossuet, St. Ignatius, Fénelon, Lamennais, Doellinger,—finally several papers on Cardinal Newman, his Apologia, his answer to Pusey's Eirenicon, his Parochial Sermons, his Course, and his Naturalness. The well-known irenic spirit of Church breathes through these essays, many of which are finished models of their kind,—philosophic, picturesque, epigrammatic. The thoughtful and cultured will read them with interest, and derive pleasure and instruction from them. In a special manner the criticism of "Ecce Homo," "Robert Elsmere," and Renan are consoling and satisfying,—models indeed of firm and correct, but gentlemanly polemic. From many passages that offer themselves for quotation we select this characterization of Renan's historical method in his "Vie de Jésus":

"M. Renan repeatedly declares that his great aim is to save religion by relieving it of the supernatural. He does not argue; but instead of the old familiar view of the Great History he presents an opposite theory of his own, framed to suit that combination of the revolutionary and the sentimental, which just now happens to be in favor in the unbelieving schools. And this is the result: a representation which boldly invests its ideal with the highest perfections of moral goodness, strength, and beauty, and yet does not shrink from associating with it also—and that, too, as the necessary and inevitable condition of success—a deliberate and systematic willingness

to delude and insensibility to untruth. This is the religion and this is the reason which appeals to Christ in order to condemn Christianity." (II. p. 203.)

Ancient English Holy Week Ceremonial, by Henry John Feasey. London, Thos. 1897. 8° pp. 247.

Out of the ancient inventories of churches and guilds, as well as out of church-warden's accounts, and certain old English texts of the pre-Reformation times, Mr. Feasey has reconstructed a manual of the ceremonies of Holy Week as they might have been seen in Ely or Canterbury before the days of Elizabeth. As a picture of the piety, the taste, and the deep religious feeling of English Catholics, it is a deeply interesting book. It is, moreover, a real contribution to the study of ancient ecclesiastical vestments and furniture, and should be in the collection of all who love such recondite but attractive subjects.

Die Chorgesänge im Buche der Psalmen, ihre Existenz und ihre Form. Von J. K. Zenner, S. J. Erster Theil : Prolegomena, Uebersetzungen, und Erläuterungen. Zweiter Theil ; Text.—B. Herder, St. Louis, 1896. \$3 35.

This work by Father Zenner is the latest attempt to determine the form of composition of the poetical parts of the Old Testament. Biblical scholars have labored frequently and earnestly to solve this question, but never with any marked success. Parallelism is the chief characteristic of the poetical art of the ancient Hebrews. Hitherto its application has been restricted to the verses of a Psalm ; but in a large number of the Psalms it is impossible to maintain any sequence of thought by merely contrasting verse with verse. In his endeavor to overcome this difficulty Father Zenner hit upon the theory of Strophe and Antistrophe. This was suggested to him by a passage in II Paral. VI, 41 :

" Now therefore arise, O Lord God, into Thy resting place,
Thou, and the ark of Thy strength :
Let Thy priests, O Lord God, be clothed with salvation,
And let Thy saints rejoice in good things.
O Lord God, turn not away the face of Thine anointed :
Remember the mercies of David Thy servant."

This is evidently a citation from Psalm 131 (Vulgate). In all likelihood this Psalm was composed by Solomon for the

dedication of the Temple. It gives expression, on the one hand, to the sentiments of David concerning the Ark of God and the Temple, and on the other hand it records the promises of God in regard to His people. The quotation as given here does not follow the order of the verses as we find them in the Book of Psalms. With this as a starting point, Father Zenner set about reconstructing the Psalm and made the following arrangement :

STROPHE.

I.

2. David swore unto the Lord,
And vowed unto the Mighty One of Jacob :
3. Surely I will not come into the Tabernacle of my house,
Nor go up into the couch of my bed ;
4. I will not give sleep to mine eyes,
Or slumber to mine eyelids ;
5. Until I find out a place for the Lord,
A tabernacle for the Mighty One of Jacob.

SELAH.

6. Ho, we heard of it Ephrathah :
We found it in the field of Jaar.
7. We will go into His Tabernacle ;
We will worship at His footstool.

III.

8. Arise, O Lord, in Thy resting place.
Thou and the Ark of Thy strength.
9. Let Thy priest be clothed with righteousness ;
And let Thy saints shout for joy.
10. For Thy servant David's sake
Turn not away the face of Thine anointed.
1. Remember, O Lord, Thy kindness towards David,
And all his gentleness.

ANTISTROPHE.

II.

11. The Lord hath sworn unto David
in truth,
He will not turn from it ;
Of the fruit of thy body will I set upon thy throne.
12. If thy children will keep My Covenant
And my testimony ; that I shall teach them,
Their children also shall sit upon Thy throne for evermore

SELAH.

13. For the Lord hath chosen Sion ;
He hath desired it for His habitation.
14. This is my resting place forever ;
Here will I dwell : for I have desired it.

IV.

15. I will surely bless Sion ;
I will satisfy her poor with bread.
16. Her priests also I will clothe with salvation :
And her saints shall shout aloud for joy.
17. There will I make a horn to spring forth unto David :
I have prepared a lamp for mine anointed,
18. His enemies I will clothe with shame ;
But upon himself shall his crown flourish.

According to Father Zenner's theory there were two choruses for the chanting of the Psalms. The first chorus chanted

the strophe, and the second chorus answered with a corresponding antistrophe. About the middle of the Psalm occurred the "Selah," at which the melody was altered in order to vary the monotony of the chant.

To account for the confusion which, according to his theory, exists in the arrangement of the Psalms as we now find them, the author claims that in the course of time the traditional manner of chanting the Psalms was forgotten, and that when the scribe was making a copy of them he wrote the whole of the first column and then followed with the second column—that is, he copied the Psalms vertically instead of horizontally.

This is a brief outline of Father Zenner's theory. It surely is ingenious and attractive. In all the Psalms which he has arranged after this system there is clearness in the sequence of the ideas, and the poetic beauty of the composition is much enhanced. The work is indeed a notable contribution to that department of biblical literature which treats of the puzzling question of Hebrew poetry. It is difficult, however, to imagine that such disorder could arise in compositions that were so familiar to all classes of the Hebrew people. The explanation offered by the author is, however, capable of being illustrated by many instances drawn from the Psalms.

The work is in two parts: the first of 92 pages; the second of 72 pages large quarto. The first part contains the "Prolegomena," in which are explained the author's theory of the Psalms and the method of chanting them. It also contains the translation of thirty-six Psalms, arranged according to his system, with full explanations. In the second part we have a number of Psalms in unpointed Hebrew characters, arranged in strophes, with valuable critical notes. Joined to these are a few other poetical pieces from different parts of the Old Testament.

The typographical execution of this work deserves all praise, especially the fine, bold, clear Hebrew characters, which are a delight to the eye.

Life of St. John of the Cross, of the Order of Our Lady of Mount Carmel (1542-1591), compiled, translated, and edited by David Lewis, M. A. London, Thomas Banks, 1897. 8° pp. 307.

In this volume we have a gist of the best lives of St. John of the Cross that have been printed, from that of Fra Joseph of Jesus and Mary down to the life of Garnica (Jaën, 1893). The deep human interest in the life of the great mystic loses nothing in the hands of Mr. Lewis. He has understood at once how to bring out the utter unselfishness of the Saint, his high and absolute idealism, and the keen suffering he was made to undergo in order to accomplish the designs of that other saintly reformer, Saint Theresa. This work is a fit companion to the "Works of St. John of the Cross," edited by the same author. Of them Bossuet said (*États d'Oraison*, I. 12) that "they possess the same authority in mystical theology that the writings of St. Thomas and the Fathers possess in dogmatic theology."

St. Augustin de Canterbury et ses Compagnons, par E. R. P. Brou, S. J. Paris, 1897. Victor Lecoffre. 8o, pp. 210.

Le Bienheureux Bernardine de Feltre, par E. Flornoy. Ibid. 8o, pp. 192.

La Psychologie des Saints, par Henri Joly. Ibid. pp. 201.

1. These elegant little volumes are the continuation of the series "Les Saints," issued by the house of Lecoffre, and the first volume of which we have already noticed. Father Brou has completed an accurate and interesting life of St. Augustin from the original sources and the best modern literature. Celts and Saxons, St. Gregory and his Letters, Canterbury, The British Church, St. Paulinus of York—such are the headings under which he groups the facts of this great saint's life. The long extracts from Bede are edifying reading, and the whole life is doubly so, because of the fact that we celebrate this year the thirteenth centenary of the Conversion of England by St. Augustin and his monks.

2. In the story of the Blessed Bernardine of Feltre we have a picture of Italy in the latter half of the fifteenth century, distracted, ravaged, threatened from all quarters, filled with dissension, the prey of France and Spain, quaking before the advancing Turk, crushed by the Jewish usurer. Pitiful reading it makes, and it recalls the line of Filicaja, *Oh, Italia!*

fossi tu men bella od almen più forte. But it serves also as a fitting background for the life of a holy man of God, a minor observant who went down among the *minuto popolo*, made himself one of them, roused Christian ideals in their souls, broke up the usurer's nests and created the Monti di Pietà, by which the poor might obtain at a low rate of interest such modest sums as they needed. Bernardine was no lettered Politian or Mirandola, but a Franciscan friar, in whose soul burned a strong and wholesome love of the plain people of Italy, people who lay perishing for spiritual nourishment while men squandered for cameos and manuscripts the hard-earned wealth of these same poor. The book is "modern" and suggestive, especially in view of the Oriental situation at the present writing.

3. M. Joly contributes to the series a volume of the most practical value on the psychology of sanctity. It will serve to reassure all those who have been troubled by some modern theories concerning the relationship of Catholic mysticism to certain kinds and degrees of nervous exaltation. The notion of sanctity in its historical development, the permanence in the saint of a strong original nature, the workings of the mental faculties, especially under the operation of divine grace, the nature of contemplation, of the thirst for voluntary suffering and heroic virtue, form the main outlines of a very charming book. It deserves to be translated and given the widest circulation. The author is already well known by several works of a psychological character on instinct, the psychology of genius, and of crime, especially in France.

A Smaller History of Greece from the earliest times to the Roman Conquest, by William Smith, LL. D. Revised, enlarged and in part rewritten by Carleton L. Brownson, instructor in Greek, Yale University. New York: Harpers, 1897. 8°, pp. 423.

In this new and improved edition of Dr. Smith's familiar History of Greece the results of modern investigation have been incorporated with skill and moderation. The inaccuracies of the old edition and some noteworthy omissions have been remedied. Some chapters have been largely rewritten, chiefly out of Busolt and Holm, but not without consultation

of the original authors when such was deemed necessary. The constitutions of the Greek states and the literature of Hellas come in for suitable treatment. The maps and plans have been especially engraved for this edition, from Kiepert, Baumeister, Bursian and other reliable sources. The illustrations are nearly all new, and a pronouncing vocabulary and index accompany the volume. It can be recommended to all colleges and academies desirous of a new text-book of Greek history.

Literary Landmarks of Rome, by Laurence Hutton. Illustrated. New York: Harpers, 1897. 8°, pp. 75.

Mr. Hutton gossips pleasantly about a number of Roman sites made famous to English-speaking readers by the pens of illustrious writers, the graves of Keats, Shelly and Constance Fenimore Woolson, the house of Hans Andersen, Hilda's Tower, the Spanish Steps, Tasso's Garden, the Albergo dell' Orso and some other localities. There are certain appreciations that we would not care to subscribe to, but, withal, the book is written in a kindly and reverential spirit, and is an addition to the guide-book literature of the Eternal City.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

Die Alexandrinische Uebersetzung des Buches Daniel und ihr Verhaeltniss zum Massorethischen Text, von Prof. Dr. August Bludau (*Biblische Studien*, II, 2, 3). B. Herder, St. Louis, 1897. 8°, pp. 218.

The Dream of Bonaparte, by William Poland, S. J. B. Herder, St. Louis, 1897.

A Glimpse of Organic Life, by William Seton, LL. D. New York, P. O'Shea, 1897.

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A Little Book of Wisdom, being Great Thoughts of many Wise Men and Women, collected by Lelia Hardin Bugg. B. Herder, St. Louis, 1897.





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